Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUJA20
2008-01-07 06:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT YAR,ADUA ON: RIBADU MISSTEP, PFIZER,

Tags:  PGOV ECON EFIN EINV NI 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 070634Z JAN 08 ZDK FOR USMISSION UNVIE
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1759
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 8497
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0021
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000020 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/W, AND EB
PASS TO NSC PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV ECON EFIN EINV NI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT YAR,ADUA ON: RIBADU MISSTEP, PFIZER,
BIT, AND OTHER ISSUES

REF: A. (A) ABUJA 2627

B. (B) ABUJA 2615

C. (C) ABUJA 2604

ABUJA 00000020 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Robin Sanders for Reasons 1.4 (b, c, & d).

Action request paragraph 8.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000020

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/W, AND EB
PASS TO NSC PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV ECON EFIN EINV NI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT YAR,ADUA ON: RIBADU MISSTEP, PFIZER,
BIT, AND OTHER ISSUES

REF: A. (A) ABUJA 2627

B. (B) ABUJA 2615

C. (C) ABUJA 2604

ABUJA 00000020 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Robin Sanders for Reasons 1.4 (b, c, & d).

Action request paragraph 8.


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador had a January 3, 2008 audience
with Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua to discuss a
range of issues, mostly notably the current political
environment and outcry surrounding the December 27, 2007,
announcement by the GON to transfer to a study tour Nigeria's
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Chair and the
country's well-know anti-graft czar, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. She
took advantage of the meeting to also raise Pfizer, get
forward movement on the BIT, and other issues, such as Lemna
International's desire to rehab the country's North-South
railway for USD 6 billion below the Chinese offer. On
Ribadu, Yar'Adua said this was a "political misstep and a
mess," but that he had been put in an "untenable position" by
Police Inspector General (IGP) Mike Okiro, as the latters
memo on transferring the anti-graft czar had been leaked to
the press as a "fait accompli" before he "even made a
decision." He said he got "blinded-sided" by the public leak
of the IG memo, but believes it was intentionally done to
force his hand to sign the transfer. The IGP had raised the
Ribadu issue with him December 23-24, but not directly via
conversation. He had just included Ribadu's name in the list
of others slated for study. Yar'Adua noted he told the IGP
on December 26 that he wanted to discuss the issue -- after
that, the leak took place. Hence, on December 28 he weighed
whether to sign the transfer or not, given the "political
mess already out in the public arena" (ref b). But, he said
in the end that the "government's credibility and the risk of
undermining the ability to control the police force, far
outweighed the transfer." Yar'Adua added that despite press

reports he has no "intention" of appointing a new EFCC Chair,
and hopes to ride out the political tide for a few months to
bring Ribadu back without hurting or fueling a perception
that his government is weak, waffling. For now, Ribadu would
still be the titular head of EFCC. Yar'Adua said he wanted
to assure POTUS, the Secretary, and A/S Frazer that he had in
"no way changed his convictions on fighting corruption and
supporting transparency." They should understand that he is
even more committed after this issue, and how it was handled,
and the messy environment and distrust it has created.

Yar'Adua still seemed mad about the issue as he checked
his words on several occasions, and clearly stated his hand
had been forced with the press leak of the IGP's memo by
"those who wanted a specific outcome" -- Ribadu's EFCC
removal. The leak itself also showed a lack of respect for
transparency in his view. We will see how all this plays out
over the next few months. Meanwhile, the press here
continues to have a field day. The Mission will need to
weigh Yar'Adua's version of events against some of Ribadu's
pointed comments about him and his Administration and the
reported financial agendas of some of its players, such as
the Police IG (ref A). There may be both truth and hyperbole
in both conversations. End Summary.

--------------
Yar'Adua on Ribadu
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador met with Nigerian President Umaru Musa
Yar'Adua January 3, 2008, principally to express U.S. concern
over issues surrounding the transfer of the country's top cop
on corruption, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) Chairman, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. The Ambassador noted
that following the Nigerian President's U.S. trip and
discussions with POTUS and the Secretary, as well as the U.S.
business community, on his commitment against corruption, not
only did the situation look bad, but the pending transfer of
Ribadu appeared to be a reversal on his Washington
statements. Yar'Adua agreed that all this looked bad, but
said he wanted to explain to the Ambassador the chronology of
events. He also wanted to stress that he was as committed as
ever to transparency, the continued work of the EFCC, and the
rule of law. The Nigerian President opened with the salvo
that he had gotten "blinded-sided" on the Ribadu issue as
Inspector General of Police Mike Okiro had tried to get him
to approve a memo on study transfers as he walking down the
stairs to leave the Villa for an out of town trip earlier in
the week of December 24, 2007. He said he noticed Ribadu's
name was in the memo, along with others.


ABUJA 00000020 002.2 OF 003



3. (C) The President claimed that he told the IGP that he was
not going to make a decision on the issue and wanted to delve
into it further. After that encounter, Yar'Adua said the
IGP's memo was "intentionally leaked to the press by those
who wanted to force his hand to transfer Ribadu." Frankly
speaking, the President said, "I was in an untenable position
by December 28, given the public leak, so a non-decision had
to become a decision in the end." Without him supporting the
transfer by that time, there was a danger of two things, he
continued, a real "blow to government's credibility on
coordination, in the eyes of the public," and more
importantly, "the risk of not being able to control the
police if the IGP was "hung out to dry on this issue." He
noted that "things were so out of control in the press by
December 28, that I had no choice but to sign the transfer."


