ARMENIA DISMAYED BY RUSSIAN POSITION ON CFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001015

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM AM RU
SUBJECT: ARMENIA DISMAYED BY RUSSIAN POSITION ON CFE
SUSPENSION, WORRIES OF SOUTH CAUCASUS ARMS RACE

REF: A. YEREVAN 827

B. MOSCOW 3451

C. STATE 107265

D. STATE 109573

Classified By: CDA R.V. Perina, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Armenian strategists are unanimously
chagrined by Russia's plan to withdraw from the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, believing that a functioning
CFE is very much in Armenia's national interests to restrain
a regional arms race. FM Oskanian and MFA experts tell us
they have raised concerns with Moscow. Respected local think
tanks echo the MFA's fears that Russia's withdrawal would
offer Azerbaijan political cover to do the same. Armenians
complain that Azerbaijan already blatantly violates CFE
limits on armored vehicles, but nonetheless feel the treaty
still provides some restraint on Azerbaijani arms
acquisitions. Armenian diplomats, however, nurtured some
hope that Russia could be persuaded not to withdraw from CFE,
and urged the U.S. work with Russia to assuage some
legitimate Russian concerns. END SUMMARY


2. (C) CFE A VALUABLE FORUM: Foreign Minister Vartan
Oskanian told CDA July 23 that Armenia was very concerned
about Russia's announced suspension of the CFE treaty.
Oskanian said Armenia was most directly and negatively
affected by this development. Oskanian noted that Russia has
a military base here in Armenia, and Russian equipment is
counted against Armenia's quota of treaty-limited CFE arms.
Armenia has expressed concerns about the move to the
Russians, and hopes Russia can be persuaded during the
180-day period not to pull out of CFE. The foreign minister
mentioned media reports that Azerbaijan had recently bought
40-50 tanks from Ukraine as a compelling example of the real
dangers posed by a conventional arms race in the South
Caucasus. If nothing else, Oskanian said, CFE provides
Armenia a forum in Vienna to protest Azerbaijan's weapons
purchases that put it in violation of CFE limits. Oskanian
offered a nod to Azerbaijani sensibilities as well, noting
that Azerbaijan often objected that military forces in
Nagorno Karabakh (NK) were not counted against Armenia's
quota limits.


3. (C) MEETING RUSSIA HALFWAY?: Poloffs met July 27 with
the director, Armen Yedigarian, and lower-level experts from
the MFA's Arms Control and International Security Department,
who echoed and elaborated on Oskanian's brief CFE comments.
Yedigarian termed CFE the "cornerstone of European security,"
and very much regretted Russia's move to withdraw. He also
applauded the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group as a very
useful, neutral venue for Armenia to air its concerns about
Azerbaijan's arms purchases, as well as to keep an eye on
Turkey's military posture near the Armenian border.
Yedigarian commented that Russian frustration had been
growing for several years over the West's refusal to ratify
the Adapted CFE (A/CFE) treaty, and Armenia was somewhat
sympathetic to this point of view. He urged the United
States to work with Russia to find a resolution that would
stave off Russian withdrawal from CFE. Yedigarian also
thought it would help if some Western countries were to start
ratifying A/CFE, to soften the sharp East-West divide between
ratifiers and non-ratifiers. He added that this is just one
aspect of a larger package of U.S.-Russian strategic
disagreements, most notably over missile defense.


4. (C) AZERBAIJAN'S "FORCE MAJEURE"?: Yedigarian and his
department were worried by Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign
Minister Araz Azimov's reported comment June 12, during an
extraordinary CFE conference in Vienna, that Azerbaijan finds
itself in a "force majeure" situation. Armenia took note of
the comment, and the fact that in the CFE context "force
majeure" had legal meaning only as a justification not to
allow treaty inspections to verify military equipment
holdings. The MFA took this as an early warning the GOAJ was
preparing the ground to start denying treaty inspections of
Azerbaijani stocks. He reported that France and Germany had
offered words of support about Armenia's complaints of
Azerbaijani violations, and hoped that the United States
would take a similar stand.


5. (C) THE REAL WORLD IMPACT: Sergei Sargsyan, a CFE expert
at the local NGO Spectrum Center for Strategic Analysis,
commented that the real key issue for Armenian security was
Azerbaijan's ability to punch through Armenian and Karabakhi
fortifications surrounding the disputed territory of Nagorno
Karabakh. While treaty-limited heavy weaponry (such as
tanks, large caliber artillery, and combat aircraft) are of
only limited use for sustained combat operations in the
ruggedly mountainous terrain in and around NK, he said, they
would be critical to Azerbaijan's ability to penetrate the

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entrenched defensive ring that Armenian/Karabakhi forces have
built up around the disputed territory over the past 13
years, and could make a decisive difference in the early
phase of any future conflict.


6. (C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION: Yedigarian asked us if we
could provide additional information on two aspects of this
issue. First, he desired more information about the U.S.
view and negotiating position with Russia on CFE and missile
defense. He commented that Armenia is periodically able to
get readouts from the Russian MFA about the Russian
perspective on these discussions, but he knew comparatively
little about the U.S. position. Second, Yedigarian wondered
about the United States' view of Azerbaijan's position
vis-a-vis the CFE treaty, and what significance we ascribed
to DFM Azimov's "force majeure" remarks. Post deployed
points from refs C and D to brief Yedigarian on the state of
U.S.-Russian talks.
PERINA