Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07YEREVAN935
2007-07-23 14:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

KOCHARIAN ON RADIO LIBERY, NDI, HR CASES, IRAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KPAO AM IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9938
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHYE #0935/01 2041403
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231403Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6001
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0028
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY 0091
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0395
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000935 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PRAGUE FOR A/DCM MICHAEL DODMAN AND PAO MICHAEL HAHN
DEPARTMENT FOR R, EUR/CARC, EUR/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KPAO AM IR
SUBJECT: KOCHARIAN ON RADIO LIBERY, NDI, HR CASES, IRAN


YEREVAN 00000935 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA R.V. Perina, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000935

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PRAGUE FOR A/DCM MICHAEL DODMAN AND PAO MICHAEL HAHN
DEPARTMENT FOR R, EUR/CARC, EUR/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KPAO AM IR
SUBJECT: KOCHARIAN ON RADIO LIBERY, NDI, HR CASES, IRAN


YEREVAN 00000935 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA R.V. Perina, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an almost 90 minute introductory call by
the CDA, President Kocharian defended his positions on Radio
Liberty, NDI, and human rights cases in a friendly but
unbending manner. He was determined to move Radio Liberty
broadcasts from state radio to a private network, but
emphatically assured that Radio Liberty's broadcast schedule
would be undiminished and unimpeded. The message on NDI was
similarly mixed, in that Kocharian maintained his refusal to
register NDI, which he characterized as an instrument of
revolution, but at the same time promised that authorities
would not interfere with NDI's activities and registration
would be given only after the presidential elections. On
Iran, Kocharian reaffirmed Armenia's need to have
constructive relations, and his unwillingness to embarass
Iran with critical public statements. He said that he does
raise international community concerns privately with Iran.
The president said he was prepared to free Aleksander
Arzumanian on bail if the investigation phase in Russia
stretches on too long, but was completely unforthcoming about
Levon Ghulyan. END SUMMARY


2. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that the Department and
Embassy Prague consider providing a readout to IBB and RFE/RL
officials in Washington (Gary Thatcher) and Prague (Enver
Safir, Julia Ragona) on the substance of the Radio Liberty
portion of this cable, as Embassy Yerevan lacks a secure
channel to those officials.

LOOKING LIKE A BAD TREND, MR. PRESIDENT
--------------


3. (C) CDA told Kocharian that observers were growing
dismayed by an array of worrisome issues: the seeming
campaign to drive Radio Liberty (RL) off of state airwaves,
NDI's continued non-registration, the arrest and protracted
detention of opposition politician Aleksander Arzumanian, and

the death in police custody of Levon Ghulyan. CDA suggested
that, taken together, these issues could be viewed as a
post-election rollback of Armenian commitment on democracy
and human rights. CDA recommended prompt action from the
president to resolve these irritants, especially RL and NDI,
to allay these concerns and sidestep any risk of
misperceptions.

A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE ON RADIO LIBERTY?
--------------


4. (C) CDA noted RL's long history and tradition as an
independent media voice in Armenia, and the continuing
difficulty IBB has had in concluding a valid contract with
Armenian Public Radio. Kocharian made very clear, over the
course of an extended discussion, that he is unswervingly
determined that Radio Liberty will not be carried by
Armenia's public broadcaster beyond August. He was equally
firm, though, in promising that the private radio network
alternative he put forward will not diminish RL's prominence
in Armenia. He repeatedly asserted his personal guarantee
that the private radio would maintain RL's current broadcast
schedule, and that authorities would not interfere in any way
to limit or reduce those broadcasts. CDA countered that the
private channel does not have as much geographic reach as
state radio. Kocharian argued that the difference in coverage
was limited to remote villages where RL's audience is
negligible.


5. (C) Kocharian insisted that the decision to shift RL from
state to private radio had nothing to do with RL's editorial
content, but was merely a matter of rationalizing the
programming, in the face of new Russian pressure for Armenian
Public Radio to give equal time to Russian broadcasts.
Kocharian said it was impossible to deny Russia equal access
to public radio. If both American and Russian broadcasts
were allocated so much time, there would be little time for
Armenia's own programming. At the same time, Kocharian
complained bitterly about RL's editorial policy, which he
considered "propaganda" aimed squarely against his
government. He claimed that RL broadcasts had been "fine"
until 2002, when new editorial management had taken on a
resolutely anti-regime tone. Without citing a name,
Kocharian said there was one man in charge of the editorial
policy of the Armenian Service who indulged his own
anti-government public opinion crusade against Armenian
authorities. Kocharian said he had no problem with RL's
criticism of him personally, and that spirited critiques of

YEREVAN 00000935 002.2 OF 003


the president's policies are "normal," but that what really
offended were RL's maligning of Armenian national values.
Kocharian asked rhetorically why Armenia's public broadcaster
should be required to air such diatribes.


