GHANA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AMBITIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ACCRA 001612

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR MARC HUMPHREY
US MISSION UN VIENNA FOR MARK SCHELAND
US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE FOR SARAH LOPP
US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ED
MCGINNIS AND CRAIG WELLING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EINT TRGY TBIO EINV BEXP BTIO GH
SUBJECT: GHANA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AMBITIONS

REF: A. SECSTATE 127423

B. ACCRA 1523

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: This cable reports on Ghana,s
current civilian uses of atomic technology and their
plans to become a nuclear power producer (response to
REF A). Ghanaian atomic science research is
established institutionally, but at a low level of
technical sophistication. Ghana,s atomic science
officials highlight Ghana,s close cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and their
membership status in GNEP. In their nascent bid to
become a nuclear power producer, the Ghana Atomic
Energy Commission indicated a clear preference for
U.S. nuclear technology. Post,s assessment is that
Ghana,s technological needs and favorable disposition
toward the United States create opportunities for USG
atomic energy and safety programming, broader U.S.-
Ghana science and technology cooperation, and
commercial prospects for U.S. producers of civilian
nuclear technology. However, the likelihood of Ghana
accomplishing its stated goal to become a nuclear
power producer by 2018 is unlikely, due to uncertain
future political support and a questionable underlying
economic rationale. END SUMMARY.


Atomic and Nuclear Science Programs
--------------


2. (U) Ghana,s flagship facility is the Ghana Atomic
Energy Commission,s (GAEC) small scale 30KW Chinese-
origin miniature neutron source rQctor (MNSR),a copy
of the Canadian SLOWPOKE reactor design. Dubbed the
Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1),it uses highly
enriched 90.2 percent Uranium 235. (NOTE: China has
supplied these reactors, said to be least expensive
research reactor, to a number of countries: Iran,
Syria, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ghana. END NOTE.)
Commissioned in 1996, the reactor,s fuel source is
nearing the end of its expected 15-year life cycle.
In a meeting with econoffs, Dr. Edward Akaho, Director
General of GAEC, indicated that within the next two
years they seek to replace the GHARR-1 current fuel
with a low-enriched source, under the DOE/Argonne
National Laboratory,s Reduced Enrichment for Research
and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. GHARR-1 is used
for teaching purposes and also for Neutron Activation
Analysis (NAA) for product and industrial testing.


3. (U) Ghana also has a Gamma Irradiator with a 12-
year old Cobalt-64 source that has reportedly weakened
from 50 to 7 kilojoules of output. Accordingly, the
GAEC has worked through the IAEA to procure a new
cobalt source from Hungary. The irradiator is used
primarily for food preservation. Other uses include
medical sterilization, tissue culture research, and
also an experimental project for the mass
sterilization of mosquitoes. Ghana also has two
radiological sources currently being used in medical
facilities, and they are seeking a third nuclear
medicine device.

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4. (SBU) To augment its teaching and testing
capabilities, Ghana seeks to acquire a Ion-Beam
Analysis (IBA) accelerator. Working with the IAEA,
GAEC identified a 2MV system initially priced at USD
1.5 million. However, the system price has now risen
to approximately USD 2.3 million. The Government of
Ghana (GOG) has allocated USD 500,000 for the system,
and are in need of donor contributions from IAEA
members for the remainder. Soliciting USG
contributions, the GAEC stated that the civil works to
house the facility are 80 percent complete, and that
the IBA accelerator will be used not only for
research, but applied in fields as varied as
agriculture, life sciences, industrial testing, and
archeology.


Nuclear Power Program: Phase 2, Possibly
--------------


5. (SBU) The outgoing government in Ghana has made a
policy decision to pursue nuclear energy; it has set
the ambitious target of 2018 for commissioning its
first nuclear power plant. According to the IAEA,s
three phase schema for development of nuclear power
this public announcement suggests that Ghana has
crossed Milestone 1: "Ready to make a knowledgeable
commitment to a nuclear program." (NOTE: IAEA
Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 is frequently
cited in discussions and likely guides the GAEC
in its policy approach to developing nuclear power.)
Thus, Ghana,s energy officials may perceive themselves
to be crossing into Phase 2: "preparatory work for
the construction of a nuclear power plant after a
policy decision been taken."


