AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL; HMONG ISSUES; ARF

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 000416

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//C O R R E C T E D COPY; ADDEE CHANGE TO ARF FORUM///

STATE FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC)
STATE FOR EAP/RSP (SHEIVES)
MANILA FOR U.S. ARF DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017
TAGS: KN KNNP LA PINR PREF PREL PTER ARF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL; HMONG ISSUES; ARF
DEMARCHE; NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

REF: A. VIENTIANE 0382

B. 06 VIENTIANE 1117

C. 06 VIENTIANE 1141

D. STATE 64134

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA M. HASLACH for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador used the opportunity of a
farewell call on one of MFA's more sophisticated Vice
Ministers, and the Lao Senior Official for ASEAN and ARF
affairs, to present the most recent Department demarche on
ARF issues. VFM Bounkeut expressed support for the USG ISM
proposals, and joined us in questioning both the Russian
"inter-civilization" dialogue proposal and the Indonesian
attempt to add "disarmament" to the nonproliferation issue.
We recommend the U.S. ARF delegation discuss U.S. positions
in detail with VFM Bounkeut in Manila. The Ambassador also
raised North Korean refugees, where Bounkeut indicate support
for "quiet" handling, and the Hmong in Thailand. On the
latter issues, it appeared that Bounkeut has to work within
very tight parameters. End summary.

VFM Bounkeut Sangsomsack
--------------

2. (U) The Ambassador paid a farewell call on Vice Foreign
Minister (VFM) Bounkeut Sangsomsack May 11. VFM Bounkeut had
served at the Lao UN Mission (1978-82),as Charge in
Washington, D.C. (1982-87),and Lao Ambassador to Thailand
(1990-98),before becoming Vice Minister in 2001. Bounkeut
told the Ambassador three new portfolios had been added to
his previous duties of supervising MFA's ASEAN Department and
Department of Economic Affairs. Now he also oversees MFA's
International Organizations Department as well as MFA's
Institute of Foreign Affairs and represents MFA in the border
committees set up with all five of Laos' neighbors (China,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma). This has kept him
extremely busy during the past year.

The Ambassador's Assessment
--------------

3. (C) The Ambassador highlighted our first Comprehensive
Bilateral Dialogue, held in Vientiane in October 2006 (ref
B),as marking a significant step forward in our bilateral
relationship. She noted the two sides have had existing
channels to discuss POW/MIA accounting, counter-narcotics
cooperation, and programs to clear unexploded ordnance (UXO).
The Comprehensive Dialogue now allows a wider set of
discussions to include more complicated issues such as human
rights and trade. The participation of the USAID regional
director from Bangkok was particularly helpful since USAID
helps fund ASEAN economic and technical assistance. It may
be possible for USAID to help fund trade implementation. The
Ambassador noted the advantage of exchanging views on issues
at times other than when problems arise. She expressed hope
the next Comprehensive Dialogue might take place in autumn
2007 in the United States.

AI
--

4. (C) The Ambassador highlighted the U.S. contribution of
close to $10 million including via the World Health
Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization to
help Laos prepare for a possible avian influenza (AI)
pandemic. She applauded the Ministries of Health and
Agriculture for their cooperation on this issue. The
Ambassador also complimented the Government of Laos (GOL) for
its national plan and for its handling of the March AI
outbreak among poultry and the first two human AI cases.
Bounkeut noted that Laos, with its smaller population, had an
easier time managing these situations than some of its
neighbors.

North Koreans
--------------

5. (C) The Ambassador expressed special appreciation for the
role VFM Bounkeut has played in resolving cased involving
North Korean refugees in Laos. Bounkeut assessed that more
North Koreans are transiting via Burma to Thailand rather
than coming through Laos. Others are traveling by commercial
boats on the Mekong River without passing through Lao
immigration check points. Since North Koreans do not stand
out in appearance, this is difficult to control, he noted.
He then pointed out that, Lao is sensitive about its
relations with all countries, so "quiet is better" in dealing
with these cases.

The Hmong Issue

--------------

6. (C) Bounkeut noted he had been involved with the GOL's
Border Committee with Thailand since becoming VFM. So he
will be attending the May 17-18 Border Committee in Bangkok
which will focus on security issues. He emphasized a) that
the two governments had agreed to deal with the Hmong in
Thailand, both at the Nongkhai Immigration Detention Center
and at the holding camp in Petchabun Province, on a bilateral
basis; b) that their return to Laos would be on a voluntary
basis; and c) that there had to be screening to ensure the
Hmong involved are actually from Laos rather than possibly
being from Vietnam or China.


7. (C) Bounkeut noted that he had met Thai MFA Permanent
Secretary Virasak Futrakun in Khon Khen, Thailand on May 9 to

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discuss the agreement to resolve the Hmong issue bilterally.
He added that, when UN Resident Representative in Laos Sonam
Yangchen Rana had recently asked him to allow UNHCR to play a
role in dealing with the Hmong, he emphasized to her that
UNHCR should allow the Lao and Thai governments to resolve
the issue first bilaterally. Bounkeut emphasized he had also
just met with the Thai Ambassador to Laos and stressed the
need for any return to be voluntary; otherwise the two
governments would wind up in "great difficulty."


8. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that any return to Laos of
Lao Hmong in Thailand should be voluntary. However, the
group of 155 in the Nongkhai Immigration Detention Center was
a special case since the UNHCR had identified them as
"persons of concern" and had referred them to the United
States, Australia, and the Netherlands for resettlement.
Since we have not been able to interview members of the
group, we are unsure how many the United States will take.
Still, the Ambassador argued, it is important to understand
the situation of the group in Nong Khai is different from the
majority of Hmong in the Petchabun camp.


