POLAND'S PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RECONCILIATION WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 002395

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG ETRD KDEM PL RS
SUBJECT: POLAND'S PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RECONCILIATION WITH
RUSSIA

REF: A. MOSCOW 05761

B. WARSAW 02369

Classified By: DCM Kenneth M. Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: For practical reasons, the new Polish
government is committed to improving relations with Russia
(ref A) without abandoning core principles on democracy and
energy security. Prime Minister Donald Tusk's decision to
stop opposing Russian OECD membership was the first in a
series of gestures that culminated in Foreign Minister Radek
Sikorski's announcement of "a new chapter" in Polish-Russian
relations - to include long-delayed ministerial level visits
and Missile Defense consultations. Along the way, Poland's
President Lech Kaczynski has made clear his disagreements
with the PM over Russia policy - but these have more to do
with style than substance. For now, both the President and
the PM await official Russian action to lift the ban on
Polish food imports (ref B) before reciprocating by dropping
Polish opposition to an EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA). This reciprocity lies at the heart of
Poland's new approach to relations with Russia. END SUMMARY.

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Steps Toward Rapprochement
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2. (C) On November 27, just days after coming to office, PM
Tusk announced that his government wanted more dynamic and
open relations with Russia. He launched the new effort by
reversing his predecessor's tough stance and announcing that
Poland would no longer block Russia's bid to join the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
This opened the door for Russia to lift a two-year old ban
on fresh meat imports from Poland (ref B). In response, on
December 12 Polish Minister of Agriculture Marek Sawicki and
his Russian counterpart Aleksey Gordeyev announced in Moscow
that the Russian ban would be lifted following the signature
by Polish and Russian veterinary authorities of a bilateral
food safety agreement in Kaliningrad during the week of
December 17. However, the Russian embargo on Polish poultry
and selected plant products remains in place for the time
being.


3. (C) Tusk offered more reconciliation with his comments on
the results of the Russian Duma elections of December 2, at
first seeming to be courting Moscow by downplaying
international concerns over the validity of those elections:
"We don't know the official results, ...but it is beyond
question that 'United Russia' has turned out to be the
winner. We are concerned with signals that not everywhere
the elections were conducted according to the standards of
democracy as we understand it."


4. (U) Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski continued the
PM's theme by announcing the "opening of a new chapter" in
Polish-Russian relations after meeting with Russian FM Sergey
Lavrov in Brussels on December 7 - the first bilateral of
this type since November 2006. Sikorski described it as a
"friendly" conversation and noted that the two FMs had
determined that "Polish-Russian relations will no longer be a
taboo subject." He reported that from "the mouth of Lavrov
came the declaration that Russia treats Poland as an
important and normal member of the EU." Sikorski cited signs
of a thaw, including: an invitation from Moscow for PM Tusk
to visit Russia in February 2008 (no such visits having
taken place since January 2005); Lavrov,s invitation to
Sikorski to do the same; the resurrection of the
Polish-Russian bilateral commission, with former FM Adam
Rotfeld as the Polish co-chair. Sikorski and Lavrov also
determined to hold Polish-Russian ongoing consultations on
consular services and Missile Defense. Deputy FM Kislyak is
scheduled to travel to Warsaw on 8 or 9 January with a team
of experts for the first round of MD consultations, at which
time he would offer the Russian policy perspective as well as
its technical analysis of U.S. MD proposals.

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Ractions
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5. (C) After facing public criticism both domestically and
internationally that he was acquiescing to Russian President
Vladimir Putin's undemocratic approach, Tusk hardened his
stance, while still trying to avoid confrontation with
Moscow. On Russian elections, Tusk said at a December 4
press conference in Brussels that he was "skeptical and
critical" about the "organization" of the ballot, but did not
question the final results. Tusk also fired a volley, but
not a barrage, in response to Russian General Yuri

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Baluyevskiy's December 15 declaration that an MD site in
Poland would destabilize the continent, and that any
interceptor launch from Poland would trigger an automated
response from the Russian strategic nuclear weapons system.
Tusk labeled Baluyevskiy's remarks "unacceptable," and FM
Sikorski helped to defuse the tension by noting that
Baluyevskiy had always been a hardliner on MD and "had
already used strong language in the past."


6. (C) President Lech Kaczynski (whose twin brother Jaroslaw
was PM in the previous government) expressed amazement over
Tusk's decision to drop opposition to Russia's OECD bid and
complained that no one had consulted him. Presidential
Chancellery head (and former FM) Anna Fotyga echoed the
President's complaint, stating that the change of policy on
Russia's OECD bid signaled that Poland was ready to
subordinate democratic ideals to big business and had
forgotten about countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and the
Baltics who suffered from Russian intimidation. She
rhetorically asked if Poland was "selling Georgia" in order
to end Moscow's ban on Polish beef. Despite this public
clash, however, President Kaczynski has made no effort to
block or change the substance of Tusk's new initiative.
Fotyga declared that the Presidential Palace was not an
alternative foreign policy center, but rather a crucial
element of the nation's foreign policy process, and should
have been consulted.


