Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUDHABI1162
2008-10-15 14:43:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UNITED

Tags:  PREL KNNP IR IZ AE 
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VZCZCXRO6294
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #1162/01 2891443
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 151443Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1572
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001162 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UNITED
ARAB EMIRATES

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b, d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001162

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UNITED
ARAB EMIRATES

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (U) We warmly welcome your visit, both for the Forum for the
Future and for bilateral meetings with the UAE's leadership.


2. (SBU) In the past five years, the United Arab Emirates has
emerged as one of the economic powerhouses of the region (our largest
export market in the Middle East) and attained a commensurate level
of political influence. A previously reticent leadership has been
the first within the GCC to cancel Saddam era Iraqi debt and
recognize Kosovo. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are now must-go locations for
Maliki, Karzai, Abu Mazin, and increasingly for Western leaders as
well.


3. (C) The UAE's desire to punch above its weight class reflects the
combined and occasionally competitive visions of the Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince, Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (known within the USG as
MbZ),and the Ruler of Dubai, Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum
(known to us as MbR). (The President of the UAE, Shaykh Khalifa, is
something of a figurehead, at least as far as the external world is
concerned.) At its core, the UAE has always been a coalition between
the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with Abu Dhabi being more
conservative, more "Arab," and having the vast preponderance of oil
wealth; Dubai is more cosmopolitan, more entrepreneurial, and lives
by its wits, not by pumping money out of the ground. This mixture
breeds a largely healthy competition, a sense of overall unity
combined with rivalry that is played out as much between the two
princes as between the two cities. Abu Dhabi tends to have the final
say, but can never afford to lightly stiff Dubai.


4. (C) Our bilateral relationship with the UAE has grown from a
mil-mil core (dating back to the first Gulf war) to one in which the
full range of USG Agencies interact with UAE counterparts on
counter-terrorism, economics, law enforcement, even notionally
domestic issues like Education. The closeness is exemplified by the
POTUS visit to the UAE in January, and the (separate) visits of
Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayed and Shakykh Muhammad bin Rashid to Camp
David over the summer.

--------------
Financial Turmoil
--------------



5. (C) Emiratis, like everyone else, are watching the financial
markets closely. Fully integrated into global markets, the big
sovereign wealth funds have seen their assets decline in value, and
locally there is a real lack of liquidity. The UAE Central Bank has
taken action to guarantee deposits, but subtly excluded Iranian
banks. The big question is whether Dubai, which has had a classic
speculation fed property bubble develop over the past few years, will
need at some point to be bailed out. There is little doubt that Abu
Dhabi would do so, the issue is what political or economic price
Dubai would have to pay. In terms of our interests, if a Dubai
bailout does become necessary, and Abu Dhabi has to hold a fire sale
of assets, it will diminish the UAE's enthusiasm for taking on
funding obligations on Pakistan, Afghanistan, or elsewhere in the
Middle East.

--------------
Iran
--------------


6. (C) The UAE shares our strategic assessment about the threat of a
nuclear Iran, and is supportive of our diplomatic efforts. Emiratis
believe, however, that the international community sees Iran
exclusively in term of non-proliferation terms, and does not take
account of the trouble that Iran causes in the region. We probably
see eye to eye with the UAE on this, but Europeans and Asians do not.


7. (S) The military reality for the UAE is that it is a rich small
country 80 kilometers from Iran. Put another way, a ballistic
missile fired from Iran would take no more than 46 seconds to hit
Emirati territory. For this reason the UAE asked for THAAD,
Patriots, and other elements of an integrated air defense system, to
complement their extant wing of the most advanced F-16 Fighters ever
built. The Air Defense package has just been successfully notified
to Congress, and we expect to present the Letters of Offer and
Acceptance shortly. CENTCOM is also working to deploy a battery of
US Patriots in response to a request from MbZ to POTUS;
unfortunately this has fallen into working level wrangling over cost
sharing arrangements. This issue needs to come back to the strategic
level, where we believe we have consensus.


8. (S) We like to reinforce the UAE's commitment to
counter-proliferation at every opportunity, and you may wish to thank
them for what they have done and remind your interlocutors that
constant vigilance on Iran-bound items of proliferation concern is
for the UAE an existential exercise. UNSCR 1835 on Iran was well
received. We seek ongoing cooperation in the terror finance and cash
courier fields as well.

--------------

ABU DHABI 00001162 002 OF 002


The Region
--------------



9. (S) MbZ andhis younger brother the Foreign Minister (Abdullah
bin Zayed, or, acronymically, AbZ) visited Baghdd last week, and
came away impressed with Malikiand ready to help.


10. (S) They are very concered about Pakistan, have a natural
instinct to suport Zardari (the Nahyan and Bhutto families have een
close for three decades),but are not sure tey can trust him.


11. (S) The UAE has special orces in Afghanistan which have been in
heavy figting at Musa Qala, and has gradually begun to let ts
public know about this deployment. UAE looks o augment the special
forces with aviation asset in the Spring but is facing equipment and
trainng challenges to make this timeline.

--------------
Free Trade Agreement
--------------


12. (S) US/UAE negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement were put on
hold in December 2006 when it became clear that it would not be
possible to reach consensus on certain issues, including the critical
Oil and Gas sector. The UAE is signaling clearly that it does not
want to resume negotiations before the beginning of the next
administration.

--------------
Forum for the Future
--------------


13. (C) Abu Dhabi's goal is to host a nice event, giving the floor
(cautiously) to civil society while hoping the NGOs do not offend
governments in the room. The UAE will highlight strides it has made
-- women in senior positions, limited elections in 2006, tolerance
for a resident population representing virtually every nation and
creed on earth, and active work against trafficking in persons. But
the Government sees reform as a very gradual, government guided
process, and most Emiratis are probably content with this. Rich
people make poor revolutionaries.


14. (C) In private conversations, you might reinforce the four areas
in which the USG has internally identified the need for progress in
our democracy strategy: political participation and representation,
development of an active and independent press, government
transparency, and judicial independence.


15. (C) UAE "civil society" at the forum will be primarily
government funded social organizations -- we simply have a different
definition of NGO activism. The UAE must be reminded at senior
levels that it in fact has much to gain by setting a long-term vision
of expanding civil freedoms. The Freedom Agenda has inter-emirate
implications as well, with Dubai sometimes stepping out ahead with
initiatives that appear progressive (declaration that it will not
arrest journalists) while in fact the ruling paradigm remains very
much centered on control (leading to self censorship that keeps the
press far too timid).


16. (C) If we press these issues too hard, the response will be that
we do not understand the danger posed by Isalmists. And it is
undeniable that in the UAE as in much of this part of the world, the
strongest institutions outside the state are Islam and family, not
civil society. The UAE has reassigned teachers it thought were
Islamist leaning, scripts mosque sermons, and is slow to allow an NGO
community. While we should sympathize with the security aspects of
these decisions, we should also encourage balance such that societal
frustrations are not bottled up too tightly (an increasing danger if
the economy loses its luster for a population accustomed to very
comfortable living).

OLSON