Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07VIENTIANE139
2007-02-20 10:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vientiane
Cable title:  

CORRUPTION IN LAOS: THE CLOSER YOU LOOK, THE

Tags:  KCRM PGOV KFRD CASC SNAR LA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1778
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHVN #0139/01 0511034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201034Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0905
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 VIENTIANE 000139 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR MLS (EDWARD BESTIC)
INL FOR INL/AAE (CHARLES BOULDIN)
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT (CAROLINE AIELLO)
COMMERCE FOR MAC/ITA (HONG-PHONG PHO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: KCRM PGOV KFRD CASC SNAR LA
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION IN LAOS: THE CLOSER YOU LOOK, THE
WORSE IT APPEARS

REF: A. 05 VIENTIANE 1232


B. 05 VIENTIANE 1298

C. 06 VIENTIANE 275

D. 06 VIENTIANE 596

E. 06 VIENTIANE 632

F. 06 VIENTIANE 646

G. 06 VIENTIANE 674

H. 06 VIENTIANE 804

I. 06 VIENTIANE 1046

J. VIENTIANE 121

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach for Reason 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 VIENTIANE 000139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR MLS (EDWARD BESTIC)
INL FOR INL/AAE (CHARLES BOULDIN)
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT (CAROLINE AIELLO)
COMMERCE FOR MAC/ITA (HONG-PHONG PHO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: KCRM PGOV KFRD CASC SNAR LA
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION IN LAOS: THE CLOSER YOU LOOK, THE
WORSE IT APPEARS

REF: A. 05 VIENTIANE 1232


B. 05 VIENTIANE 1298

C. 06 VIENTIANE 275

D. 06 VIENTIANE 596

E. 06 VIENTIANE 632

F. 06 VIENTIANE 646

G. 06 VIENTIANE 674

H. 06 VIENTIANE 804

I. 06 VIENTIANE 1046

J. VIENTIANE 121

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach for Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary. Corruption in Laos is endemic. At a recent
governance and anti-corruption workshop in Vientiane,
sponsored by the World Bank, donor and non-governmental
organization (NGO) representatives met to discuss the current
situation. While there are some positive trends, such as the
willingness of senior leaders to discuss the problem
publicly, and the recent (2005) passage of Laos'
anti-corruption law, the overall situation is negative. Low
civil-service pay, a culture of official corruption, the
Communist Party's resistance to transparency, the central
government's weakness vis--vis the provinces, and the
absence of effective institutions to counter abuse (such as a
strong civil society) means corruption remains a daunting
problem. The representatives at the World Bank meeting
reached consensus that with regard to corruption in Laos, the
closer one looks, the worse it appears. End Summary.


Positive Indicators in the Battle against Corruption
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Although corruption is a severe problem in Laos,
the situation is not entirely bleak. The Government of Laos
(GOL) has highlighted the problem of corruption since 1999,
when it issued its first decree directed at this problem,
something it had previously ignored. GOL leaders now fear
that corruption is impeding development; Laos has signed the
UN Convention against Corruption and passed an
anti-corruption law, demonstrating some commitment on this
issue. Unfortunately, insofar as we can tell, they have yet

to publish implementing regulations or publicly prosecute
anyone under the law. The GOL is also taking steps to
restructure its decentralized revenue system, which
facilitates corruption and gives provincial governments
enough independence to ignore the central government's reform
initiatives.


3. (C) The GOL is now willing to confront the reality of
corruption in Laos, something it was totally unprepared to do
in the past. A number of observers have noted that several
years ago government officials would not discuss corruption,
but this attitude has changed markedly. Senior Politburo
members have now begun to address the problem in an open and
public forum. The GOL keynote speaker for the December 2006
commemoration of the International Day against Corruption was
Deputy Prime Minister Ansang Laoly, an ironic choice given
his well-established reputation for corrupt activities.
Throughout the Lao bureaucracy, only revenue and customs
officials still seem reticent to acknowledge that corruption
remains a problem, perhaps because doing so would directly
threaten their own pocketbook.