6. (SBU) While proudly describing apparent progress
toward their ambition of delivering nuclear energy to
Ghana, the GAEC officials tacitly acknowledged that
the policy decision to pursue nuclear power was taken
at effectively the end of an outgoing administration.
The GAEC leadership anticipates that if the opposition
(National Democratic Congress) takes the Presidency in
the run-off election, the commitment to pursue nuclear
power could be revisited by the next government (NOTE:
Following the first round of elections, the opposition
is already positioned to control Ghana,s Parliament.
Thus it is near certain that the outgoing government,s
nuclear policy and plans will be critically reviewed
by the incoming parliament. END NOTE) The GAEC
characterized this scenario as likely to require
starting from scratch with extensive discussions and
"education" with the new leadership, i.e. a return
back to Phase 1: "Considerations before a decision to
launch a nuclear power programme is taken." (See para
19 below.)


7. (U) As part of its Phase 2 activities, the current
government has drafted a bill to create a Ghana
Nuclear Regulatory Authority distinct from the GAEC.
The specific inspection/enforcement powers of the

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proposed regulatory authority are still at the draft
stage. The draft bill addresses issues of domestic
nuclear liability, and would bring Ghana into
compliance with the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage.


8. (SBU) The GAEC does not as an institution exercise
final authority on the proposed nuclear energy policy.
However, its key leaders in their individual capacity
are likely being tapped for input and participation in
other bodies. Ghana,s Energy Commission is broadly
responsible for planning and assessing Ghana,s
potential energy opportunities within which nuclear
power is one element. A proposed ad hoc body is the
"Presidential Commission on Nuclear Energy" for
developing Ghana,s Nuclear Power Policy. This
Commission would have a subordinate "Committee for
Technology Assessment" that would be Qarged to
identify and assess the suitability of specific
technologies. (The GAEC indicated that the IAEA has
committed to provide support to this body.) As
Ghana,s lead nuclear experts, the GAEC,s scientists
would likely have key roles in these entities.


9. (SBU) When asked about financing scenarios, the
GAEC indicated that financial and taxation details
would be dependent on the ultimate nuclear technology
supplier and the associated financial terms offered.
They anticipate that ultimately development would be a
public-private venture, with private (or supplier
country) participation along with a Government of
Ghana position.


10. (SBU) Claiming that Ghana,s geologic profile is
similar to Brazil, the GAEC described the potential
for uranium mining in Ghana. While expressing
vehement disinterest in enrichment activities, they
suggested that production of yellow-cake would be a
possibility.


Domestic Capabilities: Nascent at Best
--------------


11. (SBU) Ghana,s economy is defined by agriculture
and extractive industries. By international
standards, Ghana,s manufacturing base is
underdeveloped. By regional standards, Ghana,s
relative stability and prosperity mask its fundamental
lack of economic diversification and low levels of
manufacturing (beyond some agricultural processing.)
Ghana has a nascent IT services sector, but no high-
tech components or heavy industry involved in nuclear
technology or services. COMMENT: While the GAEC
emphasizes its interest in local sourcing and local
hiring, it is unlikely that this position is anything
more than a desire to create a demand for its domestic
atomic-trained scientists and technicians and to
support the GAEC,s own workshops (or otherwise create
an incentive structure to expand its
workshop/production resources). END COMMENT.


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12. (SBU) Ghana,s nuclear-trained workforce is of an
unknown size, and likely limited to persons with a
scientific background, without significant applied
skills. Ghana lacks a significant engineering and
technical talent base that could be readily converted
into a large nuclear workforce. However, given their
modest initial goals, it is unlikely that an
especially large number of trainees beyond local
Ghanaians with extant raw potential would be required.
The development of civil nuclear power would most
likely require skilled foreign workers.