6. (C) Kocharian said he had been careful not to make any
changes to RL's broadcasting arrangements during
thepre-election period, precisely because he did not want the
issue to be linked to the elections. Now it is time to make
the change. CDA promised to relay Kocharian's points, but
noted that since the next elections are not that far off,
many might make the same assumption about the current action.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
--------------


7. (C) CDA urged Kocharian to register NDI right away,
commenting that his government certainly had nothing to fear
from NDI. Regularizing the organization's status would be a
cost-free gesture of good faith among NDI's many influential
boosters around Washington. CDA observed that most outside
observers assume automatically that non-registration is a
form of harassment, and count this against Armenia's stated
commitment to democratization. Kocharian should act to
remove this black eye. CDA assured that NDI has no malign
goals or activities in Armenia.
Kocharian argued passionately that NDI had been responsible
for toppling governments in Georgia and Ukraine, and was
determined to do the same in Armenia. The organization was
an instrument of agitation and regime change, and Kocharian
said he would not allow it to be registered until after the
presidential elections. Kocharian named an NDI senior
executive whom he said had nursed a years-long vendetta
against Armenia's leadership and was determined to see the
government toppled from power. He complained that NDI had
worked tirelessly, if fruitlessly, to unify the political
opposition and galvanize it into a unified force capable of
taking on the government. Kocharian would not be budged in
his conviction that NDI's intentions, activities, and
fundamental goals were targeted directly at the GOAM.


8. (C) CDA protested that he has known the NDI official for
many years, and Kocharian was much mistaken in his assessment
of his motives and ability to affect events. NDI certainly
had not caused the popular uprisings in either Georgia or
Ukraine. Kocharian was not buying. He insisted that NDI
made itself a threat to Armenia's and regional stability, and
said he had a constitutional responsibility to counter that
threat. Kocharian insisted several times, however, that his
government would do nothing to interfere with NDI's programs
and activities as currently operating in Armenia. He urged
CDA to let him know immediately of any specific allegation of
GOAM interference with any NDI activities. CDA argued that
this made little sense; if Kocharian intended to let NDI
operate freely, why not get full "credit" for normalizing the
NGO's status here? Kocharian remained adamant that the
organization was free to operate but would not get the formal
approval of registration.

HUMAN RIGHTS CASES: ALEKSANDER ARZUMANIAN AND LEVON GHULYAN
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The president said he is still waiting to hear the
report of Armenian investigators working in Russia to uncover
additional evidence of Arzumanian and his partners' money
laundering activities. Kocharian said he was powerless to
make the investigation in Russia go any faster, but he hoped
soon to have an estimate from the investigative team of how
long it was expected to take. If the investigation could not
soon be finished and conveyed to the courts for trial,
Kocharian said he would have Arzumanian released on bail
until the case was prepared. Kocharian affirmed the
importance of proper procedure, but noted that there was
considerable evidence of criminal activity. The president
commented that Armenia had passed its anti-moneylaundering
law at U.S. urging and with U.S. advice, so it was ironic to
find the U.S. Embassy now questioning its application. CDA
urged that authorities make every effort to ensure the trial
is speedy, transparent, and fair. Kocharian agreed that was
his goal.


10. (C) CDA laid down a marker on our concern with the
Ghulyan investigation, and hoped that it too would be
resolved transparently. Kocharian maintained that the matter
had been investigated, including by a team of international
experts, and no impropriety found. Local human rights

YEREVAN 00000935 003.2 OF 003


critics trying to make much of the case were indulging a
vendetta against authorities. (NOTE: The international team
mentioned was comprised of European forensic pathologists who
performed a second autopsy on Ghulyan's remains. This second
autopsy was essentially inconclusive on the substance of the
dispute. It confirmed that Ghulyan most probably died of a
fall from a height, but was unable to assess whether he
jumped, fell, or was bodily thrown from a high point of the
detention center. END NOTE).

IRAN: HAVE TO WORK WITH THE NEIGHBORS
--------------


11. (C) CDA raised our concern over Iranian FM Moutakki's
visit to Yerevan earlier that day, and what it implied for
Armenia's overall relationship with Iran. This was no time
for "business as usual" with Iran, as Iran defied UNSC
Resolutions and pressed forward on its illicit nuclear
programs. This is a very sensitive issue in Washington, and
anything that smacks of new or deeper engagement will simply
not be understood. While we understand that Armenia cannot
help but have some relations with its southern neighbor, it
is very important that Armenia also show itself to be on the
side of the international community. CDA said that Armenia
could be helpful in communicating the international
community's messages to senior Iranian leaders.


12. (C) Kocharian demurred, saying there was nothing to be
gained by public statements that Iran would just find
humiliating and enraging during the course of a visit. He
affirmed that Armenia does deliver the concerns of the
international community quietly to Iranian leaders, with due
discretion for Iranian sensitivities. Kocharian reiterated
that Armenia has its own critical national interests at stake
in having trade and energy relations with Iran, and it was
his duty to protect those interests. Kocharian opined that
rhetoric now coming from the international community was
counterproductive to the goal of winning Iranian compliance
with its nuclear obligations. Direct dialogue would be
preferable to public broadsides. CDA reminded that there
have been many attempts, especially by our European partners,
to resolve the problems through diplomatic dialogue. He
reiterated that this was not an issue of bilateral
U.S.-Iranian confrontation, but the unified policy and effort
of the international community to bring Iran back into
compliance with its obligations.


13. (C) Kocharian said that Moutaki had spoken positively of
recent contacts between U.S. and Iranian representatives on
Iraq. CDA said he had no information about the content or
tone of those conversations, but Armenia's growing
relationship with Iran remained an increasing concern in
Washington.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Kocharian's warm welcome and affable style belied
his generally tough positions on each of the issues. His
unfailing smile and likable manner did nothing to conceal
stubbornly entrenched positions. We were struck by the
vehemence of his repeated "personal guarantee" that Radio
Liberty would be completely secure and protected from any
kind of interference or diminished capability on the proposed
commercial channel. We see little chance, however, of the
president changing his mind about pushing RL off the state
radio channel, given his determination on the point.
PERINA