PRESIDENT KOCHARIAN DISCUSSES IRAN, TURKEY, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000385

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM IR AJ AM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KOCHARIAN DISCUSSES IRAN, TURKEY, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT WITH EUR DAS BRYZA

REF: A) STATE 39357 B) YEREVAN 343

Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Armenian President Kocharian met for over an
hour with EUR DAS Bryza following the funeral of PM Margarian
on March 28. On Iran, Kocharian explained that Armenia, in
its precarious geopolitical situation, must carefully think
through the consequences of every step it takes with its more
powerful southern neighbor. Armenia would meet all its legal
obligations (UNSCRs, etc),but could not afford confrontation
with Tehran. He suggested that the U.S. approach to Iran was
more combative than necessary. Kocharian also emphasized how
damaging it was that the State Department's Human Rights
Report language describing the situation in NK had changed to
name Armenia as "occupying" NK. This was taken by local
media and commentators as a calculated U.S. broadside,
intended to damage President Kocharian, FM Oskanian, and the
ruling Republican Party on the eve of elections. Bryza
assured that this was not at all our intent, and we were
exploring whether we could correct the error. On Turkey,
Kocharian and Oskanian revealed their profound skepticism
about Turkey's good faith, and their weariness with a process
that looks to them designed in Ankara merely to deflect the
pressure of world opinion, while never granting Armenia the
slightest concrete result. The meeting also featured a
Nagorno Karabakh discussion, which will be reported septel.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) A GOOD, LONG TALK: President Kocharian met EUR DAS
Bryza March 28, for well over an hour, shortly after the
close of funeral ceremonies for the late Prime Minister
Andranik Margarian. Kocharian was accompanied by FM Vartan
Oskanian and presidential staffer Vigen Sargsian, while Bryza
was accompanied by CDA Anthony Godfrey and Pol/Econ chief
Steve Banks. The president was animated and gregarious,
showing their long acquaintance. Before getting down to
other substance, Bryza ofered heartfelt sympathies for
Margarian's death, and delivered to Kocharian the text of
President Bush's condolence letter (Ref A). Participants
also discussed Nagorno-Karabakh, which will be reported
septel.

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IRAN: KOCHARIAN THE CAUTIOUS BARTENDER
--------------


3. (C) Bryza explained that the United States was very
disappointed that Armenia had chosen to host Iranian
President Ahmadinejad on its soil March 19, though we
welcomed Armenia's efforts to sharply limit the prominence of
the event. Bryza remarked on U.S. chagrin that Armenia had
declined to offer a public statement in support of Iran's
UNSCR obligations, as we had requested. President Kocharian
recapped his conversation with President Ahmadinejad, as
Oskanian had earlier relayed to us (Ref B),and added that
Armenia would continue its strong coperation with the U.S. on
non-proliferation. He continued by saying that the United
States, as a large and powerful country, perhaps had the
luxury of taking a strong stand on issues such as this, even
if it could not necessarily see to the final outcome.
Armenia, he said, as a small, relatively weak country, and
direct neighbor of Iran, did not have this luxury. He must
carefully consider each and every policy step, especially on
its Iran policy, doing his best to anticipate the
consequences of his actions. He affirmed that Armenia would
comply with all of its international treaty obligations and
the requirements of the UN Security Council, as it had always
ben careful to do, but preferred to do so quietly. Picking
up his water glass, he demonstrated that if is goal were to
move the glass from one side of the table to another, he had
a choice to either lift it high and slam it down with a great
crash, turning heads all around the room to draw attention to
what he had done, or he could silently slide it across the
tabletop without drawing notice. Kocharian preferred the
latter approach in dealing with Iran: to quietly comply with
all UNSCR and other obligations, without antagonizing Iran by
making a big noise about it.

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TURKISH RELATIONS:
A CHURCH BY ANY OTHER NAME...IS INFURIATING
--------------


4. (C) Bryza noted that "we have pushed Ankara hard" to make
positive gestures to Armenia, which are politically tough for
the GOT to make. These gestures may have been halting,
incomplete, and sometimes too late (such as the 11th-hour

YEREVAN 00000385 002 OF 003


offer to allow a direct flight),but were nonetheless
progress from the Turkish side. Bryza hoped Armenia would
recognize and embrace some of these gestures, and help
develop momentum in the relationship. Kocharian replied that
he had been willing to send his Culture Minister to Van for
the Holy Cross Church reopening ceremony on Aktamar Island,
but then the controversy had arisen surrounding the GOT's
plans for the church. The cross to top the church was one
sore point. Kocharian said that Armenia had sent Turkey a
suitable cross to go atop the church as a gift, but the GOT
had refused to allow any cross to go atop the church.
Armenia also objected to the GOT retaining the church as a
state museum rather than allowing it to be used as a house of
worship. In this context, he felt it necesary to downgrade
the Armenian participation to the deputy minister level.


