CNO VISIT TO UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000460

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR CNO ROUGHEAD
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/FO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS IR IZ AF AE
SUBJECT: CNO VISIT TO UAE

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 356 (GSD READOUT)
B) ABU DHABI 296 (GSD SCENE SETTER)
C) ABU DHABI 325 (COUNTER-PROLIFERATION TASK FORCE)

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Admiral Roughead: Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to
your April 16-18 visit to the UAE, arguably the most
important facilitator of naval operations among the Gulf
countries. We are seeking meetings with Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) al-Nahyan, UAE Vice President
and Prime Minister (and Ruler of Dubai as well as nominal
Defense Minister) Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR) al-Maktoum; and
senior military leaders. Issues in Dubai might usefully
focus on our appreciation for the UAE's hosting of U.S.
ships, while conversations with MbZ should address the full
range of strategic cooperation.


2. (C) Your visit follows those of other senior U.S. military
officers, including Commander US Central Command Admiral
Fallon (Feb 20-21),Chief of Staff of the Air Force General
Moseley (Feb 11-13),Secretary of the Air Force Wynne (Feb
3-5),and Commandant of the Marine Corps General Conway (Nov
20-21); that serve as a reminder to the UAE of the value we
place on our partnership. The Commander in Chief, President
Bush, paid a visit in January as well. Your visit in
particular comes at an opportune time with the March 25
agreement by the UAE's General Headquarters (GHQ) to formally
participate in the Combined Maritime Forces command.


3. (S) MbZ will be interested in current U.U. thinking on
Iraq and Iran, continued cooperation with the U.S. in the
mission in Afghanistan, and reminders that the USG values the
UAE contribution in the AOR. In expressing appreciation for
this outstanding partnership, we also like to remind the UAE
that the evolving nature of military requirements mandates an
ongoing focus on joint planning, coordination, and strategic
interoperability.

Support from the UAE
--------------


4. (S) The U.S. continues to enjoy strong defense cooperation
with the UAE. Nowhere is this more readily apparent than in
the approximately 450 U.S. naval ship visits made annually to
the UAE, making the UAE the number one foreign port of call
for the USN. We suggest you thank your UAE interlocutors at
all levels for the country's strong support for the Navy and
for its continued willingness to provide access, hospitality
and security for our Sailors and Marines. In addition to the
extensive naval logistics support provided, the UAE provides
critical basing and over-flight authorization for USAF aerial
reconnaissance and refueling assets. The nation also
continues to work together with the U.S. in key aspects of
the war on terror, including the placement of special
operations troops on the ground in Afghanistan since 2003,
providing security assistance for Lebanon and the Palestinian
Authority, and is assisting virtually every trouble spot in
the region in need of reconstruction support. A few
quantitative measures of bilateral cooperation include:

--- over 450 naval port visits last year;
--- more than 125,000 U.S. servicemen and women
enjoying liberty annually in the UAE;
--- 1,800 USAF personnel at Al Dhafra Air Base;
--- a vigorous multinational air training schedule at the Air
Warfare Center at Al Dhafra;
--- the F-16 Block 60 program;
--- over 24,000 US military aircraft over flights/landings
in 2007;
--- approximately 250 UAE Special Operations forces serving
with the Coalition in Afghanistan. Past operational
deployments to Kuwait, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo.


5. (S) These contributions are significant in scope but also
enduring in their continuity over many years. The ports of
Jebel Ali and Fujairah, and Minhad Air Base, are vital to
U.S. Navy interdiction operations, re-supply and sustainment
and combat support efforts across the region. Your scheduled
visit to Dubai Ports World in Jebel Ali on April 17 will
include a briefing on the future potential of Dubai World
Central's new airport, to be the world's largest, to further
support naval logistics through the establishment of a major
air-sea-land regional hub at Jebel Ali.


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Deepening naval engagement
--------------


6. (S) The UAE's naval security is distributed between
several commands. The UAE Navy is concerned primarily with
countering the Iranian Navy and IRGC-N. Its acquisition of
units such as the new Baynunah class corvette, which will be
briefed to you April 16 during your tour at the Abu Dhabi
Shipbuilding yard, reflects its focus on conventional naval
threats. The Coast Guard is primarily responsible for
securing Emirati territorial waters and offshore economic
interests. Long considered somewhat of a stepchild passed
between Ministry of Interior and the Navy, the UAE Coast
Guard is now an independent military service which has been
receiving increased government resources. NAVCENT has been
engaging the UAE Coast Guard in a commensurate fashion, and
the Coast Guard is now represented at Navy-to-Navy staff
talks (last held in February in Abu Dhabi). Recently added
to this Navy-Coast Guard mix is the Critical National
Infrastructure Authority (CNIA),originally part of GHQ but
now an independent entity focused on security of the UAE's
offshore oil infrastructure as part of its larger mandate of
securing all critical infrastructure.


