MANAGING POSSIBLE DPRK REFUGEES IN VIENTIANE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000006

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CHANGED QUOTATION MARKS AND DASHES IN
PARA 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, AND 15

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/K, DRL/SENK, PRM, DRL, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: LA PHUM PREF PREL SMIG TH
SUBJECT: MANAGING POSSIBLE DPRK REFUGEES IN VIENTIANE

REF: 06 STATE 203879

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA M. HASLACH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D)


1. (C) Summary: Following receipt of reftel, which outlines
steps Embassy Vientiane should take if approached by a North
Korean asylum seeker, DCM and Pol/Econ Chief met with
Republic of Korea (ROK) Embassy Counsellor Miyon Lee. Ms.
Lee provided updates on recent cases of North Korean asylum
seekers in Laos as follows: 1) there is no news on three
girls who are reportedly being detained in Laos, 2) the five
people who were arrested and facing deportation to China are
still in Laos, and 3) a total of ten people, including the
two children reported in the press to have sought refuge in
the South Korean embassy, are all in Thailand now. Ms. Lee
expects that more North Koreans will surface in Laos soon.
She said that her embassy is able to handle the current
volume of asylum seekers by dealing discreetly with private
individuals who are assisting them but will face problems if
the numbers increase. The Ambassador plans to follow up with
a meeting with the ROK ambassador to enhance cooperation
between the two embassies.


2. (C) In a subsequent meeting, the Ambassador briefed
newly-arrived UN Resrep Rana, the UNDP representative in
Laos, on the recent North Korean cases as well as on a
January 2005 incident in which a North Korean who had sought
asylum at the U.S. Embassy was eventually allowed -
on a one-time basis - by the Lao and Thai governments to
depart Laos for Thailand where UNHCR met him and facilitiated
his travel to Seoul with the ROK Embassy in Bangkok. Both
the Ambassador and Ms. Rana agreed the new Thai government
was less likely to offer such support. Ms. Rana, who serves
as the UNHCR representative in Laos, is planning to meet with
the UNHCR/Bangkok to discuss how the UN would handle a North
Korean asylum case in Vientiane. At present she sees working
discreetly with the ROK Embassy in Vientiane as the best
option. End Summary.

ROK Embassy Official Updates on Recent Cases
--------------


3. (C) The DCM and P/E Chief met January 3 with ROK Embassy
Counsellor Miyon Lee to discuss handling DPRK refugees. Ms.
Lee complained at the outset about the burden placed on the
small staff of the ROK Embassy because of DPRK refugees. She
expects the flow of DPRK refugees to increase, noting that
some "activists" had moved to Vientiane from Bangkok after
having been expelled from Thailand.


4. (C) Reviewing recent cases of North Korean asylum seekers
in Laos, Ms. Lee said that a total of ten DPRK refugees,
including two who had entered the ROK Embassy last month, had
now made their way to Bangkok. There was no new information
on the three teenagers who have been detained for an extended
period, reportedly at Vientiane Municipality headquarters.
The five who have been formally arrested remain "on hold;"
she added it remains unclear whether the five in this group
are really North Koreans or Chinese.

ROK Embassy Official Urges Discretion
--------------


5. (C) Ms. Lee indicated that press reports about the group
of five who have been arrested (or about any refugee group)
would be not helpful. Nor did she believe that a demarche by
the ROK or another country such as Australia on behalf of the
imprisoned individuals threatened with deportation to China
would be helpful. She said that only low-key approaches had
the potential for being effective. She commented that, once
an issue moves to a formal level such as a demarche, the
efforts of Lao officials who want to be helpful (such as
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials) are inevitably
thwarted by hard-liners within the government.


6. (C) Although Ms. Lee indicated that a group which is
formally arrested is almost inevitably returned to China, in
this case she still saw a small possibility that relatives or
others might be able to persuade the GOL against sending the
group members back to China. If they really wanted to go to
South Korea, they would just try another way. On the other
hand, Ms. Lee told the DCM that the DPRK has asked the GOL to
follow its own rules and return this group of five to China.

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If the formal process to return them begins, it will require
consultations and other legal steps which may take a long
time. During this time, the case may become public, she
opined.


7. (C) When asked about the use of publicity by activists to
support the refugee process, Ms. Lee suggested that over-use
of the media had caused journalists to lose interest in the
story. She also noted that the ROK Embassy in Vientiane had
persuaded MFA Seoul that publicity about any refugee case
would not be beneficial (suggesting that MFA had passed that
message on to South Korea,s media organizations).
Nonetheless, Ms. Lee noted that ROK journalists had visited
northern Laos (to see trafficking routes) and Vientiane (to
look at "hideaways") and had written stories about the
process in South Korean newspapers (which had apparently
never come to the attention of the Lao Embassy in Seoul).

Procedural Issues Related to Asylum Seekers
--------------


8. (C) In response to a question from the DCM, Ms. Lee
indicated that, if a possible DRPK refugee were to enter the
U.S. Embassy, someone from the ROK Embassy such as herself
could be invited to come to the U.S. Embassy to "informally
chat with the person." She added that, if a DRPK citizen
really wants to go to the ROK, the ROK Government would not
refuse. As long as refugees are not arrested, there are ways
to move them eventually to Seoul, she said.


