Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07VILNIUS791
2007-11-02 15:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vilnius
Cable title:  

LITHUANIAN IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL IZ LH 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVL #0791 3061539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021539Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1748
INFO RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 3356
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 6980
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 3683
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000791 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ LH
SUBJECT: LITHUANIAN IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

REF: A) STATE 150164 B) VILNIUS 759 C) VILNIUS 121

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CLOUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000791

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ LH
SUBJECT: LITHUANIAN IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

REF: A) STATE 150164 B) VILNIUS 759 C) VILNIUS 121

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CLOUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. We have conducted an assessment of the legal
and political challenges posed to Lithuania by the expiration
of a UN Chapter VII mandate per ref A. We conclude that the
GOL will not raise any legal concerns, but we believe the
political opponents of participation in Iraq will use this
situation and other political considerations as weapons to
attack deployment supporters in the government and to prevent
future deployments. End summary.


2. (C) Lithuania currently has international troop
deployments in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These
deployments fall under the Lithuanian Parliament,s blanket
authorization for up to 420 troops in international missions,
valid until 2010, based on the decision of the Minister of
Defense. The next Lithuanian troop deployment to Iraq will
be under U.S. command (ref B),and we do not foresee any
legal difficulties if a SOFA or mandate covering forces under
U.S. command were to be used to cover Lithuanian troops. We
believe that, of the scenarios presented in ref A, the GOL
would most likely prefer scenario A whereby Lithuania would
become a party to an agreement concluded between GOI and USG
after being a participant in negotiation. This would give
Lithuania the benefit of using the clout of the USG to ensure
a favorable agreement while giving the GOL at least the
visible status as a fellow negotiator that didn't just take a
deal, but helped to create it. The GOL's initial decision to
enter Iraq was made with eyes wide open, and was
characterized both publicly and privately as a coalition of
the willing. We do not believe that operating without the
umbrella of a United Nations Chapter VII mandate will be a
significant legal issue for the GOL.


3. (C) We do, however, see political considerations causing
trouble for any deployments beyond the next one, and loss of
Chapter VII cover will not help in this regard. Recently,
several members of the parliament publicly complained about
not having being consulted on the most recent decision for
Lithuanian troop deployment in Iraq (ref C). Some MPs who
have not voiced their concerns publicly have privately
expressed the sentiment that, while not required by law,
DefMin Olekas should have discussed the deployment with
parliament as a courtesy. While we do not face the kind of
constant, public calls for Lithuania to pull out of Iraq as
do some of our European colleagues, the most recent Gallup
poll of public opinion in Lithuania found 83 percent of
respondents were opposed to the war in Iraq and 68 percent
opposed the presence of Lithuanian troops in Iraq.


4. (C) In addition, some members of the GOL -- including
Defense Minister Olekas -- have previously tried to prevent
continued deployments to Iraq (ref B). Significant
diplomatic effort was required to reach agreement on the
upcoming deployment (ref C). Olekas is now publicly
committed to at least one more six-month deployment, but has
been careful with his language, for example stating that
Lithuania will consider additional rotations, but has no
plans for a follow-on deployment at this time. Other factors
would also make future deployments difficult. Any troop
withdrawal by Poland will create an even more difficult
political environment in Lithuania for supporting continued
deployments. In addition, we expect it would be hard for the
GOL to sustain a deployment if any casualties are suffered by
Lithuanian troops in Iraq. Finally, parliamentary elections
are scheduled for mid-October of 2008 and we predict that
many MPs will come out against future deployments for the
reasons mentioned above. Any additional hurdles, including
the loss of a Chapter VII mandate, will only give them more
"reasons" to point to for withdrawal.


5. (C) Even without the failure to renew the Chapter VII
mandate, we will have our work cut out for us to sustain the
Lithuanian contribution in Iraq. The GOL generally views its
contributions in Afghanistan as its number one priority.
Lithuania runs the PRT in Ghor province, and gets constant
positive feedback on this contribution at NATO meetings. To
the GOL, Iraq and Afghanistan commitments compete with each
other. If we hope to keep Lithuania engaged in both, we must
be careful not to send conflicting messages about where our
priorities lie.
CLOUD