Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUJA2363
2008-12-03 17:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: UNEASY CALM REMAINED IN JOS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KIRF ASEC NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4617
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RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0166
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1548
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002363 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA, DRL - KAREN GILBRIDE, DS/IP/AF/,
DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF ASEC NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UNEASY CALM REMAINED IN JOS

REF: A. ABUJA 2358

B. ABUJA 2345

C. ABUJA 2328

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002363

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA, DRL - KAREN GILBRIDE, DS/IP/AF/,
DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF ASEC NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UNEASY CALM REMAINED IN JOS

REF: A. ABUJA 2358

B. ABUJA 2345

C. ABUJA 2328

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: An "uneasy calm" remained in the Plateau
State capital of Jos on December 3, according to Mission
contacts and Locally Engaged Staff (LES) family members.
Missionary contacts reported occasional gunfire but no
widespread violence. The military retained control and
continued to enforce the curfew, although contacts reported
the ability to move about more freely than in previous days.
Nigerian military sources said troops would likely remain in
Jos until after the Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday on December
8-9. Both Nigerian military sources and Mission contacts
expressed concern over the possibility of additional violence
surrounding the Muslim holiday. The National Emergency
Management Agency (NEMA) reported there were close to 24,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps around the city,
for whom the Agency was attempting to provide relief. LES
staff confirmed media reports that neighboring state
governments, including Benue and Kwara, made attempts to send
vehicles to Jos to evacuate their indigenes back to their
home states. Some LES contemplated going to Jos themselves,
but expressed concerns about safety on the roads leading into
and out of the city. According to LES, with all the security
focused within the city, it created a void in the outskirts
and rural areas where additional violence could occur. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) An "uneasy calm" remained in the Plateau State capital
of Jos on December 3, according to Mission contacts and
Locally Engaged Staff (LES) family members. Missionary
contacts reported occasional gunfire but no widespread
violence. Although the military retained control of the
city, contacts reported that people were able to move about
more freely and a few shops began to reopen. Human Rights
Watch (HRW) researcher Eric Gutchuss (strictly protect)
arrived in Jos on December 2 and reported heavy road blocks
leading into Jos, causing him to question claims that large

numbers of non-residents were able to enter the city.
Gutchuss confirmed continued enforcement of the 6pm to dawn
curfew in the city, in addition to the 24-hour curfew in
certain areas. Nigerian military sources said troops would
likely remain in Jos until after the Muslim Eid al-Adha
holiday on December 8-9. Both Nigerian military sources and
Mission contacts expressed concern over the possibility of
additional violence surrounding the Muslim holiday.
Christian contacts of the Mission allege they continue to
receive threatening text messages promising retribution.
Despite earlier reports, LES family members reported that
schools would remain closed until January due to concerns of
violence surrounding the upcoming Muslim Eid and Christian
Christmas holidays.


3. (C) The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
estimated there were close to 24,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) requiring assistance in camps around Jos.
Contacts within the camps confirmed that food provided by
NEMA started to "trickle" in on December 2. There was
concern at the camps, however, that the military wanted to
take control of aid distribution as there were reports in the
past of soldiers allegedly taking the food for themselves or
discriminating in food distribution. LES staff confirmed
media reports that neighboring state governments made
attempts to send vehicles to Jos to evacuate their indigenes
back to their home states. Some LES contemplated travel to
Jos themselves, but expressed concerns about the roads
leading in and out of the city. According to LES, with all
the security focused within the city, it created a void in
the outskirts and rural areas where additional violence could
occur.


4. (C) A Western military source supported reports that the
Nigeria Police Force could be responsible for a number of the

ABUJA 00002363 002 OF 003


deaths that occurred during the initial stages of violence
(ref C). The source stated that many of the corpses he
examined at a mosque showed evidence of bullet wounds rather
than machete marks, suggesting security forces rather than
angry rioters were the perpetrators. Media reports also
include statements from witnesses that "men in uniform"
opened fired and indiscriminately killed local residents.
HRW suggested the actions by security forces and Governor
Jonah Jang's "shoot-on-sight" directive violated basic UN
principles.


5. (C) Embassy ConsOff traveled through Jos at approximately
noon on November 28 and witnessed mob violence that appeared
targeted toward Muslims. A woman on the side of the road
singled out the red vehicle directly in front of ConsOff in a
police escorted convoy. The woman pointed at the car,
yelling for others to come. ConsOff reported that a large
crowd of young men carrying weapons such as knives, bows and
arrows, chains, and farming tools, began immediately
surrounded the cars and began attacking the red car in front
of them. ConsOff did not observe anyone in the crowd with a
gun. The windows, including the windshield, were smashed in
and one young man attempted to pull the door off with a hoe,
according to ConsOff. The passengers of the red car appeared
to ConsOff to be Muslim (based on the headscarves worn by
women passengers),but this could not be confirmed. Soon
after the crowd attacked the red car, ConsOff witnessed
soldiers coming through the crowd shooting their Ak-47-type
weapons apparently indiscriminately. Although not aimed at
anyone specifically, ConsOff said that the guns were aimed at
crowd level rather than in the air. The crowd eventually
allowed passage of ConsOff's POV. After departure from Jos,
ConsOff traveled on to Bauchi State. ConsOff noted there was
a military road block at the border that did not allow anyone
to pass into Bauchi initially. After a short wait, the
soldiers departed and allowed the entire convoy into Bauchi
State. ConsOff remained in Yankari, Bauchi State until
November 30 and did not witness any signs of violence
spilling over. ConsOff returned to Abuja on November 30 via
a route that circumvented Jos and, again, did not see any
signs of violence spreading to the rural areas outside the
city.


6. (U) Plateau State Commissioner of Information Nuhu Gagara
released a statement that 16 "mercenaries" from neighboring
Republic of Niger were arrested for involvement in the
violence. Nigerien Ambassador to Nigeria Isa Ibrahim
rejected the accusation and was quoted in the press stating
that those arrested had been living in Jos "for several years
as water vendors." Ambassador Ibrahim added that 50 Nigerien
nationals died as a result of the violence.


7. (C) COMMENT: Although we believe it likely that attempts
to manipulate the LGA election on November 27 initially
incited the violence, it is difficult to determine who threw
the first punch, so to speak. It is possible local ANPP
members decided they would not tolerate election rigging and
tried to protect the ballot boxes. It is also possible that
the PDP-controlled state government deployed either party
thugs or the police to secure the vote and "deal with"
agitated area voters. Based on reports, it is likely gunfire
from the security forces (we have heard of no/no reports of
anyone other than security forces with firearms in the area)
caused many of the fatalities, thus adding fuel to the fire.
The comments by the Nigerien Ambassador to Nigeria were
well-reported and we hope they will diffuse some of the anger
created over claims of outside agitators initiating the
violence. Although calm remained for a third day, we remain
cautious and alert to the possibility of another outbreak
around the Eid.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. In addition to concerns among our
LES over family members in the Jos area, we are aware of at
least one heated argument between two of our LES (one
Christian and one Muslim) over the Jos violence. One of
those involved then refused to speak to a third employee of
the other faith. The tensions between the Muslim and

ABUJA 00002363 003 OF 003


Christian communities across much of northern Nigeria are
real and have only been brought closer to the surface by the
events in Jos. END COMMENT.
Sanders