Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07WARSAW937
2007-04-23 13:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:  

POLAND-IRAQ: GOP REAFFIRMS MND-CS COMMITMENT

Tags:  MARR PGOV PREL PL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4623
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHWR #0937/01 1131330
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231330Z APR 07 ZDS CCY
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4023
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000937 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY - CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED -

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PL
SUBJECT: POLAND-IRAQ: GOP REAFFIRMS MND-CS COMMITMENT
THROUGH 2007, LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR 2008


WARSAW 00000937 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000937

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY - CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED -

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PL
SUBJECT: POLAND-IRAQ: GOP REAFFIRMS MND-CS COMMITMENT
THROUGH 2007, LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR 2008


WARSAW 00000937 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 30, an interagency delegation met
with GOP officials to press for a GOP commitment to maintain
Polish troops and bases in Iraq through the end of 2007 (del
list in para 2). The common Polish position was a commitment
to keep Polish troops in Iraq throughout 2007 with a
possibility for deployment in 2008, but there was not yet
full commitment to keeping open both camps in the Polish
sector (Camp Delta in Wasit Province and Camp Echo in
Qadisiyah Province). The U.S. delegation made clear the new
urgency for continued Polish leadership: the fact that a
collateral effect of the Baghdad-Anbar centric surge is
pushing some terrorists/insurgents out of Baghdad into the
Polish sector, and the need for Polish self-sufficiency so
that no U.S. troops need to be redeployed to assist. END
SUMMARY.


2. State-DOD Delegation consisted of:

Amb. Lawrence Butler, NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary State
for Iraq
Debra Cagan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Coalition and Multilateral Operations (Acting)
RADM John Miller, Deputy Director, CCJ5, CENTCOM
Peter Evans, Deputy Director Iraq Political-Military Affairs.
State
David Glancy, Senior Advisor Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, State
Matthew Minatelli OSD Coalitions, DOD
LTC Vince O'Connor, OSD Poland Desk, DOD
LTC Brian Pearl, Joint Staff Coalitions

--------------
NSA Stasiak
--------------

3. (S) During a meeting with Secretary of State and National
Security Advisor Mr. Wladyslaw Stasiak, the Ambassador,
PolMil Counselor, and Defense Attach joined the delegation
wherein Amb. Butler provided an overview of the most recent
political developments in Iraq, RADM Miller provided a
security update, and DASD(A) Cagan provided a detailed
rationale for the need for an ongoing deployment of Polish
troops in the two camps, Delta and Echo. Specifically, Ms.

Cagan noted that in light of early success of the
Baghdad-Anbar centric surge, terrorist and insurgent elements
were being forced out of Baghdad into outlying areas
including the Polish sector (Wasit and Qadisiyah Provinces).
As such, Ms. Cagan noted that General Petraeus assesses the
Polish sector as a critical chokepoint that cannot be
downgraded or left unmanned.


4. (C) NSA Stasiak replied cautiously, and was non-committal,
down-playing the value of the Polish "Division" and
questioned whether one camp might not be more efficient than
two. He emphasized the importance Poland assigns its
relationship with the U.S., but flagged that Poland wanted to
make its decision in a larger Iraq context. During a
follow-on discussion with just the Ambassador, Butler, Cagan,
Nowak and Miller, Stasiak was more direct in communicating a
political need for Poland to have a more concrete deliverable
for continuing its deployment in Iraq in both camps at
current troop levels.

--------------
MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski
--------------

5. (C) MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski reaffirmed the Polish
commitment to Iraq until the end of the year without
addressing the issue of the two camps. He provided his own
assessment of the problems in Iraq and the challenges for
Poland: attacks on the Polish sector have risen as a result
of the surge, the police are sub-par and infiltrated by
militia; Waszczykowski asserted that politicians see no
political/economic benefit from Poland's engagement in Iraq
other than selling arms. He also questioned why Poland's
troop deployments and national sacrifice earn it less than
countries like Iran and France, who seem to get a seat at the
table simply by making trouble. Waszczykowski asked that
Poland be invited to the upcoming expanded neighbors
conference, more than once drawing contrasts between Poland's
contributions to Iraq and other less Iraq-staunch G-8
contributors such as Germany, France, and recent ex-Coalition
member Italy.


