BACKGROUND ON FN MUTINY IN SEGUELA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000500

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI IV
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND ON FN MUTINY IN SEGUELA

REF: A. ABIDJAN 492

B. ABIDJAN 459

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. DCM, ECON Chief and Political Specialist
met with senior Forces Nouvelles military leaders during a
recent visit to Bouake and Seguela, flashpoint of recent FN
violence. Emboffs had unusually frank meetings with FAFN
Chief of Staff Bakayoko and Deputy Chief of Staff Wattao,
underscoring the seriousness with which the FN took the
uprising. Wattao was widely praised by local officials with
whom Emboffs met for restoring order to Seguela and ending
the abusive, rapacious ways of Kone's men during his control
over the region. End Summary.


2. (C) During a July 15-18 trip to Bouake and Seguela,
Emboffs met with FN senior military officers and political
directors to discuss the recent uprising in Seguela. FAFN
leaders granted open meetings, reflecting the seriousness
with which they took the mutiny and their determination to
demonstrate to key international interlocutors that they now
have a firm grip on the situation. Both cities were calm.
The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
political director in Bouake reported that while the FN
military wing (FAFN) is suffering "low morale" (as evidenced
by recent insurrections in Bouake over late demobilization
payments),Bouake ComZone Cherif Ousmane's men have a firm
grip on the city. In Seguela, FAFN soldiers from Cherif
Ousmane's Bouake units had clear control over the region, but
held a low profile within the city limits. Commerce and
daily activity appeared normal in the immediate aftermath of
President Gbagbo's July 14 trip to the region.


3. (C) In a meeting with FN Deputy Political Director Cisse
Sindou, DCM asked Sindou about Gbagbo's trip and specifically
whether the timing played out Gbagbo's alleged objective of
making it appear that only he could bring control and order
to Seguela. Sindou was direct in responding that Gbagbo
could not have traveled to Seguela without the FN
guaranteeing his security. This was the first time in eight
years that he had been able to do so. He was also quite
clear in explaining that Gbagbo did not meet with any of the
rank and file FAFN during his visit - only the civilian
population and senior FN leaders. He stressed that the
uprising in Seguela was a military matter and was therefore
handled in military channels. Sindou said as signatories to
the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) the FN was
obligated to provide security for the President of Cote
d'Ivoire.


4. (C) Sindou also said that he had spent the previous two
weeks in Seguela, working with senior military officers to
bring an end to the mutiny and preparing for the President's
July 14 visit. Sindou said the FN allowed an April
demonstration in Bouake by disgruntled FAFN troops, due to
their "understandable" discontent over failure to receive
their demobilization benefits, but during a second uprising
in Bouake, the FN were forced to respond firmly in order to
maintain discipline within the ranks. As a result of the
FAFN's new approach to discipline, its troops in Bouake are
no longer allowed to carry automatic weapons (Note: Emboffs
saw FAFN troops in Bouake directing traffic and ensuring
security without their customary AKs and sporting new
uniforms. End note).


5. (C) FAFN Chief of Staff Bakayoko identified controversy
over demobilization benefits ("prime" in French) and
indiscipline within former Seguela ComZone Zakaria Kone's
troops as key elements in the events of June 28-30. Bakayoko
stressed that failure to pay the "prime" is a dangerous
gamble by the state, implicitly criticizing national level
spending priorities. Bakayoko said he personally went to
Seguela and the nearby Kani regroupment site to oversee FAFN
efforts to quell the mutiny, and that the FAFN also sent
Deputy Chief of Staff Wattao to oversee the region's
security. Wattao told Emboffs he will remain in the Seguela
area "until the whole thing is over," again underscoring the
importance of the region and the need to maintain control
over the various factions within the FN.


6. (C) Bakayoko told Emboffs that Prime Minister Soro
dismissed former ComZone Zakaria Kone because Kone had
expressed open distrust of President Gbagbo and the OPA and
had told his men the President would order an attack.
Wattao went further than Bakayoko, asserting that Kone
personally manipulated his former comrades by lying and
saying Wattao was planning to kill and torture them. UNOCI
political and military officials in Seguela underscored the
common refrain that Kone was "uninterested in DDR" and that
he was unusually corrupt. Bakayoko told Emboffs that during
the brief clash on June 28 and 29, Soro gave the FAFN a

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single imperative: to limit bloodshed if at all possible.
Following that order, reliable FAFN forces from ComZone
Cherif Ousmane Bouake unit, under the direct command of
Deputy Chief of Staff Wattao, are encamped outside of Seguela
while Wattao and other senior leaders try to persuade the
mutineers to disperse and demobilize.


7. (C) During a meeting with Emboffs in Seguela, Wattao
said he was working closely with the Integrated Command
Center (CCI) to bring the situation to closure. He
introduced Emboffs to an assistant from the CCI who was
acting as a close political advisor on the matter (Note: it
was not clear if the advisor was FANCI or an FN-affiliated
officer informally seconded to CCI, since he wore a uniform
with a CCI arm patch). Wattao said only 85 soldiers were
involved in the uprising, although local UNOCI military
sources put that figure higher, between 120 and 320. Wattao
said the situation is "80 percent" back to normal, and that
political parties are returning to the region and conducting
pre-election activities.


8. (C) UNOCI officials in Seguela said they were very
involved in calming the situation of June 28-29, and that
their mediation was crucial. UNOCI asked for the city to be
considered neutral, effectively separating the combatants
after June 28. UNOCI also asked Wattao to delay coming to
the front lines on the 29th, defusing tensions. UNOCI says
the situation in Seguela remains "tense" and that genuine
progress on DDR and regroupment is essential to lock in
recent gains in stability. Speaking in general terms, UNOCI
representatives said FAFN organization and discipline worsen
by the day, with FAFN soldiers engaged in unchecked
criminality in surrounding villages, although they credited
Wattao for beginning to bring this situation under control.
One UNOCI military officer expressed surprise that after 6
years, the FAFN had no semblance of military structures.


9. (SBU) Emboffs went to Kani to witness first-hand the
process of FAFN regroupment in Seguela. Wattao addressed
some 150-200 candidates for reintegration into the FANCI,
some of whom were presumably participants in the uprising.
Wattao stressed the need for discipline, and said a future in
the unified armed forces was an excellent opportunity for
advancement that each man needs to take seriously. Wattao
said he himself would be "resigning" sometime before the
presidential elections, but did not elaborate.


10. (SBU) Representatives from each of the three main
political parties in Seguela indicated varying levels of
satisfaction with Wattao's takeover of the region,
particularly his reduction of Zakaria Kone's previously
exorbitant transit taxes of CFA 5000 (USD 12) per vehicle to
a more reasonable CFA 1000 (USD 2.50). Overall, all of the
parties expressed some level of impatience with the FN and
were eager to see a unified national administration return to
full control.


11. (C) Comment. The FN and FAFN leadership continues to
take the Seguela mutiny very seriously, as evidenced by FAFN
Deputy Chief of Staff Wattao's indefinite assignment to the
region. FAFN senior commanders blame Zakaria Kone explicitly
for provoking the uprising, indicating he will not be allowed
to return to FN territory anytime soon. Apart from the
intra-FAFN factionalism over how to handle President Gbagbo's
political overtures and tensions created by the inability to
pay demobilization benefits (septels),control over the
Seguela region's diamond resources appears to have been a
factor motivating the conflict (septel). For the moment, the
situation appears under control. End
Comment.
NESBITT