7. (S) One of NAVCENT Commander VADM Cosgriff's top
priorities has been to get the UAE Navy and/or Coast Guard to
join the Combined Maritime Force (CMF),aka "the coalition."
We recommend complimenting the UAE on its recent (March 25,
2008) decision to join this flexible organization, which will
enable the UAE to gain increasing advantages of coordination
and intelligence sharing to help protect the UAE's maritime
interests, including its offshore critical energy
infrastructure. It is of note that the UAE's decision to
formally join the maritime coalition was reportedly done at
the insistence of MbZ over the objections of his military
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Mohammed Hamad Thani Al
Rumaithy, who was uncomfortable linking the UAE so publicly
with U.S. military interests. As with most areas of joint
military cooperation, the UAE prefers to work quietly and
behind the scenes with us, with no pubic acknowledgment of
its role.


8. (C) In addition to encouraging the UAE to move forward
with its coalition participation, another point on which we
request UAE assistance is the relocation of housing as well
as operational and administrative facilities for the U.S.
Navy inshore boat unit at Fujairah, which provides water-side
security for U.S. ships in the port of Fujairah. Due to
force protection concerns, USLO's number one priority is to
move berthing and operations inside a more secure perimeter
within the new UAE naval base at Fujairah (facilities under
development). The UAE has given approval for working groups
to discuss the issue, but it would be advantageous to get
senior leader buy-in during your meetings.


9. (C) Similarly, the impending closure of Dubai's Port
Rashid to commercial and military ship visits will reduce
NAVCENT's port visit options. The potential for Abu Dhabi's
new port "Mina Khalifah," to be built at Tawilah (between Abu
Dhabi and Dubai),to include designated piers capable of
supporting USN carrier visits is worth raising in your
conversations to facilitate future efforts to work that issue
with Emirati officials.


10. (C) the UAE's growing concern with critical
infrastructure security provides another opportunity for
maritime engagement. Although CNIA is an Abu Dhabi emirate
agency technically not part of the GHQ military structure, it
is staffed primarily by military officers and currently draws
on military units for any necessary crisis response units.
CNIA is still very much in its formative phases, creating its
own internal TTPs while also trying to define how it will
interact and coordinate with other government agencies. Most
noteworthy is that CNIA has the personal patronage of MbZ and
you might wish to ask MbZ directly what he sees as CNIA's
mandate. Current U.S. engagement with CNIA is focused on
maritime critical infrastructure protection. At the late
February MIPS conference VADM Cosgriff met separately with
the UAE delegates to discuss U.S.-UAE cooperation on critical
infrastructure protection. NAVCENT is following up on these
efforts and is currently pursuing a UAE and Coalition
solution to critical infrastructure protection.

The UAE's threat picture: Iran in focus
--------------


11. (S) MbZ continues to insist that Iran is the UAE's most

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serious and long-term threat. The UAE military has long
viewed Iran as its top security threat in spite of the
extensive economic relationship the two countries share. As
such, Iran will top the agenda in terms of putting regional
threats into perspective. UAE military planners will
continue to focus on it as the primary driver of defense
procurements. MbZ will stress the continual concern that
Iran poses to the UAE; he will speak out in private with USG
interlocutors against the "superpower" ambitions of his
Persian neighbor. Iranian meddling in Iraq and Lebanon will
be underscored by UAEG officials.


12. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so
the UAE feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic
side and especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this
rough and unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our
mission in the region, the UAE leadership has consistently
pursued a cautious, non-confrontational, public posture
towards Iran. In the past, the UAE has been hesitant to
participate in military exercises designed to show a strong
defensive front against Iran. The UAE did, however, send
observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006, which had a
Proliferation Security Initiative theme. The decision to
host Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air and Missile
Defense theme, is another praiseworthy step. The recent
announcement during French President Sarkozy's visit of a
French military presence in Abu Dhabi is another indication
of UAE willingness to send a strong signal to Iran.
Nonetheless, with an estimated 400,000 Iranians in the UAE,
MbZ will be cautious about a direct confrontation. Iran is
an adversary to prepare defenses against, which the UAE is
doing. Yet, it considers a certain level of engagement to be
part of that defense, including, apparently, MbR's February
18 trip to Tehran.


