EXPORT CONTROL UPDATE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001382

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, T, AND ISN/CPI CHARRINGTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC PREL AE
SUBJECT: EXPORT CONTROL UPDATE

REF: ABU DHABI 323

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: MFA recently confirmed that its proposed
amendment to the Export Control Law -- to set up an independent
authority to oversee the law -- had been altered by the Presidency,
which assigned oversight to an existing committee in the Ministry of
Interior. Staffing a new authority was deemed unfeasible. MFA
offered no update on cases sent for prosecution under the Export
Control Law, but said the fact that a case was referred for trial was
a sign of success. The Ministry provided information on shipments
previously detained at USG request and sought USG help in their
disposition, while noting that intercepted shipments constitute the
tip of a much larger iceberg. The Minister of Interior lamented to
the Ambassador that the UAEG was often asked to intercept shipments
that could have been stopped at a prior port of call. The
Counter-proliferation Task Force (CTF) has been postponed to an
unidentified date in early 2009. End summary.

Export Control Law
--------------


2. (C/NF) MFA's Director of International Organizations Yacub
al-Hosani, Post's key diplomatic interlocutor on counterproliferation
issues, told Pol Chief November 24 that the amendment to the Export
Control Law recommended by the Cabinet had not been ratified, but had
been altered by the Supreme Council (the rulers of the seven
emirates) and the Presidency. The MFA (and cabinet) recommendation
to create an independent authority to oversee the Export Control law
was deemed logistically burdensome and the function was assigned to
an existing committee in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) originally
designed to oversee Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations.


3. (C/NF) Al-Hosani said the sudden decision had a certain logic, as
recruitment of personnel to staff an independent authority would be
very difficult. Consolidation under an existing entity was the
preferred option. He said the MoI committee, of which he is a
member, was active and would likely undergo some staff expansion to
meet the new requirement. (He said MFA had originally recommended
that the MoI CW committee coordinate through the new authority, but
in effect the reverse was deemed appropriate.)


4. (S/NF) Al-Hosani had no update on the first case sent for
prosecution under the Export Control Law (reftel),but said the fact
that the case was sent to trial (rather than the details of the
proceedings) was the important point and should be noted as a
success, as it showed that the legal authorities had been established
to pursue such cases. Pol Chief reminded al-Hosani that successful
prosecution, and enforced penalties, are key to an aggressive
application of the law and the source of its legitimacy. He
nonetheless had no insights into the details of the ongoing case.

Shipments of Concern
--------------


5. (S/NF) Regarding shipments previously flagged by the USG as
warranting inspection, al-Hosani said the UAEG had developed some
information to share with the USG. He subsequently provided a brief
description of actions taken in four cases, including a few
photographs. Post will translate the information and forward it to
appropriate agencies. The UAEG is requesting USG advice and
assistance on the disposition of some of the shipments.


6. (S/NF) Al-Hosani added, as he has done before, that these
shipments represent a very small fraction of the problem. For every
shipment we discuss another 100 are likely moving ahead, he lamented.
A more strategic approach to counter-proliferation would require
forceful discussions with key source countries, he said, reiterating
prior comments about China as the source of many of the troublesome
articles.


7. (S/NF) Reminded that the U.S. Congress was intensely interested
in the UAE's export control regime and often skeptical of progress,
al-Hosani indignantly stated that the U.S. administration knew of,
and often spoke favorably in public on, close bilateral cooperation.
The UAE does not want to "hear otherwise" from separate USG voices
and cannot accept congressional misunderstandings that the USG should
have coordinated in advance (essentially saying "leave us out of your
internal coordination problems").


8. (S/NF) In a separate conversation with the Minister of Interior
(before we knew that MoI would oversee the export control authority),
Minister Seif bin Zayed complained to the Ambassador that the UAEG
was asked to stop shipments that could have been intercepted in
Singapore or other "advanced" ports. Seeking UAE assistance in
intercepting goods from a developing country was understandable, he
suggested, but we should be able to work more closely with other
advanced countries. The Ambassador stressed that we work hard to
intercept goods near the point or origin but that the nature of the
work often makes the UAE the most feasible. (Comment: This
complaint continues a theme we often hear about "picking on the small
UAE" rather than stopping shipments from getting this far. We often
remind the UAE of the geographic and economic position by which it
gains both benefits and obligations. End comment.)

CTF Postponed
--------------


9. (C/NF) Subsequent to these conversations, al-Hosani notified us
of the UAEG's intent to postpone the Counterproliferation Task Force
(CTF) into the new year, citing scheduling conflicts and holidays
which prevent the UAEG from sufficient preparation before the
originally-identified date of December 15. (Note: In addition to
other commitments, the UAEG announced the closure of federal offices
from Dec. 2 to 13 for local and Islamic holidays. End note.) Post
has confirmed the UAEG's intent with more senior officials (CTF Chair
Mohammed al-Qemzi in Dubai and MFA MinState for Foreign Affairs Dr.
Anwar Gargash) but will not be able to coordinate an actual date
until mid-December or later.


10. (S/NF) Comment: Bilateral counterproliferation cooperation is
broad and active, but as these discussions confirm, we do not always
operate on the same wavelength as the UAEG. The UAE will continue to
experience personnel shortages, as the complexity of the portfolio
and the multi-agency nature of the effort calls for experts who are
not distracted with multiple portfolios; for his part, al-Hosani
juggles a myriad of issues without much back-up. Recognition of its
personnel and logistics challenges apparently led the UAEG to
consolidate the Export Control Law under the MoI rather than create a
new entity. End comment.
OLSON