Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUDHABI159
2008-02-05 14:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

ADMIRAL FALLON'S UPCOMING VISIT TO ABU DHABI

Tags:  PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR KPAL IR IZ AF LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9859
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0159/01 0361429
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051429Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0374
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 000159 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR KPAL IR IZ AF LE
PK, AE
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON'S UPCOMING VISIT TO ABU DHABI

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 119 (NATO VISIT)
B) ABU DHABI 65 (FRENCH VISIT ON MIL PRESENCE)
C) ABU DHABI 62 (PA DONATIONS HELD UP)
D) ABU DHABI 45 (EXPLORING NUCLEAR OPTIONS)
E) 06 ABU DHABI 1939 (USMC COMMANDANT VISIT)
F) 06 ABU DHABI 1595 (PRIOR CENTCOM VISIT)
G) 06 ABU DHABI 1479 (PRIOR CENTCOM SCENE SETTER)

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 000159

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR KPAL IR IZ AF LE
PK, AE
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON'S UPCOMING VISIT TO ABU DHABI

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 119 (NATO VISIT)
B) ABU DHABI 65 (FRENCH VISIT ON MIL PRESENCE)
C) ABU DHABI 62 (PA DONATIONS HELD UP)
D) ABU DHABI 45 (EXPLORING NUCLEAR OPTIONS)
E) 06 ABU DHABI 1939 (USMC COMMANDANT VISIT)
F) 06 ABU DHABI 1595 (PRIOR CENTCOM VISIT)
G) 06 ABU DHABI 1479 (PRIOR CENTCOM SCENE SETTER)

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (S) Admiral Fallon, Embassy Abu Dhabi again welcomes you
for a visit to the UAE, where we look forward to your
engagement with U.S. personnel on the ground and your
discussions with the nation's top strategic defense planner,
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the
UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). Nominal Minister
of Defense (and Ruler of Dubai) Mohammed bin Rashid is less
well versed on defense issues, yet carries the federal title
while focusing on the economy of Dubai, Inc. Recent senior
U.S. visitors include the President (Jan 13-14),Secretary of
Energy Bodman (Jan 21-23),Secretary of the Air Force Wynne
(Feb 3-5),and an anticipated visit by Chief of Staff of the
Air Force Moseley (Feb 11-13). These consecutive visits
serve as a reminder to the UAE of the value we place on our
partnership, and MbZ hopes this engagement will speed the
process of weapons releases sought by the UAE -- to build a
common defense against the Iranian missile threat in
particular.


2. (S) As with your prior visits, MbZ will be interested in
current U.S. thinking on Iraq and Iran (MbZ stressed to SECAF
Wynne February 3 his desire for advanced notice of U.S. plans
in the region),continued participation in the mission in

Afghanistan, and reminders that the USG values the UAE
contribution in the AOR. Positive comments about the UAE
role in Afghanistan, for example, will encourage MbZ's own
oft-stated interest in sustaining that mission. Any
reminders that we need to plan and exercise together in
response to Iran's provocations will also help solidify
coordination on that front. MbZ should also be reminded,
however, that the stability of Iraq requires a more serious
contribution from the UAE, including the reopening of an
Embassy in Baghdad and facilitation of visas for Iraqi
officials to visit the UAE in order to engage in training,
development, and business conferences which are often held in
Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

Pol-Mil Fundamentals are Strong
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. continues to enjoy strong defense
cooperation with the UAE, with a significant U.S. presence at
Al Dhafra Air Base (1,500 USAF personnel and engagement
through the Air Warfare Center),robust transport operations
through Fujairah, significant transits through the port of
Jebel Ali (over 400 ships per year),and UAE facilitation for
over 24,000 U.S. military overflights/landings per year.
This critical support enables U.S. transport requirements in
the AOR, in addition to reconnaissance and refueling
operations. It also helps us to maintain a presence on very
welcome terms in a volatile region. In expressing
appreciation for his partnership, you might also remind MbZ
that the evolving nature of military requirements mandates
continual review, joint planning, coordination, and strategic
interoperability.


4. (S) Plans for a third round of the Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) on March 11, followed immediately by the Joint Military
Committee (JMC) on March 12-13, offer an opportunity to
further solidify our partnership and work through some of the
questions facing the relationship. One key question for the
UAE is how quickly the U.S. will release weapons systems of
particular interest to it -- MbZ may ask you about THAAD,
SL-AMRAAM, and Patriot PAC 3 (see paragraphs 15-16). Another
delicate issue is the precise status of the Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA),signed in 1994 for 12 years but
without a recent review of its current status (the UAE
sometimes notes that it was not fully ratified by the Supreme
Council made up of the rulers of all seven emirates and
suggests some uncertainty about the ongoing validity of the
agreement after the initial 12 years passed in 2006). A
current legal case involving three Marines being tried for

ABU DHABI 00000159 002 OF 005


alleged abusive language highlights the need for reopening
the DCA for scrutiny (see paragraph 17).

