NIGERIA: AF DAS MOSS'S MEETING WITH SGF KINGIBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000202

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS USTR FOR AGAMA
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EINV ECON MARR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AF DAS MOSS'S MEETING WITH SGF KINGIBE

REF: A. A) ABUJA 142

B. B) ABUJA 152

Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b & d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and AF DAS Moss met with
Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) Kingibe

SIPDIS
January 23, and discussed the situation in the Niger Delta,
the recent sidelining of Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) Chair Ribadu, and the court case against
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals. On the Delta, Kingibe said the GON
had just launched a new initiative aimed at addressing the
past grievances of local people, particularly the Ijaw in
Bayelsa and Delta states, but also at confronting what he
considered "criminality," particularly in Rivers State. He
acknowledged that the GON had been sometimes "hesitant" to
accept previous offers of security assistance from the USG
because it did not want to internationalize what it believed
should remain an internal matter. He acknowledged that the
sidelining of Ribadu had been badly handled, but insisted
that this should not be read as any decrease in President
Yar'Adua's commitment to fighting corruption. On Pfizer,
Kingibe urged us to treat the Attorney General as our main
point of contact, but acknowledged that the Kano State
Government was also part of the equation. The conversation
also briefly touched on Nigerian peacekeepers in Somalia, the
bid of a U.S. company to rebuild parts of Nigeria's rail
network, and the conclusion of a Bilateral Investment Treaty.
End summary.


2. (C) On January 23, visiting AF DAS Todd Moss, accompanied
by the Ambassador, EconCouns and PolCouns (notetaker) met
with SGF (the position is roughly equivalent to the White
House Chief of Staff) Babagana Kingibe. SGF's Political
Advisor Abubakar Muhammed was also present.

Expanding the Bilateral Relationship
--------------

3. (C) DAS Moss noted that President Yar'Adua's recent U.S.
visit was widely considered a success, and had increased our
expectation for improved cooperation with the GON as well as
raised the bar for Nigeria to improve its democracy. Kingibe
said Yar'Adua was also satisfied with the visit, and
acknowledged that it was the GON's responsibility to fulfill
those expectations and maintain the momentum in the
relationship. He promised to keep pushing ahead.


4. (C) Kingibe said he had a growing respect for the
President, whom he described as deliberative and steady, and
"a man who says what he means and means what he says." This
was a major shift from the more Machiavellian ways of former
President Obasanjo, and had taken some getting used to.
Kingibe added that this was a "make or break time" for the
Yar'Adua administration, and that the relationship with the
USG continued to be of major importance.

Niger Delta Policy
--------------

5. (C) DAS Moss asked Kingibe to lay out the GON's current
strategy for addressing the continuing disruption and
insecurity in the Niger Delta; he stressed that the USG wants
to play a supportive and constructive role there. Kingibe
acknowledged that progress on the Delta was vital for
President Yar'Adua's overall agenda, and that the GON had
made less progress in tackling the issue than he and the
President had hoped. When they laid out a strategy back in
July in a meeting with elders from the region, they had
expected results within three months; seven months later,
they had little to show for it.


6. (C) According to Kingibe, the GON had just launched a new
outreach effort aimed primarily at addressing the grievances
of the Ijaw people in Delta and Bayelsa states, for which
Vice President Goodluck Jonathan (himself an Ijaw) was acting
as the point. This effort was to come up with a new strategy
within the next few weeks to promote "inclusiveness and
economic advancement" in the region. Kingibe added that,
while it was also necessary to address security issues in
order to make progress on other areas, the main focus would
be on engagement and dialogue. (Comment: VP Jonathan was

ABUJA 00000202 002 OF 003


also at least the figurehead of the Yar'Adua administration's
earlier unsuccessful effort to promote dialogue in the Delta,
and did not impress in that role. End comment.)


7. (C) Turning to Rivers state, Kingibe characterized the
security problems there as more a case of "pure criminality"
than real grievance, and would require a tougher stance. He
said the new Governor in the state (Rotimi Amaechi),who,
like many politicians in the area, had previously had ties
with some of the criminal gangs, now appeared seriously
committed to taking the so-called "militants" on. Community
leaders in the state, who had previously been cowed by the
gangs, were now also starting to speak out against the
continuing unrest.


8. (C) DAS Moss recalled that the USG had made previous
offers to the GON of monitoring equipment, assistance with
tracing militants' weapons, etc., which were intended to
assist security efforts in the Delta, but these had generally
not been taken up. He asked if the GON wanted such help, or
did it prefer to take the issue of Delta security on without
outside help. Kingibe acknowledged the GON's own ambiguity
on this point. The government was "hesitant" to see the
"creeping internationalization of an internal problem," to
which there would likely be a negative domestic political
reaction. That said, he added, his hesitation did not mean
the GON was ruling out such help "for all time," but it would
prefer to deal with the problem itself, and, he believed it
could do so.


