CROATIA: RESPONSE FOR INFORMATION ON HOST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001027

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCCUNE
CIA FOR NCTC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2017
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC DHLS HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA: RESPONSE FOR INFORMATION ON HOST
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING,
AND SHARING

REF: STATE 133921

Classified By: DCM Vivian S. Walker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c)


1. (SBU) Embassy Zagreb provides the following responses to
reftel request for information regarding Croatia's policies
toward and capabilities for collection of biographic and
biometric data for terrorist screening purposes. Responses
are keyed to questions in reftel. The information provided
presents the current understanding of post's country team,
supplemented with what information we have been able to
obtain since receipt of reftel request. Post's response does
not answer every question contained in reftel, but presents
the fullest information we have been able to obtain from our
Croatian interlocutors. It should be noted that the
information provided by the GoC officials sometimes presents
a more optimistic representation of the country practices
than Embassy officers have themselves noted. In such
circumstances, post's response will note both perspectives.


2. Watchlisting:

-- (SBU ) Border officials have access to watchlists,
maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which
incorporate data from Interpol, Europol, Schengen and
National Police indices, as well as names provided by other
friendly governments. The watchlists include both terrorist
and criminal names. The number of names included in these
lists is not known, incorporating as they do other agencies'
watchlists. In theory, this watchlist is accessible at all
border crossing points, but in practice is readily accessible
only at the three primary POE's.


2. Traveler Information Collection:

-- (SBU) Host country policy is to collect traveler
information from all foreigners arriving to Croatia. In
practice, computerized collection of traveler data is fully
function only at two POE's (at the Zagreb airport and the
Bajakovo crossing point with Serbia),with installation of
computerized collection underway at nine additional POE's.
Installation at 25 more border crossing points is planned and
awaiting EU funds. GoC policy is that all non-Croatian
passports are swiped and the traveler information collected
at the two fully computerized crossing points. However, post
personnel have witnessed, and local interlocutors
acknowledged, that at most border crossing points,
particularly at land borders, incoming foreigners are
"profiled" and certain nationalities and types of passports
are waived through without inspection.

-- (C) Traveler information is also collected through
mandatory registration of tourists with local police, a
function most frequently performed by hotels and other places
of accommodation. Police and/or places of accommodation will
sometimes provide traveler information to Croatian security
services, but not on a regular basis.

-- (C) Croatian Border Police receive advance Passenger Name
Records (PNR) on incoming commercial flights. Names are
checked against watchlists. Post knows of no existing
agreements to share PNR data.


3. Border Control and Screening:

-- (SBU) Computerized collection of traveler data is fully
functional only at two POE's (at the Zagreb airport and the
Bajakovo crossing point with Serbia),with installation of
computerized collection underway at nine additional POE's.
Installation at 25 more border crossing points is planned and
awaiting EU funds. GoC policy is that all non-Croatian
passports are swiped and the traveler information collected
at the two fully computerized crossing points. However, post
personnel have witnessed, and local interlocutors
acknowledged, that at most border crossing points,
particularly at land borders, incoming foreigners are
"profiled" and certain nationalities and types of passports
are waived through without inspection. Estimates of the total
percentage of non-recorded crossings vary from negligible to
20 percent, and will also vary widely between harder border
crossings in the north to more porous crossings in the south.

-- (SBU) In determining whom to allow into Croatia, border
officials rely on the information in the combined databases.
They may also detain persons for perceived document
discrepancies. Such persons may be held only four hours. If
in this time the person is found to be of security interest,
he may be detained further. Otherwise, the person is
permitted to enter, or, if the travel document is determined
to be fraudulent, turned around at the border.

-- (SBU) In theory, information, including terrorist-related
information, is shared between government agencies and such
agencies would work cooperatively on any issues.


4. Biometric Collection:

-- (SBU) Croatia has no biometric program at this time. No
biometric information is collected at any border crossing
point.


5. Passports:

-- (SBU) Croatia does not issue a biometric passport.

-- (SBU) Replacement passports are normal, full validity
passports and bear no special notation indicating that the
passport is a replacement for a lost or stolen travel
document. Post knows of no special programs in place for
dealing with "habitual" losers of passports. Post has not
noted any increase in the number of "clean" passports used to
apply for visas.


6. Fraud Detection:

-- (SBU) Border Police take fraud detection seriously and
will open investigations. Intercepted fraudulent documents
are taken out of circulation and submitted to the
investigating court. However, embassy officials hear little
of the results of such investigations or of prosecutions of
those perpetrating the fraud. Local officials advise that
persons bearing fraudulent documents are generally deported
in lieu of prosecution.



7. Privacy and Data Security:

-- (SBU) Information relating to the questioning, detention,
or removal of persons encountered at the border is included
in the central database.

-- (SBU) Restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive
data are based on Croatian law, which is accessible to the
public. Sharing of sensitive information is also governed by
a restrictive law governing the protection of personal data,
which prohibits transmission of any personal data, even basic
biographic data, outside Croatia's borders, which also
prohibits the sharing of such data with foreign government
representatives inside Croatia outside of formal requests for
mutual legal assistance.

-- (SBU) Post does not know of a right for foreigners to sue
the government to obtain personal data or information.

BRADTKE