Iran
--------------


5. (S) MbZ continues to insist that Iran is the UAE's most
serious and long-term threat, while uncomfortably cognizant
of the country's significant economic engagement with its
much larger neighbor. President Bush was reminded of Abu
Dhabi's strong views on Iran during his recent visit and
agreed with the UAE leadership that the threat continues in
spite of the results of the early December NIE. MbZ remains
urgent about setting up a defense architecture against
Iranian missiles.


6. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so
the UAE feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic
side and especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this
rough and unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our
mission in the region, the UAE leadership has consistently
pursued a cautious, non-confrontational, public posture
towards Iran. In the past, the UAE has been hesitant to
participate in certain military exercises designed to show a
strong defensive front against Iran. The UAE did, however,
send observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006, which had
a Proliferation Security Initiative theme. The decision to
host Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air and Missile
Defense theme, is another praiseworthy step. The recent
announcement during French President Sarkozy's visit of a
French naval presence in Abu Dhabi is another indication of
UAE willingness to send a strong signal to Iran.
Nonetheless, with an estimated 400,000 Iranians in the UAE,
MbZ will be cautious about a direct confrontation. Iran is
an adversary to prepare defenses against, which the UAE is
doing. Yet, it considers a certain level of engagement to be
part of that defense.


7. (C) The UAE is studying the development of peaceful
nuclear power, with the clear caveat that it will ensure
top-notch safety standards and full transparency to the
international community. The UAE faces skyrocketing
electricity needs and sees the nuclear option as a
potentially feasible answer. The Foreign Minister told us
that it seeks to show the region "the right way" to pursue
such a program, unlike the negative example of Iran.

Iraq
--------------


8. (S) The UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership maintains a
skeptical attitude towards the leadership of Iraqi PM
al-Maliki. The PM has not pursued plans to visit the UAE
since an aborted attempt in which Abu Dhabi asked that he
come on a date more convenient to them -- he had asked for a
weekend visit in mid-2007. The conversation has been
somewhat stagnant since, in spite of UAE claims that it again
extended an offer for al-Maliki to visit (an offer extended
in New York at the UNGA). The UAE has also expressed
skepticism of other Iraqi leaders (citing Sunni VP al-Hashemi
as a "Muslim Brother" in one instance),and continues to
presume that former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is Iraq's most
viable leadership candidate.


9. (S) The UAE has not moved to relieve Iraqi debt (of $3.5
billion) and may not do so while al-Maliki, perceived as too
opportunistic in consolidating support for Shi'a causes, is
in power. On the question of diplomatic representation, the
UAE sent a team to Baghdad in August 2007 to explore options
for reopening an Embassy, yet claims that the GoI (National
Security Advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubai in particular) was not
responsive to subsequent requests for assistance when the
location shown to them was deemed unsafe. Al-Rubai had
visited Abu Dhabi in late June and, according to the
Emiratis, focused his efforts on urging the UAE not to
support Iraqi Sunnis; the UAE found al-Rubai's approach
somewhat hostile. Concerns about Shi'a influence hamper a
more constructive dialogue on the part of the UAE, while they
perceive the reverse to be true in Baghdad. That said, the
UAE has engaged in reconciliation talks in the past and has
made attempts to reach out to moderate Shi'a to encourage
their engagement in the Iraqi political process independently
of Iran. Iraq was discussed during President Bush's visit,

ABU DHABI 00000159 003 OF 005


but no new ground was broken.

Afghanistan
--------------


10. (S) UAE participation in security operations in
Afghanistan was a confidential topic discussed during the
January 24 visit of the NATO Secretary General to Abu Dhabi,
while all public statements were vague and the press reported
on the UAE's "humanitarian" contributions there. UAE
schizophrenia about that mission was yet again in evidence --
MbZ wants his forces battle-hardened through actual conflict
but shies away from public acknowledgment of the mission.
MbZ did apparently confide in the SecGen that he often feels
lonely fighting in Afghanistan without his Arab brothers
contributing to the cause. The confidential setting of your
meeting is a good opportunity to endorse the ongoing
participation of UAE troops and even ask MbZ whether he
thinks enhanced participation by other Arabs is a prospect
worth pursuing.


11. (S) The UAE also aids Afghan reconstruction of roads,
mosques, medical facilities and schools, has made efforts at
political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and
assists some military infrastructure projects (runways). In
June 2007 MbZ also agreed to donate ten Mi-17 helicopters to
Kabul and that effort is underway (six of these refurbished
aircraft should be on the ground in Afghanistan by
mid-February).

Other delicate conflicts
--------------


12. (S) The UAE leadership staunchly supports Pakistani
President Musharraf (MbZ told USMC Commandant Conway in
November that if forced to decide between supporting U.S.
policy and backing Musharraf, "I'll bet on Musharraf"). They
see him as the only bulwark against instability, which
sometimes runs at cross purposes with the ideal of credible
elections based on an open, free and fair debate. You might
wish to engage MbZ on his views of how the UAE can best
encourage stability along the Afghan-Pakistani border, given
the UAE's significant influence in Islamabad (President
Khalifa made a private trip to Pakistan in late January).


