Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUDHABI136
2008-01-31 15:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
how-toVZCZCXRO6278 PP RUEHDE DE RUEHAD #0136/01 0311522 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311522Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0349 INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1335 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 1406 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0412 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 1695 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 7572 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0045
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000136
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
ENERGY COOPERATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 8175
B. ABU DHABI 120
C. ABU DHABI 45
Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4
(b & d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000136
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
ENERGY COOPERATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 8175
B. ABU DHABI 120
C. ABU DHABI 45
Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4
(b & d).
1. (C) Post appreciates the opportunity to provide input on
planned U.S. engagement with select countries in the Middle
East that have expressed a serious interest in developing a
peaceful nuclear power program. We agree that an early
positive engagement is key to both demonstrating that
countries can develop peaceful nuclear power in a way that
does not increase a proliferation risk and to opening the
door for U.S. companies to participate.
2. (C) In the specific case of the UAE, the leadership
appears to be committed to evaluating the need for nuclear
power then moving quickly to implement decisions. The
proposal to bring initial reactors on line by 2017 is
ambitious. Although the UAE has committed its
participation and support to the ongoing GCC initiatives
toward peaceful nuclear energy, it is clear that the UAE
does not intend to let the GCC slow it down. Rather, the
UAE plans to have its program serve as a model for the
GCC. It appears, therefore, that we will need to deal with
the UAE on a bilateral basis, whatever our interaction with
the GCC as an organization.
3. (C) The key driver behind this program for the UAE is
clearly the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than the UAE
federal government. Specifically, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
(and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces)
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan appears to be the
driving force. The organization pushing forward
development of laws and regulations and funding the studies
is the Emirate of Abu Dhabi's Executive Affairs Authority
(EAA). The EAA is a kind of think tank for the Chairman of
the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, the same Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Energy are being brought into the process. Even so, the
MFA's coordinator for peaceful nuclear cooperation is Hamad
Al-Kaabi, an EAA employee. The General Counsel of the EAA
is taking the lead for drafting the UAE's nuclear
regulatory law (ref b).
4. (C) Post proposes the following engagement process with
the UAE:
-- High Level Visits. Both POTUS and Secretary Bodman have
expressed general support for the UAE's proposed
development of nuclear power. Post believes that the
high-level message has been passed. The need is to follow
through on expert level discussions and practical issues.
The upcoming proposed Counter-proliferation Task Force
(CTF) meeting in late February will give us another
opportunity to reiterate the USG commitment.
-- Provide Comments on the UAE's draft white paper. In
accordance with ref A, post has informed the EAA that the
paper was very well received and that comments will be
provided. The UAE is eagerly awaiting these comments and
has promised to take timely suggestions into
consideration. The earlier, we can provide constructive
comments, the better our chance will be to shape the
discussion. The UAE, after all, wants to go public with
its white paper in February.
-- The UAE has proposed sending a delegation to the U.S. in
the February 6-8 time frame. If at all possible, we should
accommodate this delegation. Ideally, post would have an
opportunity to provide comments to the white paper before
this visit to give the UAE delegation time to prepare for
the discussion. At a minimum, however, we should be
prepared to discuss the white paper in Washington.
-- Pursue GNEP and other bilateral agreements. This
dialogue appears to be compatible with the UAE's objectives
and could forward our goals as well.
-- Use the U.S. Embassy as the primary point of engagement
with the UAE, especially until the UAE's policy is agreed
on and adopted. This eases the logistical burden on the
UAE and limits any potential confusion.
ABU DHABI 00000136 002 OF 002
QUINN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
ENERGY COOPERATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 8175
B. ABU DHABI 120
C. ABU DHABI 45
Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4
(b & d).
1. (C) Post appreciates the opportunity to provide input on
planned U.S. engagement with select countries in the Middle
East that have expressed a serious interest in developing a
peaceful nuclear power program. We agree that an early
positive engagement is key to both demonstrating that
countries can develop peaceful nuclear power in a way that
does not increase a proliferation risk and to opening the
door for U.S. companies to participate.
2. (C) In the specific case of the UAE, the leadership
appears to be committed to evaluating the need for nuclear
power then moving quickly to implement decisions. The
proposal to bring initial reactors on line by 2017 is
ambitious. Although the UAE has committed its
participation and support to the ongoing GCC initiatives
toward peaceful nuclear energy, it is clear that the UAE
does not intend to let the GCC slow it down. Rather, the
UAE plans to have its program serve as a model for the
GCC. It appears, therefore, that we will need to deal with
the UAE on a bilateral basis, whatever our interaction with
the GCC as an organization.
3. (C) The key driver behind this program for the UAE is
clearly the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than the UAE
federal government. Specifically, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
(and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces)
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan appears to be the
driving force. The organization pushing forward
development of laws and regulations and funding the studies
is the Emirate of Abu Dhabi's Executive Affairs Authority
(EAA). The EAA is a kind of think tank for the Chairman of
the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, the same Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Energy are being brought into the process. Even so, the
MFA's coordinator for peaceful nuclear cooperation is Hamad
Al-Kaabi, an EAA employee. The General Counsel of the EAA
is taking the lead for drafting the UAE's nuclear
regulatory law (ref b).
4. (C) Post proposes the following engagement process with
the UAE:
-- High Level Visits. Both POTUS and Secretary Bodman have
expressed general support for the UAE's proposed
development of nuclear power. Post believes that the
high-level message has been passed. The need is to follow
through on expert level discussions and practical issues.
The upcoming proposed Counter-proliferation Task Force
(CTF) meeting in late February will give us another
opportunity to reiterate the USG commitment.
-- Provide Comments on the UAE's draft white paper. In
accordance with ref A, post has informed the EAA that the
paper was very well received and that comments will be
provided. The UAE is eagerly awaiting these comments and
has promised to take timely suggestions into
consideration. The earlier, we can provide constructive
comments, the better our chance will be to shape the
discussion. The UAE, after all, wants to go public with
its white paper in February.
-- The UAE has proposed sending a delegation to the U.S. in
the February 6-8 time frame. If at all possible, we should
accommodate this delegation. Ideally, post would have an
opportunity to provide comments to the white paper before
this visit to give the UAE delegation time to prepare for
the discussion. At a minimum, however, we should be
prepared to discuss the white paper in Washington.
-- Pursue GNEP and other bilateral agreements. This
dialogue appears to be compatible with the UAE's objectives
and could forward our goals as well.
-- Use the U.S. Embassy as the primary point of engagement
with the UAE, especially until the UAE's policy is agreed
on and adopted. This eases the logistical burden on the
UAE and limits any potential confusion.
ABU DHABI 00000136 002 OF 002
QUINN