Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ZAGREB1073
2007-12-13 10:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:
CROATIAN RESPONSE ON KOSOVO POINTS
how-toVZCZCXRO0748 PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHVB #1073 3471023 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131023Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8416 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001073
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PPD AND EUR/RPM
OSD FOR WINTERNITZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR SR KO
SUBJECT: CROATIAN RESPONSE ON KOSOVO POINTS
REF: STATE 165486
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001073
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PPD AND EUR/RPM
OSD FOR WINTERNITZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR SR KO
SUBJECT: CROATIAN RESPONSE ON KOSOVO POINTS
REF: STATE 165486
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D
1. (SBU) POL Chief on December 11 delivered reftel points to
Neven Pelicaric, Assistant Foreign Minister with
responsibility for Southeast Europe and relations with the EU.
2. (C) Pelicaric confirmed what we have heard repeatedly from
Croatian officals; Croatia would "not be the very first to do
so," but it would recognize Kosovo's independence shortly
after it is declared. Ideally, Croatia would recognize along
with the bulk of EU members. Croatia remained concerned
about Serbian reaction to its neighbors recognizing Kosovo's
independence, and believed Belgrade might well decide to
severe diplomatic relations with Croatia. The larger number
of countries that recognized Kosovo at once, the harder it
would be for Belgrade to respond with harsh measures.
Pelicaric asked, therefore, that Croatia be kept informed of
plans and consultations between the US and the EU on the
timing of a Kosovar declaration and for recognition of
independence.
3. (C) Pelicaric also inquired about planning within Kosovo
on how to respond to Serb actions or provocations. How would
the US respond, and how would the US hope Croatia and others
would respond, if the Northern Kosovo Serbs declared
secession from Kosovo upon independence? Clearly, we would
all denounce such a move as illegal, but were there other
concrete responses envisioned by KFOR or others on the ground
in Kosovo?
4. (C) Pelicaric agreed that Russian obstruction would
prevent the UNSC from being able to take any decision on
Kosovo. But Croatia expects Russia will still look to force
UNSC discussion of Kosovo in 2008, when Croatia will be
joining the Security Council. The Russians clearly can not
muster the votes for any action, but he thought Libya, when
it held the monthly presidency of the Council, could be
responsive to Russian demands for a public debate on Kosovo.
BRADTKE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PPD AND EUR/RPM
OSD FOR WINTERNITZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR SR KO
SUBJECT: CROATIAN RESPONSE ON KOSOVO POINTS
REF: STATE 165486
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D
1. (SBU) POL Chief on December 11 delivered reftel points to
Neven Pelicaric, Assistant Foreign Minister with
responsibility for Southeast Europe and relations with the EU.
2. (C) Pelicaric confirmed what we have heard repeatedly from
Croatian officals; Croatia would "not be the very first to do
so," but it would recognize Kosovo's independence shortly
after it is declared. Ideally, Croatia would recognize along
with the bulk of EU members. Croatia remained concerned
about Serbian reaction to its neighbors recognizing Kosovo's
independence, and believed Belgrade might well decide to
severe diplomatic relations with Croatia. The larger number
of countries that recognized Kosovo at once, the harder it
would be for Belgrade to respond with harsh measures.
Pelicaric asked, therefore, that Croatia be kept informed of
plans and consultations between the US and the EU on the
timing of a Kosovar declaration and for recognition of
independence.
3. (C) Pelicaric also inquired about planning within Kosovo
on how to respond to Serb actions or provocations. How would
the US respond, and how would the US hope Croatia and others
would respond, if the Northern Kosovo Serbs declared
secession from Kosovo upon independence? Clearly, we would
all denounce such a move as illegal, but were there other
concrete responses envisioned by KFOR or others on the ground
in Kosovo?
4. (C) Pelicaric agreed that Russian obstruction would
prevent the UNSC from being able to take any decision on
Kosovo. But Croatia expects Russia will still look to force
UNSC discussion of Kosovo in 2008, when Croatia will be
joining the Security Council. The Russians clearly can not
muster the votes for any action, but he thought Libya, when
it held the monthly presidency of the Council, could be
responsive to Russian demands for a public debate on Kosovo.
BRADTKE