IMPLEMENTING PEACE AGREEMENT INCREASES TENSION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000008

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W-EPLUMB AND INR/AA-BGRAVES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV EAID IV
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING PEACE AGREEMENT INCREASES TENSION IN
SOME AREAS


Classified By: POL/ECON SECTION CHIEF SILVIA EIRIZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (b/d
).




1. (C) Summary: As the government of Cote d'Ivoire takes
action to implement DDR-related provisions of the Ouagadougou
Political Agreement (OPA),deep lying fissures are surfacing.
Violent confrontations in the north over the past few weeks
have exposed rifts within the Forces Nouvelles between
elements loyal to Prime Minister Soro and those loyal to one
of the masterminds of the rebellion, Sergeant Ibrahim
Coulibaly (aka IB) who is currently in exile. The return of
government authorities to the north coupled with movement to
restore government control over financial resources has
engendered resentment among those who were benefiting from
the status quo. There is also great concern that the
underlying issue of identification has still not been fully
resolved. Further incidents are likely as implementation of
the OPA proceeds. End Summary.

DDR - LOTS OF MOVEMENT BUT NOT NECESSARILY PROGRESS
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) The third complementary agreement to the OPA
provided for the Integrated Command Center (ICC) to begin
operations to re-group ex-combatants, stockpile weapons, and
disband militias no later than December 22, 2007. The
Government went to great lengths to demonstrate publicly that
it was meeting this deadline by holding ceremonies on
December 22 at the 2 locations where the government and the
New Forces (Forces Nouvelles - FN) have each deployed troops
since 2003. Government troops stationed in Tiebissou were
moved to the political capital, Yamoussoukro, and the FN
troops stationed in Djebonoua were moved to the FN
stronghold, Bouake.


3. (C) The United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
issued a statement describing the December 22 events as an
important stage in the disarmament, demobilization, and
reinsertion (DDR) process and welcoming respect for the
December 22 deadline. There is confusion, however, about
whether the ceremonies were just a show. UNOCI and French
Embassy officials told the Ambassador that both the
government and FN troops who were moved to regroupment
centers on December 22 subsequently returned to their units.
DAO sources later reported, however, that new, smaller
contingents were subsequently deployed to the same locations
and that the local populace may have mistaken these new units
for the old one. Embassy attempts to determine exactly what
may or may not have happened have revealed a remarkable
degree of confusion, including within the government, about
what is supposed to happen at the regroupment centers, i.e,
what services are to be provided and how long forces are
expected to stay at them.

PROGRESS ON OPA LEADING TO FRACTURE IN NEW FORCES
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Incidents in the last few weeks indicate growing
discontent and strain among the FN. On December 18, FN
troops in Bouake demonstrated and fired their weapons into
the air because they had not received a monthly salary
stipend. Several days later, on December 24, traditional
hunter soldiers ("dozos") blocked the Bouake-Kateola route
demanding payment for their services. Prime Minister Soro
subsequently met with them in Abidjan. On December 27, FN
troops in Bouake reportedly exchanged fire with a group of
men, killing one or more of them. Media reports about the
incident initially indicated that there was an attack by 22
men on Bouake "Zone Commander" Wattao's residence which was
repulsed in heavy fighting. In the melee, the ringleader was
killed. He was subsequently identified as a supporter of
exiled Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, who is known to be a prime
rival of Prime Minister Guillaume Soro. Subsequent media and
other reports have raised questions, however, about what
actually happened.


5. (C) DATT sources from both the French Licorne
stabilization force and an FN soldier residing in Bouake
during the December 27 incident indicate there was no battle
or attempted coup. More recent media reports quote
unidentified sources from the FN in Bouake corroborating
Licorne and claiming that FN elements under the command of FN
commanders Wattao and Morou engaged in roundups and summary
executions of IB supporters. UNOCI on January 2 issued a
statement of concern about respect for human rights related
to the attacks in Bouake.

ABIDJAN 00000008 002 OF 002




6. (C) Pro-government militias appear to be beset by similar
internal tensions as the FN. On December 29, members of two
militias, the Front for the Liberation of the Greater West
(Front de Liberation du Grand Ouest - FLGO) and the Movement
for the Liberation of Western Cote d'Ivoire (Mouvement
Ivoirien de Liberation Ouest de Cote d'Ivoire - MILOCI)
clashed in Guiglo. While the confrontation between the two
groups was reportedly the result of traditional rivalry,
MILOCI had allegedly been demonstrating because its members
had not received payments they felt were due from the
government. The leader of a pro-Gbagbo youth group seeking a
meeting at the Presidence with Gbagbo, was badly beaten by
presidential guards on December 31. The President has
promised an immediate investigation but this may be yet
another sign that established alliances are fracturing.


7. (C) Comment: While many details are unknown and some of
the facts surrounding recent events remain sketchy
(especially regarding the December 27 incident in Bouake),
Embassy believes these are signs that alliances forged during
the crisis are beginning to fracture. President Gbagbo and PM
Soro appear to be intent on implementing -- or at least
appearing to implement the OPA in order to permit elections
to be held. There appears to be significant frustration
among some elements of the FN over the fact that the issue
they care most about, identification, has still not been
fully resolved. In addition, most of the FN troops and
members of the militia face an uncertain and economically
bleak future. That future looms closer every day that OPA
implementation moves forward and the Gbagbo government
expands its control over the entire country.
NESBITT