5. (C) Bryza explained how sensitive Turkish politics are at
the moment, with the "perfect storm" created by the
confluence of the Turkish elections, the U.S. Congressional
"genocide" resolution debate, and the U.S. inability to
deliver to Turkey's satisfaction on concerns about the PKK in
Iraq. Bryza urged Armenia not to rebuff Turkish overtures.
He asked what it would take to convince Armenians that there
is a real opening on the Turkish side. Kocharian
replied--and Oskanian strongly seconded--that, although
Armenia would reciprocate positive gestures, the GOAM is
tired of the endless cycle of gestures and discussions
leading nowhere in its Turkish relationship. What is most
important to Armenia, Kocharian said flatly, is the border.
Diaspora groups had been pressing him to support passage of
the Congressional resolution, but he had refused: "I don't
need it," he said. "What I need is the border open and an
opportunity to offset the giant trade imbalance with Turkey."
Kocharian said he understood that the United States has
many issues and priorities with Turkey, especially related to
defense cooperation, the use of Incirlik airbase, and so
forth. But this is frankly not Armenia's headache, Kocharian
said, despite Armenia's desire to be helpful to the United
States.

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NEW HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT LANGUAGE ON NK:
WHY WOULD YOU DO IT?
--------------


6. (C) Kocharian and Oskanian commented that the sentence
added in the latest Human Rights Report that "Armenia
continues to occupy the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno
Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories." was
highly inflammatory and damaging for the GOAM. He wondered
why this language was being added now, in 2007, after so many
years of conflict negotiations. Kocharian said this
statement was very widely interpreted by local media and
political observers as a calculated U.S. swipe against
President Kocharian, FM Oskanian, and the ruling Republican
Party. These commentators reported that the "real purpose"
of the revised wording must have been a U.S. desire to
undermine the credibility of the ruling Republican Party for
the May 12 elections. Local observers were convinced there
must be an ulterior agenda of this sort, because otherwise
why, in 2007, would the United States reformulate its
description of the NK conflict after so many years? Calling
the new language "outrageous," FM Oskanian said it goes
against Armenia's fundamental policy on Nagorno Karabakh, and
everything they had worked for these past fifteen years to
affirm that Nagorno Karabakh is a self-governing entity, not
an arm of the Armenian government. Oskanian said this was
the most damaging single sentence ever written during the
last fifteen years to his position as foreign minister and as
an NK negotiator. (NOTE: In a previous meeting with us
Oskanian had made explicit the point that he found the
sentence so devastating because it undermined the very
delicate arrangement under which "Nagorno Karabakh Republic"
(or "NKR") officials allowed the GOAM to negotiate on the
"NKR's" behalf--as Azerbaijan insisted. Now Armenia's
position as an intermediary was being turned against the
GOAM, with the allegation that Armenia was a hostile
occupying power controlling NK. END NOTE)


7. (C) Bryza took on board Kocharian's protest, expressed
regret for the counter-productive effect it was having in
Armenia, and assured Kocharian that there was no hidden
political agenda. He pledged to work to correct the text.


8. (C) Kocharian took the opportunity to question the
crediblity and reliability of the entire human rights report,
alleging that 60 percent or more of the facts reported were
mistaken, in his opinion. CDA pushed back, noting while we

YEREVAN 00000385 003 OF 003


understand the president's anger and concede that that one
sentence was poorly chosen, we stand behind the factual
reporting of the human rights report, and had taken
pains--including significant, ongoing consultation with
relevant GOAM officials--to be accurate in our findings. CDA
urged the GOAM to take the report seriously as sound work
overall. Kocharian barely took note of this pushback; he
barely paused in his animated and lengthy expounding of his
complaint to allow the U.S. side to get a word in on this
subject.


9. (U) DAS Bryza did not have the opportunity to clear on
this cable prior to his departure.

GODFREY