UAE PRIME MINISTER'S QUICK VISIT TO TEHRAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000222

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP IR SY AE
SUBJECT: UAE PRIME MINISTER'S QUICK VISIT TO TEHRAN AND
DAMASCUS

Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REF: Doha 0136


1. (C) Summary: UAE Prime Minister, Vice President, and
Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid embarked on a sudden visit
to Tehran and Damascus February 18, taking the Foreign
Minister (an Abu Dhabi royal) in his entourage. Public
explanations of the visit are benign and innocent, and we
heard from official circles that a blunt message was to be
delivered in both places; nonetheless, the fact that such a
high level visit (albeit a short one in which he hit both
capitals in one day) took place at all is untimely. The
optics of the visit may overshadow the frank message we have
been encouraging the UAE and its Gulf neighbors to deliver to
Iran and Syria about the need for responsible behavior. End
summary.


2. (SBU) Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR) al-Maktoum, also Ruler of Dubai,
made a high profile visit to Iran and Syria February 18. The
most senior UAE visitor to Iran since the 1979 revolution,
MbR met with Iranian President Ahmedinejad, accompanied by
UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) and
MbR's newly-appointed Deputy Ruler of Dubai (his son) Maktoum
bin Mohammed bin Rashid. (The traveling delegation also
included Dr. Anwar Gargash, newly-appointed Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs and recognized as one of the UAE,s
leading experts on Iran -- his family is of Iranian origin.)
MbR also met with First Vice President Parviz Davoudi.
Public statements in advance of the visit suggested that
economic ties and general brotherly cooperation would be high
on the agenda in Tehran, and that even the long-standing
territorial dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the
Greater and Lesser Tunbs could be discussed. (Note: Press
reports note that in 1992 MbR visited then Iranian President
Rafsanjani, but at that time MbR did not hold his current
senior UAE titles. End note.)


3. (C) With Dubai's deep and long-standing cultural and
trade links with Iran, MbR is known for taking a much softer
approach to Tehran than the leadership in Abu Dhabi, stating
recently on a trip to Germany that Iran's nuclear program is
peaceful and often citing the UAE's friendly ties with its
much larger neighbor. He will no doubt be a welcome guest of
the current regime in Iran and is not likely to carry the
firm message that Iran's behavior is destabilizing the
region. On the contrary, Iran's engagement with Dubai --
economic and otherwise -- is an important part of the
prosperity in that emirate and will likely be encouraged by
the visit. UAE annual trade with Iran, mostly focused in
Dubai and the Northern Emirates and largely made up of
re-exports, is estimated at well over $10 billion ($11.7
billion last year according to some reports with projections
reaching over $14 billion for the current year). An
estimated 450,000 Iranians live in the UAE, mostly in Dubai
(Iranians thus constitute over 10 percent of the total UAE
population). Given this level of economic and societal
interaction, it is noteworthy that no sitting UAE prime
minister has yet visited Iran.


4. (C) The fact that AbZ, a senior Abu Dhabi royal (who had
apparently not mentioned these travel plans to a USG
interlocutor in a meeting as recently as two days prior to
the trip, ref A),is in the entourage lends an Abu Dhabi
leadership imprimatur on the visit. Although AbZ himself
might argue that his presence helps ensure that a direct and
firm message is conveyed to Iran (as we have heard him
suggest in the past),he is clearly a junior partner in the
delegation and is not likely to represent the more strident
Abu Dhabi viewpoint in meetings led by MbR. It is unclear
what role Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ),
who generally takes a hard line on Iran with USG visitors and
spends much energy preparing the national defenses, might
have played in the decision to send a prime ministerial level
visitor. President Khalifa's views are also unclear,
although the UAE's ultimate decision-maker presumably
approved the trip.


5. (C) MbZ's International Affairs Director, Yousef
al-Otaiba, told us February 18 that MbR had one blunt message
for each stop. For Iran: Tehran needs to engage with the
international community and take UNSCRs seriously, as they
have implications for others in the region; and, for Syria:
political stalemate in Lebanon cannot be allowed to fester
and devolve into civil war. Al-Otaiba offered no reply when
reminded that the optics of a senior visit, and MbR as the
messenger, was not likely to convey the firmness suggested in
these positions.


6. (C) MbR's visit to Tehran is reportedly in response to an

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invitation relayed recently by the visiting Ali Akbar
Valayati, advisor to Supreme Guide Ali Khamene'i; we do not
know how long the visit might have been in the planning, yet
presume there was more thought put into it than a simple
response to a recent invitation. Prior high level visits
include AbZ's January 2007 trip to Tehran and Ahmedinejad's
May 2007 visit to the UAE (where he met with a warm reception
on the heels of Vice President Cheney's visit to the UAE and
delivered a strong anti-Western message to an audience of
thousands at a Dubai sports arena).


7. (C) Topics discussed in Damascus seem similarly
superficial, including cooperation and preparation for the
Arab League Summit. Again, the message sent by the visit
itself speaks louder than what was discussed. Bashar al-Asad
was last in the UAE as an official guest in December, 2006;
UAE President Khalifa -- again with AbZ -- visited Damascus
in July, 2007.


8. (SBU) According to Iranian press coverage of the visit,
MbR is quoted as saying that the Iran-UAE relationship is a
good example for other regional countries and described
Iran's nuclear program as peaceful. He reportedly said that
foreigner's claims that Iran is a threat to regional states
are false because countries in the region share a common
history and background. The UAE press quoted MbR saying
that: "The UAE is committed to fostering cordial relations
with friendly and sisterly countries. My visit to Tehran
comes within this context." He described his meeting with
Vice President Davoodi as "fruitful" and "useful,"
particularly with regards to economic issues. Interestingly,
there was no mention in either Iranian or UAE press reports
of discussion of the three disputed islands, despite
suggestion in the press before the trip that the subject
would be raised.


9. (C) Comment: Engagement with all of its neighbors, to
one degree or another, is a UAE tradition. This small nation
tries to balance its many relationships to avoid offense to
any that might return to haunt it in the future. Just as
Ahmedinejad's visit came on the heels of VP Cheney's visit
here, this trip follows closely the visit of the President to
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. As justification for similar visits in
the past we have been told by AbZ that one can only send a
firm message when one is actually talking. Further
emphasizing the UAE's penchant for engaging both sides, we
are periodically reminded by MFA colleagues that the four
pillars of UAE foreign policy are: 1) balanced alliances, 2)
conflict avoidance, 3) active diplomacy, and 4) working with
international organizations.


10. (C) Comment continued: The surprise announcement of a
visit to Iran and Syria comports with MbR's favored style of
the big gesture. He announced a cabinet reshuffle on the eve
of his departure, yet another MbR-esque maneuver that caught
the public by some (but not total) surprise, was clearly
coordinated behind the scenes with Abu Dhabi (yet leaving
them with some plausible deniability as to its intent),and
will be praised in the mostly Dubai-based local press as yet
another masterful stroke in the nation's development. MbR's
(and the UAE's) true intentions will take some time to
decipher, but two key UAE motive in the Iran visit may be to:
1) make progress on securing the Iranian natural gas
supplies the UAE needs to generate power to support its
headlong development; and 2) to protect its equities and
possibly gain leverage for movement on the three islands
dispute. The UAE interest behind the visit to Syria, apart
from balancing the UAE's many international relationships, is
less apparent. Combining both countries in a single day trip
suggests that the UAEG may see the two as politically linked.
End comment.
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