13. (S) In spite of the dichotomy of the UAE balancing its
interests -- engaging with Tehran on the one hand and
preparing defenses against it on the other -- it is our
interest to keep the focus on defense preparations. MbZ
consistently emphasizes the need for contingency planning and
uses the looming threat from Tehran as the basis for U.S.
weapons sales to the UAE. He remains urgent about setting up
a defense architecture against Iranian missiles. He most
recently discussed Shared Early Warning with General Moseley
in February, and his Chief of Military Intelligence in March
received, at personal request, a tailored assessment of the
Iranian missile threat to the UAE from Lieutenant General
Maples at DIA. MbZ often states the need to U.S. officials --
as he did in February with Air Force Secretary Wynne -- to
prepare to "go across the border" in self-defense if
necessary (ref b). His past and planned future military
purchases - F-16 and Mirage fighters, Black Shaheen ALCMs,
Airbus aerial refueling aircraft, AEW&C and ISR aircraft,
imagery satellites ) all point toward the acquisition of
deep strike capability that if nothing else may provide a
credible deterrent to give Iran pause with regard to any
notion of retaliating against the U.S. via the UAE.


14. (S) Iran is a known threat and we should work
methodically to bolster our mutual defenses without expecting
the UAE to show a more public antagonism towards Tehran; it
has long since decided that it cannot afford to do so. Among
the measures we should continue to pursue are a robust joint
exercise regime, missile defense planning, UAE participation
in PSI exercises, and increasing UAE participation in
coalition activities at NAVCENT.

Procurement always on MbZ's mind
--------------


15. (S) UAE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT STATUS: The UAE has
committed billions to current and anticipated Foreign
Military Sales cases, in addition to over $8.5 billion in
direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16 program, one of
the premier security assistance portfolios in the region. The
total current FMS portfolio (signed cases and cases in
development) is valued at approximately $22 billion.


16. (S) At the invitation of the Pentagon and State
Department to deepen the security relationship by cooperating
on an integrated missile defense shield, the UAE last year
submitted Letters of Request on the Patriot (nine PAC-3/GEM-T
batteries),Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile (SL-AMRAAM) (8 fire units),and Theater High Altitude
Air Defense (THAAD) system (3 fire units),for an estimated
total value of $17 billion. It now wants the USG to make
good on our offer of enhanced engagement by pressing for

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expeditious approval of these sales in the Congress, and will
be looking for specifics on where we are in that process,
particularly in regard to THAAD, which the UAE has
articulated is essential to a complete Air and Missile
Defense architecture. Currently, only the Patriot has
Congressional approval and a draft offer has been delivered
to the UAE. The UAE will see our posture as a critical
measure of USG willingness to stand by the UAE in a
contingency involving Iran.


17. (S) Other pending weapons sales include: three E2-C
Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (in LOA negotiations) as an interim
solution until delivery of a more permanent AEW&C platform
(that down-select/decision not expected until summer-2008);
Harpoon missiles originally purchased for shipboard use are
being converted for use on the F-16; Evolved Sea Sparrow
Missiles are being integrated on the Baynunah corvettes; High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, case was signed and
is being implemented now, valued at $597M); 40 UH-60M
Blackhawk helicopters for its Special Operations Command (the
UAE has already signed a case, which is now being implemented
and valued at $807M, for 26 Blackhawks, and an additional 14
are pending Congressional notification); 20 additional
Blackhawks via Direct Commercial Sales from Sikorsky; ongoing
upgrade of AH-64 Apache helicopters to the "D" (LONGBOW)
model; 1300 Hellfire missiles (with the expectation of a
request for an additional 1200 missiles); and additional
weapons for their F-16s (three Letters of Request have been
received, valued at over $800M). The UAE is also seeking
integration with Shared Early Warning, GCCS-M, LINK-11,
Link-16, and the classified internet, CENTRIX. Considering
the threat and the available cash reserves, the UAE is
seeking to purchase all the latest defense technology.
Despite the threat to the UAE, they still require financial
offsets arrangements prior to awarding defense contracts.

Iraq: another challenge
--------------


18. (S) The UAE appreciates the fact that there have been
measured security gains on the ground in Iraq but remains
skeptical of the enduring strategic implications of those
gains. Still very skeptical of a Shi'a-dominated government
it believes is controlled from Iran (and still coddling Iyad
Allawi as Iraq's most viable leadership candidate),the UAE's
stance towards Baghdad remains too passive. It should be
pressed to play a more active and facilitating role,
particularly with regard to re-opening its Embassy in
Baghdad, more proactively facilitating a visit to the UAE by
PM Nuri al-Maliki, granting long term debt relief, answering
UN appeals to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria, and
easing Iraqi visa restrictions for such events as the planned
May 26-28 U.S./MNF-I sponsored coalition conference in Abu
Dhabi.
QUINN