9. (C) Ms. Lee said that she does not believe UNDP has a
useful role to play with regard to asylum seekers (even in
its role as UN Resrep). The ROK experience is that any
negotiations with the GOL regarding DPRK refugees have to be
done informally, and "the UNDP does not have an informal
level." She noted that the ROK embassy had asked UNICEF for
assistance regarding the three detained girls. UNICEF tried
to help, suggesting that the girls be moved to a children,s
center supported by UNICEF, but its intervention was
unsuccessful. The GOL apparently denied having any
information about the three. Asked what UNDP could do to
help, Ms. Lee said that it might be good if UNDP were able to
issue transit passes on behalf of UNHCR to allow refugees to
travel to the UNHCR Bangkok office. (Comment: we doubt the
Lao Government would actually accept "transit passes" from
UNHCR for travel.)


10. (C) Ms. Lee expressed some frustration with UNHCR
Bangkok, noting that when the ROK Embassy called for
assistance with the two children who had entered the ROK
Embassy last month, UNHCR was not willing to pick up the
children in the Thai city of Nong Khai, directly across the
Mekong River from Vientiane. The ROK Embassy had to find
another way to get them to Bangkok. This involved using
activists or handlers, but Ms. Lee made clear the ROK Embassy
did not pay the activist or handlers directly for their
assistance. She indicated, though, that the families of the
refugees wound up paying.

Discussion on Asylum Seekers with UN Resrep
--------------


11. (C) On January 4, the Ambassador and DCM met with UN
Resrep Sonam Yangchen Rana, who heads the UNDP office here.
Ms. Rana arrived in Vientiane in November 2006. The
Ambassador briefed Ms. Rana on the recent North Korean cases.
Ms. Rana said that the UN had tried to track the three
detained girls through the UN trafficking project and the Lao
Women,s Union but was not successful.


12. (C) The Ambassador also described the January 2005
incident in which a North Korean citizen named Mr. Anh jumped
over the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane and sought
asylum. That case, she said, was eventually resolved when a
World Food Program employee in Vientiane (the UN Resrep was
not in country at that time) interviewed Mr. Anh on behalf of
UNHCR and determined he was a legitimate asylum seeker. ROK
officials from Seoul also interviewed Mr. Anh to verify that
he was a legitimate refugee and that he wanted to go to South
Korea. In the end, the Lao and Thai governments agreed to
allow him to depart Laos for Thailand, and UNHCR met him at
the border with South Korean documents. However, both the
Lao and Thai governments said that they would not agree to
this type of arrangement in future cases. The Ambassador

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said that coordinating with the Thais might be particularly
challenging under the new government, which has taken a
hard-line stance on refugee issues. Ms. Rana agreed, saying
that the Thai government has been "very heavy-handed" with
UNHCR.


13. (C) The Ambassador asked Ms. Rana for confirmation of the
USG's understanding that, in her capacity as UN Resrep, she
serves as the UNHCR representative in Laos. Ms. Rana
confirmed this and told the Ambassador that she was planning
to meet with the UNHCR representative in Bangkok in a few
days. She would discuss with him how the UN would handle a
North Korean asylum case in Vientiane. Ms. Rana said that
the UN attaches particular importance to the coordinating
role of the Resrep under the current "one UN" policy.
However, she added, UNHCR's mandate is quite distinct. "My
jobs is to liaise closely" with UNHCR officials and be
guided by them. "I don't take decisions on their behalf."



14. (C) The Ambassador asked Ms. Rana what, in practical
terms, the UN saw as the modalities for dealing with a North
Korean asylum seeker in Laos. Ms. Rana responded that
"there should be ways to do it discreetly." She commented
that the South Korean embassy would not close its doors to a
North Korean. "That's the only way I see it (managing a
North Korean refugee) happening." Her interest as UN
Resrep, she told the Ambassador, is to see that the person,s
rights are not being violated. "It will be hard to come up
with a strategy in advance - it will have to be handled on a
case by case basis." (Note: During the conversation, the
Ambassador pointed out to Ms. Rana that the United States has
legislation -- the North Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) --
which requires the State Department to facilitate
applications from North Koreans for entrance to the United
States as refugees. Ms. Rana continued, however, to focus
only on South Korea as a final destination when discussing
this issue.)

COMMENT
--------------

15. (C) Neither the South Koreans nor the UN Resrep believe
North Korean refugees in Vientiane can be managed other than
via the good offices of the ROK Embassy here (and its shadowy
group of handlers). The ROK Embassy appears to be willing to
continue to help with this ongoing refugee flow - as long as
the numbers do not overwhelm its limited staff. The only
major requirement is that the process remain discreet. Any
formal intervention by the U.S. Embassy here - or by any of
the other like-minded Embassies such as Australia - is seen
as only locking the Lao Government into a corner from which
its only option is to return the refugee(s) to China as
required by GOL rules. The Ambassador plans to follow up
with UN Resrep Rana, after her Bangkok meeting, and then meet
with the ROK Ambassador to increase coordination between our
two embassies on dealing with this issue. We will continue
to emphasize, in these conversations, the requirements of the
NKHRA that the United States be available as a destination
for North Korean refugees. Nonetheless, given the ROK's
informal system for moving refugees to Bangkok, UN officials
are most likely to look to South Korea first if they are
asked to help with North Korean refugees here.

HASLACH