7. (C) Shortly after this public dispute, the MFA Eastern
Policy Director Wojciech Zajaczkowski told us that he saw a
difference more in style than in substance in the new
approach to Russia. "Basically, there is no difference
between the President and the Government" on Russia policy,
although there are variations in "presentation." He warned
that, "There is no sense in overemphasizing the difference
between the President and the Prime Minister. Both
understand it is impossible to conduct separate foreign
policy." (COMMENT: Zajaczkowski seems to have the confidence
of both President and PM, having accompanied Kaczynski on his
December 6-7 trip to Ukraine only a day after participating
in Tusk's December 4 visit to Brussels. END COMMENT)

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Wary Rapprochement
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8. (C) Poland's new approach does not signal a new found
trust in Moscow, but rather a practical effort to reduce
conflict. During December 12 Missile Defense consultations
with Acting U/S Rood, Sikorski described the basis of
Poland's rapprochement: "We have enough problems with Russia
already - we don't need to create more." Sikorski added,
however that, "I don't have to prove my anti-Russian
credentials here in Poland, but there is no point in poking
them in the eye. We are done with 'honor games' here in
Warsaw. We'll leave those to the Russians."


9. (C) This reciprocal approach to Russia also surfaced in
Zajaczkowski description of Poland's approach to the Russian
meat ban: "A positive resolution to the meat embargo is a
precondition; it is the main obstacle in our relationship."
Zajaczkowski said that Russian diplomats had told him the
meat embargo was a failed policy and Moscow was just looking
for a face-saving exit from the current impasse. The change
of government in Warsaw had provided that opportunity, and
Zajaczkowski expected a resolution to the issue before the
new year. Zajaczkowski speculated that the ban had in fact
been Moscow's attempt to see how far the EU would wade into
bilateral affairs. He added that, in exchange for Moscow
lifting the ban on Polish meat, Poland would drop its veto of
the mandate for a new Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA). In remarks to the press on December 14, PM
Tusk clarified that Poland would drop the veto only if and
when Russia ended "all" remaining restrictions on food
imports from Poland - not just those on fresh pork and beef.


10. (C) This is a cautious rapprochement, however, as Poland
understands that its continued focus on democracy promotion
in former Soviet states will be a source of tension in the
relationship. This friction first surfaced in 2004 when then
President Aleksander Kwasniewski played a key role in
Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Zajaczkowski conveyed that,
despite efforts to reduce tensions with Russia, Poland would
not yield on democracy. With regard to Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine, he commented, "We (and the Russians)
will come down on different sides." There are numerous
examples of Poland's ongoing commitment to the post-Soviet
space. Poland hosted in November a donor's conference for
Belarusian Satellite Television (BELSAT),which transmits
uncensored Belarusian language broadcasts into Belarus. On

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December 6, President Kaczynski and Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko signed an agreement on "Common Challenges -
New Dimensions of Strategic Partnership," after which
Kaczynski said the Ukrainian people would have to make their
own choices but, "We are convinced that Ukraine will become a
NATO and EU member." Poland has also consistently supported
the democratic process in Georgia, most recently dispatching
Adam Michnik, Solidarity icon and founder/editor-in-chief of
Poland's influential daily Gazeta Wyborcza, to Tbilisi as a
media freedom ombudsman in the run-up to Georgia's January 5
presidential elections. Michnik's EU-backed efforts resulted
in a December 3 agreement allowing independent television
station "Imedi" to resume broadcasts in Georgia.


11. (C) Concerns over energy security will also remain a
source of friction in Polish-Russian relations, even as
efforts to reconcile move forward. During their December 6
meeting, Kaczynski and Yushchenko discussed extending the
Odessa-Brody oil pipeline from the Ukraine into Poland.
While visiting Berlin, PM Tusk discussed with German
Chancellor Merkel the GOP's concerns regarding the proposed
"Nordstream" Baltic Sea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany,
which would bypass Poland. Warsaw worries that Nordstream
would provide the Russian government with a new way to supply
gas to Western Europe, increasing Russia's ability to disrupt
Polish energy supplies without impacting Germany badly. The
Tusk government is promoting renewed discussion of the
alternative land-based "Amber Route," that would pass through
Poland and the Baltic States to Germany.

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Poland is Ready for Realpolitik "light"
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12. (C) COMMENT: The style and tone of Poland's new
government vis-a-vis Russia has shifted significantly and
seems to be paying off. Despite some public wrangling, there
is no sign of a real substantive split between the President
and the PM over policy. In a very practical way, Poland
seems poised to return every favor offered by Russia.
However, given Poland's role as a champion of democracy and
its need for energy security, this reciprocity has limits.
For now, though, there exists ample room for the more dynamic
and open relationship that Prime Minister Tusk has invited.
END COMMENT.
HILLAS