WARSAW 00000937 002.2 OF 003



6. (C) Amb. Butler conveyed the USG request for Poland to
keep both camps open at current troop levels until the end of
the year. He provided an extensive outline of the Iraqi
political landscape, and more recent actions that USG sees as
reinforcing national reconciliation such as Iraqi progress on
the foreign investment law, hydrocarbon law, deba'thification
law, stand-by agreement on fuel subsidies, and the new
resistance to Al-Qaida in Iraq by Anbar sheikhs. President
Talabani plays a crucial role in the reconciliation effort.
In terms of USG efforts to assist Iraq, recent noteworthy
efforts include the D/USD effort on State Owned Enterprises,
and the joint State-DOD surge of ten new Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).


7. (S) Admiral Miller noted in the course of his security
overview that Poland's deployment frees the U.S. for the
Baghdad Security Plan (BSP),an Iraqi-led operation. He
outlined the Iraqi command structure for the BSP, and noted
that once U.S. troops reach full force in July there will be
a two to one ratio of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to
Coalition Forces (CF). Iraq's effort is an integrated one
involving CF-ISF synergy and Iraqi army-police cooperation.
Ms. Cagan emphasized the frequency of POTUS-Maliki
consultations to underscore the improved cooperation between
Iraq and the U.S. on the New Way Forward, and offered the
assessment that Poland's role in Iraq is of more importance
now than at any other time since the beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom.

--------------
MOD U/S Boguslaw Winid
--------------

8. (C) Following the USG presentation on Iraqi politics and
security, MOD Undersecretary of State Boguslaw Winid was
pointed in his interventions, beginning with the observation
that he has been receiving similar U.S. delegations on Iraq
since Jay Garner in 2003. He noted Poland is in a difficult
and unpredictable political environment and faces a hostile
parliament coupled with low public opinion. Winid asked what
he could show to the Polish people his country is deriving
from working with the U.S. in the war on terror beyond
coffins from Kabul. He wove in Poland's equities on other
issues with Iraq, ranging from Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to missile defense and
Poland's "top priority" of deploying to Afghanistan.


9. (C) The DCM clarified the limiting factor for proceeding
with FMS involved paperwork needed from the Polish General
Staff and had no basis in any perceived lack of rewards for
service in Iraq. Amb. Butler offered Winid USG resources in
assisting Poland with a legislative strategy, including
copies of reports sent to the U.S. Congress (DOD's 9010 and
State's 1227 and 2207 reports),noting that Poland's history
demonstrates all too well the value of a nation's struggle
for freedom.


10. (C) Winid noted that a continued Mongolian deployment is
an important and necessary but not sufficient condition in
keeping both camps open. He also cited the deployments of
Romania, and possible departures of El Salvador and Slovakia
as affecting Poland's decisions. Winid committed to seeing
if there was a floor in the number of Polish troops needed to
keep both camps open.

--------------
General Staff
--------------

11. (C) Butler, Cagan, and Miller met with Deputy Chief of
the General Staff Vice Admiral Tomasz Mathea separately from
the rest of the delegation. Mathea flagged Poland's need for
intelligence -gathering Unmanned Aerial Vehicles should
Romania depart and take that platform with them. Butler and
Cagan reaffirmed points on need to keep both Delta and Echo
opened, while Nowak explained the delay in getting GOP/MOD
formal request in order to begin the lengthy order process.
DASD Cagan noted the unlikelihood of UAVs slated for U.S.
forces in combat zones being redirected to non-U.S. partners
at this point.


12. (C) Polish Joint Staff working level communicated great
enthusiasm for maintaining both camps in the Polish sector
and affirmed to the other members of the U.S. delegation
their intent to recommend as much to their superiors.

COMMENT
--------------

WARSAW 00000937 003.2 OF 003



13. (C) The delegation effectively reinforced with Polish
leaders the new urgency and rational that the New Way Forward
and civil-military surge provides for a continued Polish
presence in both camps through the end of the year. If we
can continue to assist Poland in maintaining the other
countries' troop levels in its sector, combined with a
consistent and strong message about the value of the Polish
deployment in Iraq, there is a good chance GOP will make the
right decision for 2007 and even possibly 2008. In this
regard, it will be important that Poland receive an
invitation to the May 4 neighbors ministerial in Sharm
el-Sheikh. END COMMENT


14. (U) This message was cleared by Amb. Butler, DASD(A)
Cagan and RADM Miller.
ASHE