4. (C) The Ambassador asked if the President had plans to
bring on a new chairman or was there a way for him to
reconsider his decision or allow Ribadu to be dual hatted in
some way while attending his course. Yar'Adua said he had no
plans to appoint a new EFCC Chairman and wants to wait until
things die down, adding that he was not removing Ribadu's
Chief Operations Officer Ibrahim Lamorde, as was reported in
the press. Lamorde will "manage the EFCC until I can bring
Ribadu back on seat, if that is possible, given the political
mess right now," he commented. With Lamorde handling
day-to-day operations, the EFCC should still have the same
vigor. The Nigerian President added that Ribadu will still
be the titular head of the EFCC, and will still have some
influence in the Commission. Without saying specifically he
did not like Ribadu's "style" of getting things done,
Yar'Adua admitted that he had "problems with the
personalization of the EFCC" as in the end "it is best if all
Nigerian institutions can become real institutions with the
right capacity and respect." He lauded Ribadu's work to
date, and reiterated that he plans to bring him back on, "if
and when things cool down a bit," and if he could do it in a
way that did not further undermine "him, government, or
government coordination in the eyes of the public." (Note:
Ribadu himself in a January 2 telcon told the Ambassador that
he heard some positive news, but not a complete change, on
developments for his future. End note.) The President was
also clear that he reserved his prerogative not to bring the
EFCC Chair back if things did not cool down over time, or if
he thought later that in the end it was not best for the
government's credibility. In summing up, Yar'Adua said he
would keep in touch and that the Ambassador had access to him
at anytime. He said to reassure both POTUS, the Secretary,
and A/S Frazer that he had not faltered or wavered on his
commitment to the rule of law, EFCC's mandate and goals, or
transparency, but he had been badly burned on how this played
out in public and he had been forced into this untenable
political situation.

--------------
Pfizer and Lemna International
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the audience with
Yar'Adua to try to move the ball along on the Pfizer and
Lemna International issues. On Pfizer, the Ambassador noted
that it was important that there was a real dialogue on
seeking a resolution to the issue, including ensuring that
there were no arrests. She added that she hoped the
President could identify a person(s) in his administration
that could be the point of contact on the issue so that we
could try to obtain a resolution. Yar'Adua said he was aware
of the Pfizer issue and agreed with the Ambassador that an
"amicable" resolution was best, and that he too sought a
non-court solution to the problem. The President said he
would ask the Attorney Generals of the Federal Government and
Kano to meet with the Ambassador upon her return from the
U.S., and that she should call him directly upon return in
order to set things up. Moving on to the case of Lemna
International's desire to help rehabilitate the country's
North-South railroad, the Ambassador only highlighted that
their proposal was 6 billion USD under that proposed by the
Chinese. Yar-Adua said he was aware of the Chinese proposal,
but not the one from Lemna, was pleased with the lower bid,
and would take a look at the proposal.

--------------
Bilateral Investment Treaty
--------------


6. (C) Continuing with the private sector theme the
discussion had taken, the Ambassador reviewed her earlier
discussion with the President on December 14, 2007, in

ABUJA 00000020 003 OF 003


Washington regarding a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with
the United States - noting that after his presentation at the
D.C. business roundtable, U.S. companies would be looking for
this type of framework as a tangible sign of his commitment
to best business practices and support for foreign investors
(ref c). He said that he was very supportive of a BIT and
that he would prepare his team accordingly to begin
discussions with us. He asked when we could have a team come
out for discussions. The Ambassador said she would first
notify Washington that he had again reiterated his support
for a BIT, and saw the BIT as a critical part of the U.S.-GON
new partnership. She would also ask how soon a team could
come out for preliminary discussion, and left a copy of the
BIT treaty template as well as background information.

--------------
Washington Trip Follow-up
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the President would be on
travel for the last two weeks of January going to Davos, a
Least Developed Nations' conference and then on to the
African Union meeting on January 31, but wondered if she
could come to see him just after with 3-4 members of her team
to truly have a working meeting on follow-up. She noted that
her team was busily pulling together points to highlight to
him what the USG was already doing to support democracy,
governance, security, and transparency in Nigeria, as well as
things that were in the pipeline on military cooperation,
etc. Yar'Adua stood ready for such a meeting, and said he
would have a team ready to dialogue on a trip follow-up
session -- all the Ambassador had to do is call and he would
set the time himself.


8. (C) Action Request: Now that we have twice had Yar'Adua's
commitment on a BIT, Mission seeks to request a time table as
to when a USG team could come out to Post for preliminary
discussions on this issue as the ball is now back in our
court.


9. (C) Comment: On the Ribadu transfer issue, the truth
probably lies somewhere in the middle between the President's
account and Ribadu's (ref a). But the one reassuring thing,
if we must find one, is that at least for now, we do not see
any evidence of Yar'Adua being involved in anything corrupt.
But what he may suffer from is a lack of the cut-throat gene
which may be required to deal with some of the political
figures around him. He clearly got burned on this issue
regardless of whether his version or Ribadu's is closer to
what really happened. Also Ribadu probably did not help
himself either as he admitted and knew that the President had
sensitivity to his style and had previously told him so.
Given Yar'Adua's demeanor, malicious intent just does not
seem to be his style either, but maybe some rural naivety
remains, which instances like this should cure him of --
hopefully -- sooner rather than later. If not, he will
continue to have these missteps, and the government's
credibility that he sought to protect during the Ribadu
fiasco by signing off in the end on a decision he reportedly
had not really made, will be hurt not by others but by him.
For now, let's go with the benefit of the doubt, and see if
he is able to hold open the EFCC Chief's slot to which he can
eventually return.
SANDERS