13. (U) Ghana,s current graduate-level nuclear science
teaching activities at the School of Nuclear and
Allied Sciences (SNAS, a collaboration between the
GAEC and the University of Ghana) includes the
following specializations: applied nuclear physics,
nuclear and environmental protection, nuclear
engineering, nuclear agriculture, nuclear and
radiochemistry, radiation protection, radiation
processing, medical physics, computational nuclear
sciences and engineering, and nuclear earth sciences.
There are approximately 30-40 students in each M.Phil
program class year, spread across these
specializations. At the PhD level, Ghana has a total
of 14 nuclear science students. The nuclear science
faculty has approximately 38 permanent senior members.


Opportunities for U.S. Industry
--------------


14. (SBU) Given its stated status as seeking nuclear
energy, the full range of nuclear sector opportunities
potentially exist for U.S. industry in Ghana,
including: feasibility studies, consulting services,
plant construction management, reactor sales, fuel
cycle service provision, plant operations, waste
management, and logistics.


15. (SBU) At this stage no private companies have
formally initiated discussions with Ghana. However,
GAEC,s Director General explicitly articulated to
econoffs his strong interest in Westinghouse,s AP600
and AP1000 nuclear plant designs.


16. (SBU) Prior to specifically mentioning the cited
U.S. nuclear technologies, the GAEC expressed a number
of general preferences that would guide them in their
assessment of potential suppliers. First, they are
seeking tested, reliable and safe nuclear technology.
Second, they seek to maximize technology transfer
provisions and utilization of local inputs and labor.
In terms of scope, they would seek phased development,
starting with an initial reactor output not exceed 10
to 15 percent of the grid, to then scale up with
additional reactors. Ghana explicitly does not wish
to be responsible for the fuel cycle: they would seek
for any supply agreement to include provisions for the
return of spent fuel. Finally, the GAEC expressed a
strong preference for initial development under a
bilateral nuclear cooperation program. After their

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nuclear program matured they suggested that
multilateral cooperation agreements could be possible.


Foreign Competitors
--------------


17. (SBU) The GAEC,s Director General, Dr. Edward
Akaho noted that soon after the public announcement of
Ghana,s plan to pursue nuclear power, he was visited
by the Russian Economic Attache, who presented them
with product brochures. Dr. Akaho and his colleagues
noted that the Russian diplomat did not engage in much
substantive dialogue with them. In a separate line of
discussion, Dr. Akaho noted that even through he was
trained in the UK, he did not especially like British
nuclear technology.


18. (SBU) Stressing that they work primarily through
the IAEA, the GAEC officials did not state the
existence of any formal agreements relating to nuclear
cooperation, commerce, or technical exchanges with any
other countries -- other than GNEP (NOTE: econoff
cannot be sure this was a definitive statement, or
avoiding the question. END NOTE.). When queried
about the procurement of a radiological source from
Hungary, the GAEC noted the procurement (like that of
GHARR-1) was accomplished through IAEA mechanisms.


19. (SBU) The IAEA has allocated Ghana funds for two
assessment projects. The first is titled "Evaluating
the Role of Nuclear Power in Future Options for
Electricity Generation (GHA/0/011)." COMMENT: This
project appears to correspond with Phase 1 in the
IAEA,s phased, conditional approach for introduction
of nuclear power, belying the public window-dressing
that Ghana has already crossed the threshold into
Phase 2. (See para 6 above.) Furthermore, it is not
clear whether Ghana has sufficient funds from IAEA to
fully execute this project. END COMMENT. The second
project is entitled "Implementing the Borehole
Disposal Concept (GHA/3/003)." This project explores
the possibility of using a borehole to dispose of
radioactive waste in a safe manner.