9. (C) DAS Moss noted that the problems of the Delta were not
caused by a lack of resources. The state governments
received very large allocations, but the funds did not
produce results because of corruption, particularly by past
Governors. He asked if we could help deal with this problem,
for example by assisting with tracking where funds allocated
to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) actually
went.


10. (C) Kingibe acknowledged the problems both with
corruption in state governments and the allocation of NDDC
funds to projects of questionable development value. He
noted that the Delta states constantly demanded more of the
national revenue, but were not able to give evidence of how
previous funds had been spent. He said the federal
government was trying to address both problems, both by
pursuing governors responsible for corruption and by changing
the way the NDDC funds were used. He said future NDDC
projects would have to involve more than one state, so no
individual state governor could control them.

The EFCC Issue
--------------

11. (C) DAS Moss said the decision to send EFCC Chairman
Ribadu off on a one-year study course had played very badly
in the U.S. and internationally. President Yar'Adua, during
his visit to Washington, had impressed us with his commitment
to reform in Nigeria, particularly in the area of corruption.
For him, so soon after his return, to have sidelined the
person seen as the GON's point man on corruption brought many
to question Yar'Adua's commitment. It was simply not
credible to argue that the leader of the fight against one of
Nigeria's biggest problems needed to be pulled out to go on a
study course.


12. (C) Kingibe acknowledged that the issue had been
mishandled (see also ref. A),and had hurt the government
domestically as well as internationally. He insisted that,
whatever the public perception, President Yar'Adua remained
deeply committed to the fight against corruption, but Kingibe
recognized that the onus was on the GON to show this was
true. He asked the USG to make a distinction between
supporting the EFCC as an institution and backing Ribadu as a
person. He described Ribadu as something of a loose cannon;
he was vigorous in pursuing corruption, but "vigor without
caution" was not necessarily a good thing. Ribadu's very
public disagreements with the Attorney General and others
were not helpful or tenable over the long term, he argued.

The Pfizer Case

ABUJA 00000202 003 OF 003


--------------

13. (C) The Ambassador noted that, on President Yar'Adua's
recommendation (see ref. B),she will be seeing Attorney
General (AG) Aondoakaa shortly to discuss the court case in
Kano against Pfizer Pharmaceuticals. We were trying to
encourage dialogue between the parties to help find a
settlement of the case. She asked if the AG was the right
interlocutor, or were there others?


14. (C) Kingibe pointed out that the federal government was
not the only, or even the main, player in the case; the Kano
State Government was the principal party facing Pfizer.
Still, the President had discussed the case with the state
Governor, as had AG Aondoakaa with the Kano state AG, in both
cases to urge a settlement. Kingibe thought Aondoakaa should
remain the Ambassador's "go to" person on
this case. He warned that there were some "ambulance
chasers" involved in the case up in Kano whom we would do
well to avoid. The Ambassador also added that she would keep
him in the loop on the issue when needed, to which he not
only added his concurrence, but also offerd to assist when
stumbling blocks arose.

Other Items
--------------

15. (C) Peacekeeping: DAS Moss thanked Kingibe for Nigeria's
willingness to send peacekeepers to Somalia, and asked what
the next step was on making this a reality. Kingibe deferred
to the Minister of Defense (with whom Moss was meeting
January 24, see septel) on this. He thought, however, that
agreeing to an MOU with the African Union was the likely next
step, especially in light of Nigeria's sometimes difficult
experience in Darfur.


16. (SBU) Railway reconstruction: Kingibe asked if anyone at
the Ministry of Transport had contacted us concerning the bid
of U.S. firm Lemna Corporation to rebuild parts of Nigeria's
rail network. EconCouns said we would be seeing the Minister
of Transport on January 24, and expected to discuss it then.
Kingibe said that, for him, the important thing was that
someone did get back to us about the matter, which the
Ambassador had raised with the President.


17. (C) BIT: Moss asked if the GON was proceeding to
consider our proposal to negotiate a Bilateral Investment
Treaty. Kingibe said the Presidency has already signed off
on the principal of concluding such a deal. The actual
negotiations were "someone else's department."

Comment
--------------

18. (C) Throughout the meeting, Kingibe was eager to
underline the Presidency's and his own wish for open and
close working ties with the USG. We will see if this
positive discussion turns into concrete actions on the issues
key to U.S. goals and objectives in Nigeria. End comment.


19. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Moss.
SANDERS