ACTING A/S MCNERNEY MEETS WITH UAEG OFFICIALS

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000326

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR T, ISN, NEA/ARP
COMMERCE FOR BORMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC AE
SUBJECT: ACTING A/S MCNERNEY MEETS WITH UAEG OFFICIALS

REF: A. DUBAI 72

B. ABU DHABI 222

Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaries a.i., for reasons 1.4 b
and d.


1. (S) Summary: On February 25 and 26, UAEG officials
asserted that the UAE's export control law was in force, but
that it was being amended to make it easier to implement.
The UAE would create an autonomous organization to implement
the export control law. The UAE interlocutors raised
concerns about the timeliness of USG-provided information
with regard to interdicting shipments to Iran, especially
requesting the provision of follow-up information to help the
UAE make a legal case for actions. With regard to peaceful
nuclear cooperation, the UAE reiterated its renunciation of
any domestic reprocessing or enrichment capabilities. The
International Affairs Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
stated that the Prime Minister/Ruler of Dubai had carried
clear messages of concern to both Iran and Syria, but that
the recipients were "in denial." The UAE appeared receptive
of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and
asked for additional information. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On February 25 and 26, Acting ISN Assistant
Secretary Patricia McNerney held meetings with Abdulla

SIPDIS
Al-Saleh, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Economy; Yousef
Al-Otaiba, International Affairs Director for Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed; Mohammed Al-Mehairi,
Director General of the Federal Customs Authority; Yacoub
Al-Hosani, International Organizations Director for the MFA;
and Dubai Customs Director Ahmed Bin Butti. She was joined
by USDOC/BIS DAS Matthew Borman and ISN/CPI Director Tony
Foley for all meetings, except the one with Al-Otaiba.
Ambassador Jackie Wolcott joined on the meeting with
Al-Otaiba.

Interdictions
--------------


3. (S) Several of the interlocutors raised the UAE's
willingness to continue stopping transshipments based on
USG-provided information, but expressed some concerns about
the timeliness of resolving questions of disposition of the
cargoes. Al-Otaiba, noting the focused nature of security
officials, stated that "no one wants to" hold on to shipments
longer than necessary. Without evidence that could be used
to make a legal case for holding/redirecting shipments, UAEG
officials were predisposed to return the goods to their
countries of origin rather than continuing to detain them or
allowing them through. In a separate meeting, Ahmed bin
Butti expressed similar complaints about not being able to
detain shipments indefinitely. Al-Otaiba said he would
suggest to the security services and the MFA that they
provide a specific time frame after which they would take
action (not necessarily our desired action),absent further
information from the USG. He noted that the process of
making a law enforcement case from intelligence information
took too long and referred to an interdiction that the UAEG
took on behalf of the UK authorities -- after the UAEG held
the shipment for a year, the UK admitted that it could not
make a legal case and asked the UAE to allow the items to
continue to Pakistan.

Export Control Law
--------------


4. (C) Both Al-Hosani and Al-Saleh discussed the challenges
of implementing the export control law. Al-Saleh said that
the Ministry of Economy, which had championed the law's
passage, no longer had a meaningful role in its
implementation. He had not even been invited to the CTF
meeting. He explained the UAEG's concerns that because of
MinEcon's role with trade agreements and the WTO that any
detailed involvement in implementing the law would conflict
with its role as a trade advocate. Al-Saleh asserted that
MFA, which is responsible for implementing the law, doesn't
have the expertise needed. Despite the planned amendments,
he stated that the law was in operation.


5. (C) Al-Hosani admitted that implementing the law had been
difficult, citing federal-local jurisdictional issues as
complicating the process. Both Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and Minister of
Presidential Affairs Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan had
agreed to establish an independent authority or office to
implement the law. The UAEG would also amend the law to link
it explicitly to existing anti-money laundering and counter
terror laws. The new implementing office would be
autonomous, but report through Sheikh Abdullah to the
cabinet. It would also incorporate the Chemical Weapons
Convention national committee.


6. (C) Al-Hosani explained the current UAE export licensing
process, which he described as confusing. A company submits
an application to the customs departments and economic
affairs departments in individual emirates. These
organizations then send the paper work to the security
services, which (after checking) pass it to the MFA for final
approval. He added that the business community (especially
the foreign business community) was unhappy with the law's
implementation. For his part, Al-Saleh stated that UAE
private sector antagonism towards the law has been minimal,
mainly because the law relates to national security.

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
--------------


7. (SBU) Ambassador Jackie Walcott explained our support for
the UAEG's renunciation of domestic enrichment and
reprocessing in its plans for developing nuclear power.
Al-Otaiba noted that the UAE was starting to build its
nuclear infrastructure from scratch and wanted to learn from
best practices. He stressed the need to keep U.S. - UAE
agreements, whether the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, a Memorandum of Understanding, or a 1,2,3
agreement, on-track in order for the UAE to met its ambitious
goal of having an operational nuclear power plant by 2017.
He asked the UAE's head of peaceful nuclear cooperation,
Hamad Al-Kaabi, to be sure that the Executive Affairs
Authority (the body tasked with evaluating nuclear power)
pursue negotiating agreements with the U.S. as a priority.
With regard to the Global Initiative, Al-Otaiba asked for a
more detailed assessment of the UAE's obligations as a member
of the organization. A/S McNerney explained that the
initiative was about building capacity and -- although there
were not specific obligations -- there was an expectation
that members would focus resources on meeting the G.I.
principles.

Iran
--------------


8. (C) Al-Otaiba stayed on message with regard to UAE Vice
President/Prime Minister/Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin
Rashid Al-Maktoum's visit to Iran and Syria. He explained
that the UAE had had modest expectations for the trip. The
message to Iran, he said, was that the Iranian nuclear
program had regional implications. The message to Syria was
that it needed to be proactive and "work together" on
Lebanon. A Lebanese civil war would harm the region. He
stated that this message had been delivered to the highest
levels in both countries, but admitted that the response had
been one of "denial, lack of acknowledgement." The Iranian
PR machine, he noted, had twisted the visit to one of
economic cooperation and a "happy, happy" message. A/S
McNerney asked for Al-Otaiba's assessment of Kish Island,
which she noted was coming up increasingly on the USG's radar
screen. Al-Otaiba replied that he was not too familiar with
Kish Island, which he described as historically a sort of
"Cayman Islands" with little control over activities taking
place on it.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
--------------


9. (SBU) A/AS McNerney pressed Al Otaiba on the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and asked that the
UAEG endorse the initiative. He indicated there were no
political issues but that the UAE was interested in the level
of commitment required. A/AS McNerney promised to provide him
with a paper outlining GI commitments.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by the U.S. visiting
party.
QUINN