Motivations For Pursuing Nuclear Power
--------------


20. (SBU) Ghana,s stated justification for pursuing
nuclear power is domestic energy security, and a
desire to serve as a regional power generator and
exporter. (NOTE: Ghana was historically a power
exporter from the commissioning of the Akosombo Dam in
1965 until the 1990s. With the further expansion of
the USAID-supported West Africa Power Pool, increased
transmission capacity will further boost the
prospected for Ghana serving as a regional exporter,
assuming increased production in Ghana.) Framed in
development terms, increased power production is
needed for Ghana,s socio-economic development and goal
to become a middle income country. Citing burgeoning

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domestic demand and unmet regional power needs, GAEC
officials conclude that nuclear power is more certain
than the vagaries of imported gas from Nigeria via the
West African Gas Pipeline. COMMENT: Missing from the
public arguments on the economic need for nuclear
power is the likelihood of cheap, domestically
produced natural gas from Ghana,s 2007 new offshore
oil discoveries. END COMMENT.


21. (SBU) The GAEC pragmatically recognizes that
political considerations -- both domestic and
international -- influence both the resources and
directions they receive, and will impact decisions on
nuclear cooperation. Internationally, they noted that
once they are locked into a nuclear cooperation
relationship, it was difficult to change course; thus
they are sensitive to securing an external long-term
supplier who would not be subject to political
vagaries. The GAEC also stressed that with the
introduction of nuclear power they are seeking
technology transfer and donor support for development
of greater indigenous capacity and human resources.
COMMENT: Local content and technology transfer are
likely positive externalities of a successful nuclear
program. However, the GAEC,s implication that these
factors may be "conditions" or otherwise heavily
weighted within the underlying economic rationale for
pursuing a nuclear power program suggest institutional
self-interest at play within the GAEC,s advocacy of
nuclear power. END COMMENT.


Comment: Reality and Ambition - An Uncertain Gap
-------------- ---


22. (SBU) It is difficult to assess the political and
practical viability of Ghana,s stated goals to pursue
nuclear energy. The Ghana Atomic Energy Commission is
most likely not an impartial source - we cannot expect
anything less than a positive assessment of nuclear
technology and its benefits for Ghana from this
analytically captured, group of nuclear technical
specialists. While Ghana does have indigenous
technical capability sufficient to serve as a host
for external support, it is unclear what domestic
political support and economic resources Ghana can
muster to sustain its nuclear ambitions.


23. (SBU) The current political climate suggests
that the (opposition) NDC party will control
Ghana,s parliament in late January 2009. (The
presidential election returns will be known by
the end of December.) Thus, political support
for the outgoing administration,s energy plans
cannot be taken for granted. Given the IAEA,s own
commitments to what appear to be a feasibility
studies for nuclear power in Ghana, a reasonable
conclusion is that the outgoing government,s
announcement of a goal to achieve nuclear energy
by 2018 was a political gesture to bolster the
NPP,s claim to delivering modernization and
prosperity to Ghana. After the current election

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period political dust settles, a clearer view of
the underlying national political appetite for
nuclear power will be possible.


24. (SBU) Even assuming continued domestic political
support for the pursuit of nuclear power in Ghana, the
economic and financial rationality of any proposed
nuclear power plant will depend entirely on the terms
of external financing, and the costs of alternative
sources of energy. Consistent with the current global
economic down-turn, Ghana faces the usual macro-
economic pressures associated with large budget
deficits, and the increased costs of essential
imported economic inputs - e.g. oil. While dropping
oil prices will ease some of the pressure on Ghana,s
current account, concerns regarding Ghana,s increasing
levels of external indebtedness are likely to persist
until Ghana,s domestic oil production comes on line in
late 2010 or 2011. While expansion of domestic power
production is a clear economic priority for Ghana,
cheap domestically produced natural gas (and gas-fired
power generation) may erase in the shor-to-medium-
term the economic arguments for a multi-billion dollar
investment in nuclear power.


TEITELBAUM