Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUJA1270
2008-07-01 08:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH SHELL AND EXXON

Tags:  EPET PGOV ENRG MOPS ASEC NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3264
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0290
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 9520
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001270 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: EPET PGOV ENRG MOPS ASEC NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH SHELL AND EXXON
EXECUTIVES

REF: ABUJA 1184

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001270

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: EPET PGOV ENRG MOPS ASEC NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH SHELL AND EXXON
EXECUTIVES

REF: ABUJA 1184

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).


1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with Shell Executive Vice
President Anne Pickard June 25. Pickard described in detail
the June 19 militant attack on the Bonga platform (see
reftel),and claimed there was likely internal collusion in
the attack; that members of the National Assembly accused
Shell of not doing enough to protect itself from the attack;
that members of President Yar'Adua's administration knowingly
feed him false information concerning the true state of
Nigeria's oil industry; and that Shell oil output at Bonga
should be back up to pre-attack production levels by June 26
or 27. (Note: Septel will report on a new attack affecting
Shell which took place on weekend of June 28-29, following
Pickard's meeting with Ambassador. End note.) Ambassador
ensured that Shell's security representative also briefed the
RSO. On June 26, Ambassador met with Exxon-Mobil Nigeria
Chairman and Managing Director John P. Chaplin. Chaplin
related to Ambassador Exxon's top priorities for her to
convey to President Yar'Adua at the next opportunity. Both
executives portrayed an industry whose Nigerian government
partner is at best inefficient and inept, and at worst
antagonistic and systematically corrupt, listing
incompetence, GON lack of Joint Venture funding, and sanctity
of contracts as major issues. END SUMMARY.

The Bonga Attack
--------------

2. (S) On June 25, Ambassador met with Shell Executive Vice
President for Africa Anne Pickard, who opened the meeting by
describing details of the June 19 Bonga platform attack.
Using ship-based radar, Shell staff realized there was an
impending attack at around midnight, June 19, giving Bonga
about two hours' warning before the militants arrived,
allowing for ample time to go into security lockdown.
Militants attempted to gain access to the platform for around
four hours, she said, hitting living quarters with machine

gun and small arms fire and using a blowtorch to successfully
penetrate every security door except the last one, which
would have given them access to the entire Bonga operation.
Able to monitor attackers' communications up until the last
minute before the attack, Shell personnel overheard that the
attack on living quarters was a deliberate effort at
terrorizing Shell's workers. Attackers used three speedboats
to approach the vessel, Pickard reported, and another three
stood off, apparently to provide back-up and fueling. Bonga
called the Nigerian Navy for help at 0230, but a Nigerian
Navy vessel did not arrive until 1930 that evening, and upon
arrival needed to be provided with both food and fuel. The
Shell executive also noted that the Navy provides Bonga with
almost no protection, having visited only three times since
January. She guessed that the militants may have had an
inside source on the platform's security arrangements, as had
happened in attacks on platforms belonging to other
international oil companies (IOCs). She was also concerned
that the militants will have gained additional valuable
intelligence from penetrating as far as they did this time;
Shell is reviewing its security posture.


3. (S) Pickard reported that Shell's Niger Delta-wide
intelligence sources, which she described as very good,
informed them that the speedboats used in the attack were
loaned to militants by Bayelsa State Governor Timipre Sylva,
ostensibly to be used for the protection of the Pennington
River. Upon hearing of their use in the Bonga incident,
however, Sylva apparently was extremely upset, and dispatched
his aides to secure the release of an Amcit kidnapping victim
taken from a Tidewater vessel in a separate incident
(reftel). In response to Ambassador's question about whether
a larger vessel was involved to assist the speed boats,
Pickard said no, as Shell was very familiar with the new line
of boats and thought they did not need a mother ship as an
intermediary transport to carry out the atatck.

The National Assembly

ABUJA 00001270 002 OF 003


--------------


4. (C) Pickard said that in a later appearance before members
of the National Assembly two days later, some Nigerian
Representatives accused Shell of not performing due diligence
to prevent the attack, and suggested that if Shell could not
provide adequate security for its facilities and equipment,
then perhaps it should not be allowed to operate. (Note:
Pickard surmised that National Assembly members were
referring to the practice of some other IOCs -- like Chevron
and Agip -- of bringing Nigerian soldiers on board their
vessels to provide protection, a practice Shell eschews
because of the possibility of being accused of collusion in
any human rights abuses that might subsequently occur. She
added that, given the circumstances, Shell may reconsider its
stance. End note.) Pickard said that Assembly members in
her meeting also accused the USG and UK of worsening the
Niger Delta crisis by "their conversations with the
militants." Ambassador assured Pickard that this was not the
case and the reference may have referred to communication of
some sort that we understand may have involved the Carter
Center. Pickard asked for the Embassy's help in reminding
the GON that security in the region is first and foremost its
responsibility, and not that of Shell or the other IOCs.

Misinforming the President
--------------


5. (S//NF) Pickard claimed that President Yar'Adua is
deliberately fed misinformation by individuals in his
administration seeking to protect their own positions. After
the May 15 announcement that Angola had surpassed Nigeria as
the continent's largest oil producer, Yar'Adua called
Engineer A. L. Yar'Adua (no relation to the President),head
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, with whom
Pickard was meeting at the time. She listened incredulously
as Engineer Yar'Adua assured the President that Nigeria still
outproduced Angola, with a total output of 3.4 million bpd;
after the phone call ended, he openly admitted to Pickard
that he had added in gas figures so as to ensure a larger
total than Angola's reported petroleum output, intentionally
misleading the President. (Note: Nigeria's current oil
production hovers around two million bpd when there is
respite from the too-frequent militant attacks on production
operations; of late reports are that it is down to around 1.8
million bpd. End note.)

Exxon's Wish List
--------------


6. (C) On June 26, Ambassador met with Exxon-Mobil Nigeria
Chairman and Managing Director John P. Chaplin to hear his
challenges in the current tense (more so than usual) IOC-GON
relationship. When asked what Exxon's top priorities in
Nigeria were for changes in GON policies and practices,
Chaplin responded with the following four items: 1)
protecting the sanctity of contracts; 2) gaining confidence
in funding by GON in Joint Venture oil production
institutions for the medium term; 3) ensuring security,
against both militants and criminals/pirates; and 4)
providing reliable electrical power -- specifically, a
resolution of the GON's debate over whether power should be
publicly or commercially provided. Ambassador assured him
she would take his views into account in preparing her key
points for her next meeting with President Yar'Adua.


7. (C) COMMENT: A main theme from both meetings is the lack
of responsibility taken by the GON at all levels for
insecurity in the Niger Delta region and the problems with
oil production in Nigeria. GON officials readily shift the
blame for militant attacks onto the oil companies themselves,
are unwilling to tell their own top officials the truth,
particularly the President, and the GON leadership gives
indifferent support to agencies (e.g. the Nigerian Navy)
tasked with improving security -- which are themselves
riddled with corruption. All of this is capped off by the
various moribund regional and Niger Delta security
initiatives which the GON either sponsors or is supposed to

ABUJA 00001270 003 OF 003


be a major player in, from the planned Niger Delta Summit
scheduled for July 2008 to the Gulf of Guinea Commission to
the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy. For now, the
GON is hamstrung by its own lack of capacity and political
will to work toward any positive change, and oil production
will continue to suffer as a result. END COMMENT.
SANDERS