13. (S) We continually engage the UAE on Lebanon, where the
UAE provides significant humanitarian and security assistance
and lends its political weight to Arab League efforts to calm
the political situation. The UAE continues a long-standing
de-mining operation, contributes resources for school and
hospital construction, assists with the airlift of
humanitarian supplies, has donated arms and ammunition to
Lebanese security forces, and shares our desire to bolster
the legitimate government. While reluctant to shun
interaction with Syria, the UAE increasingly recognizes that
nation's unhelpful role in bringing calm to Beirut.


14. (S) The UAE laments the lack of progress in Palestine,
and eyes the chaotic situation in Gaza with some confusion as
to how to best deploy humanitarian resources to assist the
Palestinians. It has donated significant security supplies
to the Palestinian Authority and money to accounts controlled
by President Abbas ($80 million last summer). One recent
shipment of over 100 vehicles and arms for PA security forces
is reportedly being held up by Tel Aviv, causing yet another
frustration in the UAE's efforts to focus its substantial
resources on building Palestinian security services. If MbZ
raises this issue, you might point out that the shipment was
not coordinated with the U.S. Special Coordinator's office,
which might have had better success in getting the shipment
through (and which is currently engaged in trying to break
the logjam on the 100 vehicles). As for Hamas, the UAE is as
allergic to that organization as are we.

High expectations for weapons release
--------------


15. (S) The UAE has committed billions to current and
anticipated Foreign Military Sales cases, in addition to over
$8.5 billion in direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16
program, one of the premier security assistance portfolios in
the region. At the invitation of the Pentagon and State
Department to deepen the security relationship by cooperating

ABU DHABI 00000159 004 OF 005


on an integrated missile defense shield, the UAE last year
submitted Letters of Request on the Patriot (nine PAC-3/GEM-T
batteries),Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile (SL-AMRAAM),and Theater High Altitude Air Defense
(THAAD) system (3 fire units),for an estimated total value
of $17 billion. It now wants the USG to make good on our
offer of enhanced engagement by pressing for expeditious
approval of these sales in the Congress. The UAE will see
our posture as a critical measure of USG willingness to truly
stand by the UAE in a contingency involving Iran.


16. (S) Other pending weapons sales include: High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, case was signed and is being
implemented now, valued at $597M),short-term interest in
purchasing three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (in LOA
negotiations) as an interim solution until delivery of a more
permanent AEW&C platform (decision expected in mid-2008),40
UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters for its Special Operations
Command (UAE has signed and the case is being implemented,
valued at $807M),10 Blackhawks via Direct Commercial Sales
from Sikorsky, ongoing upgrade of AH-64 Apache helicopters to
the "D" (LONGBOW) model, 1300 Hellfire missiles (with the
expectation of a request for an additional 1200 missiles),
and additional weapons for their F-16s (three Letters of
Request have been received, valued at over $800M).

Defense Cooperation Agreement
--------------


17. (S) In spite of differences on status of forces issues
and the use of passports/visas versus military IDs/orders for
UAE entry and exit, overall mil-to-mil cooperation with the
UAE has been excellent, with consistently reliable support at
Jebel Ali and Fujairah ports and at Al Dhafra Air Base. The
case of three Marines undergoing court action as a result of
a traffic altercation is an anomaly which we hope will be
resolved before your visit through intensive diplomatic
efforts. This case does highlight the need for a careful
review of the status of the Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA). The Embassy still believes the timing is right to
discuss the DCA with the UAE and suggests this be done at the
Joint Military Commission (JMC) working group meetings
scheduled in March 12-13 (following right after the March 11
Gulf Security Dialogue).

Keeping an eye on the horizon
--------------


18. (S) As the UAE prepares to face potential threats over
the horizon, and as our military partnership continues to
build mutual confidence that will pay off well beyond the
foreseeable time horizon, engagement visits like yours are
helpful to ensure that we have a clear understanding of what
each side expects out of the relationship. We welcome your
engagement with MbZ in particular and look forward to an
opportunity to deepen the USG dialogue with him still further.


19. (S) We offer a final summation of a few points you may
wish to make during your meetings:

-- Appreciate UAE contribution to our mutual defense; recent
high level USG visits attest to the importance Washington
places on the UAE's role;

-- Ask MbZ's views about the President's visit;

-- Acknowledge that we continue to see Iran in similar terms,
a strong argument to continue joint exercises and efforts
toward interoperability;

-- Note security progress in Iraq and the timeliness of Abu
Dhabi playing a more aggressive engagement role (opening an
Embassy, helping Iraqis get visits to UAE for official
programs, facilitating a PM al-Maliki visit, debt relief);

-- Commend UAE's long-term military commitment to Afghanistan
and inquire how other Arab states might be drawn into the
GWOT there;

-- Comment on helpful UAE contributions to Lebanon and the
Palestinian Authority yet remind that coordination with USG
can smooth delivery of goods to PA;


ABU DHABI 00000159 005 OF 005


-- Consult on best approach to pursue stability in Pakistan;

-- Commit to examine the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
as the UAE has requested; and,

-- Emphasize the ongoing strength of our political-military
partnership as key to our mutual defense.
QUINN