S/I SATTERFIELD BRIEF TO BAHRAIN ON IRAQI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000581

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD BRIEF TO BAHRAIN ON IRAQI
DEVELOPMENTS

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Special Advisor David Satterfield and four
accompanying experts on Iraq and Iran briefed a Bahraini
delegation in Abu Dhabi on May 7. Satterfield emphasized
that the time is ripe for a substantive Arab diplomatic
presence in Baghdad; Secretary General of the Bahraini
National Defense Council Sheikh Ahmad bin Khalifa agreed with
the assessment and reiterated that his government was, in
principle, committed to sending an Ambassador. His
delegation conveyed lingering suspicions about Shi'a loyalty
to Iran; the U.S. delegation noted that Senior Shi'a players
must adapt to political reality as it evolves and argued
strongly for GCC states to help shape that political reality.
As Sunni groups also adjust to increased engagement with the
GoI, and even integration, the USG sees increased GoI
willingness to deal proactively with them. The delegations
also discussed PM al-Maliki's evolution as a leader, and
other Iraqi leaders, in the context of encouraging engagement
from a strategic perspective rather than based on personal
characteristics or ambitions. End summary.

Time for an Arab Presence
--------------


2. (S) Ambassador Satterfield recalled fluctuations in
Baghdad's security and political environments since 2006,
when the bombing of the al-Askari mosque underscored how
tenuous had been the achievements in Iraqi reconciliation up
to that point. Subsequent developments indicate a positive
trend in GoI ability and determination to pursue national
interests without regard to political identity, and to pursue
security without leaving "safe areas" in which militia or
insurgent groups can operate. Recent events in Basra
underscore that positive trend and evidence PM Maliki's
increasing confidence as a national leader. Maliki's embrace
of the "Sons of Iraq," despite initial reservations about
outreach to Sunni groups (some of whom had admittedly been
involved in violence),is characteristic of an improving
national leadership paradigm. The GoI is, in fact, "taking
ownership" of the process of integrating the Sons of Iraq
into the security services and civilian employment. On the
Shi'a side, Maliki is responding vigorously to threats by
Jaysh al-Mahdi and "special groups" under the influence of
Iran -- a nation which has clearly overplayed its hand in
Iraq and is undermining its own support.


3. (S) Citing the need to force Iran to deal directly with
an emboldened GoI rather than through influence on surrogate
groups in Iraq, Satterfield stressed that GCC support would
have a very positive impact. Checking Iran's ambitions in
Iraq would constitute a check on its regional goals. We have
a moment of opportunity in which strong Arab engagement with
the GoI could help turn the tide. However, the lack of Arab
embassies in Baghdad leaves the field of influence to those
who are there -- the Iranians (whose mission is second only
in size to the U.S. presence). Bahrain should not depend on
second hand information, but should have its own eyes and
ears on the ground in Baghdad, said Satterfield, noting how
he had visited the Bahraini Charge in the hospital in Baghdad
after the latter was injured some years ago. Returning such
an "extraordinary diplomat" to Baghdad would give Bahrain a
significant voice in issues that impact its future -- Bahrain
should be in Baghdad for Bahrain's own sake.


4. (S) Sheikh Ahmad said Bahrain had announced its intention
to return an Ambassador to Baghdad and requested assistance
in locating a mission within the International Zone. He
welcomed Satterfield's assurance that the USG was working to
ensure a secure facility, saying this was the first such
notice he was aware of from the USG and he would relay the
good news to Manama. Satterfield promised to provide
additional details on a proposed Bahraini facility (from our
Embassy in Baghdad) within a week; the USG will assist others
with particular concerns as well, he noted.

Lingering Bahraini Concerns over Shi'a Loyalties to Iran
-------------- --------------


5. (S) Bahrain, for its part, monitors security threats from
Iran on a daily basis and endeavors to share data with USG
authorities. Sheikh Ahmad added that Bahrain has information
that ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and others are in fact
"related" to Iran. Satterfield reiterated that Iran's

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ambitions must be checked and that Iraq's national leadership
must be reinforced as it seeks to govern free of Iran's
intervention. The Shi'a of Iraq look to Najaf and Karbala,
not Iran, for guidance from their "marja'iyya" and should not
be viewed by neighboring states as "Persian" in their
identity. Iran is less comfortable with its position in Iraq
than it was two months ago, asserted Satterfield, and was in
fact set back by the evolution of events in Basra. Others in
the USG delegation underscored the same theme with analysis
of Iranian missteps, increased GoI confidence, and an
internal debate in Iran about how to protect its interests in
Iraq. Iraq needs other strong neighbors (besides Iran)
present in Baghdad to take advantage of opportunities for
influence.