9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the majority of Hmong in the
Petchabun camp are likely to be economic migrants or people
enticed by traffickers claims about being able to be
resettled in the United States. Only a small percentage of
this group might qualify for resettlement. Bounkeut
complained about companies exploiting the possibility of U.S.
resettlement to make a lot of money from these people. The
Ambassador reminded him that PRM Assistant Secretary Ellen
Sauerbrey, during a Bangkok visit, made clear last August
that the United States did not intend any further large
resettlement of Lao Hmong to the United States. Of course
that did not stop manipulation of the issue by the
trafficking companies.


10. (C) Instead of trying to bring the 155 from Nong Khai
back to Laos, since they all have UNHCR referrals, the
Ambassador asked why the GOL and the Thai did not return a
group of purely economic migrants from Petchabun. The GOL
could set up a pilot project to resettle them, allow
international monitoring, and the world could see they are
not being mistreated.


11. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that our primary focus is
to work together to improve the bilateral relationship
between the United States and Laos and reminded Bounkeut our
diplomatic relations have been uninterrupted for 50 years.
It would not have been in our interest to have supported the
Hmong insurgency since 1975, and we have not done so. We do
not support talk of a separate homeland for the Hmong.
American citizens offering armed or material support for the
Hmong insurgency are breaking U.S. laws.


12. (C) Bounkeut askeed how many Hmong the USG planned to
accept, apparently referring to Nong Khai as well as
potential refugees from the Petchabun camp. The Ambassador
said DHS would have to complete its interviews before that is
decided. The law is strict, and people referred for
resettlement have to meet specific criteria. The Ambassador
also mentioned the discussion in the United States about the
ongoing review by Congress of a possible material support
waiver for the Hmong. She noted that such a waiver should
not be seen as impinging on Lao sovereignty.


13. (C) The Ambassador noted the return to their families in
April of the 21 girls from the group of 26 Hmong children who
had been detained since December 2005 as a positive step.
However, most have not been reunited with their parents who
remain in Petchabun. Bounkeut pointed out that, if the
parents choose to return to Laos to be reunited with their
daughters, "there is no reason not to treat them well." The
Ambassador pointed out that the fate of the 5 boys from the

group remains undetermined. The Ambassador noted reports
they were somewhere in northern Laos. Bounkeut promised that
the GOL would continue to try to "find" the 5 boys. (Note:
as reported ref C, to our knowledge, the five boys have never
been moved from Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly City.)

ARF Demarche
--------------

14. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the meeting's timing
to deliver the points from Ref D which had arrived that
morning. Bounkeut was familiar with the issues and said that
the ASEAN side would separately discuss the U.S. proposals
before the ARF meeting begins. He opined that the GOL would
agree generally with the USG's ISM proposals. Commenting on
Russia's draft Minister,s Statement on Inter-Civilization
Dialogue, Bounkeut noted that there have been "interfaith
dialogues, including with the EU, to focus on religious
issues, but discussing "civilization" delves deeply into the
history of a country and is "too big." He wondered if this
is a mis-translation from Russian to English.


15. (C) Regarding Indonesian ARF Senior Official
Director-General Primo Jaliento's letter to A/S suggesting
that the ISM be retitled "ISM on Nonproliferation and
Disarmament" or "ISM on Nonproliferation in All of Its
Aspects," Bounkeut said the GOL supports a focus
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus the
Indonesian proposal is too broad; the group should stay
focused on nonproliferation particularly of nuclear weapons.
He wondered what levels of disarmament Indonesia would want
covered, noting that ASEAN had discussed small arms issues
(when the Indonesian Government was concerned about the flow
of small arms to Acheh). Bounkeut concluded that the GOL
will support the continued focus to be nonproliferation, an
issue which he called increasingly important with a nuclear
North Korea and a nuclear Iran.

Belarus
--------------

16. (C) The Ambassador had presented the USG position on the
upcoming vote on new members of the UN Human Rights
Commission to Vice Foreign Minister Phongsavath Boupha when
they met May 10 (ref A). Learning that VFM Bounkeut now
supervises the International Organizations Department, the
Ambassador also briefed him on the Belarus-Slovenia-Bosnia
competition, and the Embassy delivered the non-paper to VFM
Bounkeut for further information. Note: MFA has three Vice
Foreign Ministers, and the division of responsibilities among
them shifts irregularly.

Comment
--------------

17. (C) Bounkeut has been the most supportive of the three
Vice Foreign Ministers although his portfolio does not
include supervising the Europe/Americas Department. We and
other Embassies have asked for and received his support for
quiet resolution of cases involving North Korean refugees.
With his almost two decades in New York, Washington, D.C.,
and Bangkok, Bounkeut has a broader world view than many of
his colleagues. We are not surprised he was practical about
the need for a quiet flow of North Korean refugees,
supportive of the U.S. ARF ISM proposals, and understanding
that the Russian proposal for "inter-civilization dialogue"
and Indonesia's attempt to add disarmament to the
nonproliferation issue would be problematic. Still, Bounkeut
appears to have very little room to maneuver on the Hmong
issues which continue to be of great concern to the
international community.


18. (C) The Embassy recommends the U.S. ARF delegation in
Manila provide VFM Bounkeut its latest thinking in advance of
the ARF SOM Meeting. We expect VFM Bounkeut can be helpful
in the ASEAN-only pre-meetings in pressing for "friendly"
positions on U.S. proposals.

HASLACH