CSAF GEN SCHWARTZ MEETS MBZ IN ABU DHABI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001229

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PREL EFIN MOPS MARR MCAP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: CSAF GEN SCHWARTZ MEETS MBZ IN ABU DHABI

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) shared his views on Iraq,
Iran, and the financial crisis with Air Force Chief of Staff General
Schwartz on October 21. He highlighted Iran's influence in Iraq and
noted that while his own view of PM al-Maliki had improved, we need
to be planning for a successor. Iraq knows that American troops are
needed for the time being and might "blink" in SOFA negotiations if
they truly feared our departure. MbZ assured his guest that the UAE
would not "let down" financial and corporate institutions in the
country in spite of market instability. In times of crisis Abu Dhabi
will be a responsible steward of the emirate's resources, he
insisted. He described a recent meeting with Iran's intelligence
chief in which the latter exuded confidence in Iran's ability to
dominate a post-capitalist financial system -- a frightening display
of overconfidence in MbZ's view. MbZ was uncharacteristically
downbeat in his assessment of the Iranian threat. End summary.

DEALING WITH IRAQ ON ITS TERMS
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2. (S) USAF Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz began his initial
courtesy call on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (and Deputy Supreme Commander
of the UAE Armed Forces) Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) by expressing
thanks to the UAE for enabling critical ISR (intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance) and refueling operations from
al-Dhafra Air Base. MbZ affirmed the UAE's warm welcome to U.S.
forces. He quickly turned a question on Iraq (regarding SOFA
negotiations) into an analysis of Iran's influence. Carefully
collecting his thoughts, he said we must first acknowledge that "the
Iranians are doing a fantastic job," working hard to influence Iraqis
in ways that the U.S. cannot. They do not share our inhibitions in
using underhanded tactics to exert influence. Speaking frankly
"among friends," MbZ said the extensive U.S. experience in Iraq is
too focused on Western modes of operation and analysis. Time is
short and we must work together, he asserted.


3. (S) Having listened closely to both Americans and Iraqis in
Baghdad during his visit earlier in the month, MbZ said in the final
analysis Iraq cannot afford to have the U.S. depart. In spite of
much pressure on Iraqi leaders to resist a prolonged U.S. presence,
we should not underestimate how dire their situation could be in our
absence. He said the GoI "might blink" in the negotiations if it
truly believed we had a plan to pull out if the agreement was not
favorable; of this he was "confident," while admitting a small chance
that his analysis may be wrong. They deal, said MbZ, based on under
the table bargaining without any price tag showing.


4. (S) Al-Maliki wants to stay in power but cannot "turn things
around," especially as Iraqis try to outdo one another in proving
their nationalist credentials (by standing up to Washington).
Describing his change of heart about al-Maliki, whom he had
previously judged by background and sectarian affiliation, MbZ said
he now recognizes the PM's national leadership goals. It is
nonetheless important to consider now who many eventually succeed
al-Maliki.

FINANCIAL CRISIS
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5. (C) Asked how the UAE is coping with the financial crisis, MbZ
said "everybody" needs to deal with it in unison. At Camp David in
June the President had asked him why oil prices were high, said MbZ,
and he responded that he had no clue. He was similarly unsure of the
reasons behind the current crisis -- the world seemed upbeat as we
watched the Olympics in China and suddenly (snapping his fingers) we
find ourselves in a financial mess. While it is premature to judge
how the crisis will end, he sensed a larger problem outside the U.S.
than within it. In both percentage terms and in absolute numbers,
Europe and elsewhere are hurting more, he asserted. The UAEG had
made a clear decision to support its banks. The leadership would not
let its banks or companies down. Abu Dhabi tries to invest wisely,
he emphasized, and "in this time of crisis, it's our duty to use it
well" to support our people and bolster confidence. Comparing the
crisis to "two or three tsunamis" at once, he hoped another tidal
wave was not on the horizon. He said the UAE would take the
decisions necessary to make sure people who invest here are secure.

AN OVERCONFIDENT IRAN
--------------


6. (S) Describing Iran's odd view of the market instability, MbZ
said he had at long last accepted a meeting with Iran's Chief of the
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),Qolan Hosein
Mohseni-Ejei, some days prior and he listened to an explanation that
the world's financial system was outdated and unable to keep up with
the times. Mohseni-Ejei said communism had collapsed in 1989, we
were now watching the collapse of capitalism, only the Iranian way
would be left. If Iran really believes its own propaganda on that

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point, MbZ feared, "we are in trouble." Such thinking reverts back
thousands of years to the confidence of the Persian Empire, said MbZ,
as Iran tries to manipulate events from Lebanon to China.


7. (S) The Ambassador suggested Iran may be bargaining for advantage
as it suffers from the pinch of financial sanctions. Even if
sanctions are very effective, responded MbZ, it was still a problem
for us all if Iran believes what it is saying -- as his self
confident MOIS interlocutor was aggressively trying to convince him.
Criticizing the nonsensical approach of Iran's leadership, as he
often does, MbZ said at least one can talk to other countries, but
not to Supreme Leader Khamenei. He worried aloud that Dubai and Abu
Dhabi are within range of Iranian missiles.

PILOT TALK
--------------


8. (C) Ever the pilot at heart, MbZ asked what air assets might be
arrayed in Afghanistan in coming months as the U.S. conducts a
mini-surge. Schwartz highlighted infrastructure limitations
hindering more robust air operations. He also discussed changes in
troop levels, noting the difficulty of adjusting support operations
(and associated personnel numbers) as fast as combat troops. MbZ
inquired about the utility of the A-10, which led to a discussion of
stresses on older aircraft that the newer UAE fleet does not often
worry about. MbZ joked that he would "pass a note" to his successor
about the challenges of older aircraft.

COMMENT
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9. (S) MbZ turned every discussion back to Iran, which reflects his
preoccupation with the threat from across the Gulf. Less
characteristic was his somewhat gloomy take on the situation. He
talked about the formidable nature of the opponent, the threat of
missiles, and the fanaticism of the MOIS chief in a way that
emphasized the challenge, rather than the response. This may have
just been an off moment for MbZ, rather than an onset of defeatism,
but it bears watching.

OLSON