6. (S) Ambassador Faihani still questioned whether
al-Hakim's loyalties had indeed switched from Khamenei to
Sistani; Satterfield stressed that al-Hakim has political
ambitions for his family and indeed -- like many other Iraqi
figures from all communities -- has ties to Iran. But
al-Hakim must adjust to reality on the ground. The US hoped
that such adjustments would move increasingly away from Iran
toward a more "national" approach.

Encouraging GoI Engagement with Sunni Groups
--------------


7. (S) Sunni groups are engaging with the GoI on an ongoing
basis, including progressive integration of the Sons of Iraq
into GoI institutions and programs. The USG sees increased
GoI willingness to deal proactively with groups that still
cause it some concern. An opportunity now exists for pushing
these groups toward integration and away from keeping one
foot in the resistance (a group of former senior military
officers negotiating a resumption of pension payments with
the GoI is an example of the improving potential for
cooperation). While there is still some perception, in the
sea of mistrust that is Iraq, that "Sunni equals Baathist"
and "Shi'a equals loyalty to Iran," those stereotypes are
breaking down as diverse groups cooperate in the national
policy arena and Iran continues to overplay its hand in Iraq,
said Satterfield. GCC help would sway that equation in the
right direction, he noted, and complement negotiation of an
enduring and effective U.S. presence through a SOFA and
Special Framework agreement with Iraq.

Looking for Leadership
--------------


8. (S) The Bahraini delegation raised Saudi concerns about
Maliki's credibility. Saudi King Abdullah is influenced by
what he hears from Iraqi (largely Sunni) tribal leaders, who
have often complained about Maliki. Sheikh Ahmad agreed with
Satterfield that a strategic perspective and not a personal
approach (i.e., simply rejecting Maliki because "he lied" in
the past),is the safe course. Maliki is growing from his
roots as a "Dawa insider" into a national leader, stressed
Satterfield, and his neighbors must play to his national
leadership potential rather than shy away from his personal
quirks or emotions.


9. (S) In a brief discussion about other potential Iraqi
leaders, the delegations agreed that Iyad Allawi should be
encouraged to play a role inside Iraq if he seeks a positive
impact on Baghdad politics. His absence from the country is
not helpful. An improved personal chemistry between Maliki
and Tareq al-Hashemi is evident and hopeful in facilitating
more unified governance, said Satterfield. Broad Sunni
participation in provincial elections later this year will be
another positive indication of practical reconciliation.
Moqtada al-Sadr is also faced with a choice of cooperation or
confrontation, and Satterfield hoped the Sadr Movement would
"reconcile with and join the political process." Even his
own senior lieutenants are confused by Sadr, noted
Satterfield, and other religious leaders simply see him as
unstable. As for possible succession in the event of
Sistani's death, the Bahraini delegation felt Bashir
al-Najafi was likely the best of the four likely candidates
(the others including Haq al-Fayyad and Mohammed Saeed
al-Hakim).


10. (SBU) Participants:
-------------- U.S. delegation
-- David Satterfield, Special Advisor for Iraq
-- Jonathan McCarter
-- Christopher Manfra
-- Jillian Burns, Iran Regional Presence Office Director
-- Don Blome, Strategic Engagement Cell

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-------------- Bahraini delegation
-- Sheikh Ahmad bin Khalifa al-Khalifa, Secretary General,
National Defense Council
-- Ambassador Saeed al-Faihani, Office of the Foreign Minister
-- Colonel Issa al-Bin Ali, Bahrain National Security Agency
-- Abdulrahman al-Eid, Director of Sheikh Ahmad's office
-- Adnan al-Dhaen, National Security Agency.


11. (U) Ambassador Satterfield approved this message.
QUINN