4. (C) As previously reported (ref C),the GOL is now
taking action against senior officials implicated in
corruption. At the 8th Party Congress in March, 2006, the
Communist Party Central Committee forced out several
governors and former governors accused of corruption. Both
the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Industry and
Handicrafts were sacked for the same reason. The Foreign
Minister stated at a press conference following the Congress
that some former Central Committee members had been involved
in corruption and narcotics trafficking, but that this would
no longer be tolerated. The Congress also increased the
power of the Party Inspection Authority, headed by Deputy PM
Ansang Laoly, to act proactively to preclude corruption
within the party's senior ranks. Those removed from the
Party's Central Committee, however, were not subsequently
prosecuted for their offenses; the GOL prefers to transfer
errant officials to less prestigious (and lucrative)
positions rather than send them to jail.


5. (SBU) At the policy level, the GOL perceives corruption

VIENTIANE 00000139 002 OF 006


as a major impediment to development that could help to
derail its stated goal of graduating from least-developed
country (LDC) status by 2020. Fortunately the GOL has a good
implementing vehicle to help bring about the type of
fundamental changes it needs in its National Socio-Economic
Development Plan for 2006-2010. The plan calls for the GOL
to make fighting corruption a priority, establish the
organizations and legal framework it needs to control
corruption, and enforce anti-corruption statutes vigorously.
International pressure, from the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP),the World Bank, and possibly Vietnam, has
given added impetus to Lao anti-corruption efforts.


6. (U) In May of 2005, the Lao National Assembly adopted an
anti-corruption statute. The new law moves Laos toward full
compliance with the 2003 United Nations Convention against
Corruption, which the GOL signed in December of 2003. Under
the new law, acts that constitute corruption are:

-Embezzlement of state property or collective property
-Swindling of state property or collective property
-Taking bribes
-Abuse of position, power, and duty to take state property,
collective property or individual property
-Abuse of state property or collective property
-Excessive use of position to take state property, collective
property or individual property
-Cheating or falsification relating to technical construction
standards, designs, and calculations
-Deception in bidding or concessions
-Forging documents or using forged documents
-Disclosure of state secrets for personal benefit
-Holding back or delaying documents


7. (U) Among other things, the law specifically calls for an
end to nepotism, senior official asset declarations, and the
establishment of a national anti-corruption organization with
similar bodies at the provincial level. However, the law
itself is sparse and clearly in need of detailed implementing
regulations, a common problem for the GOL, which lacks the
resources and expertise required to produce the comprehensive
legal structures it needs to support its policies. The law
also establishes severe penalties, ranging up to 25 years
imprisonment, for serious violations. These enforcement
provisions are in addition to existing laws that cover some
but not all of the violations listed in the new statute.


8. (SBU) One reason that the GOL has been ineffective in
curbing corruption is its inability to exert influence over
the actions of provincial governments. Following passage of
the anti-corruption law, there were major efforts to educate
provincial officials. Although in theory the Lao state is
highly centralized, in fact the central government has
traditionally been weak in comparison to the provinces. The
majority of revenues are collected by the provincial
governments, which provide only a portion of what they take
in to support the national government in Vientiane.
Obviously, this does not give the GOL much leverage over the
provincial governors. The revenue structure made the
implementation of national policies difficult and allowed the
provinces to impede national initiatives promoting
transparency and discouraging corruption.


9. (SBU) Fortunately, the new budget law, passed in December
2006, is designed to correct some of this imbalance by
centralizing revenue management through consolidated tax
operations. In addition, Laos will introduce a national
value added tax (VAT) designed to replace customs revenues
being phased out as part of bilateral and regional free-trade
initiatives. The VAT is also intended to reduce the
opportunities for corruption within the customs collection
system. In theory, all revenues will now come to the central
government before they are reallocated to the provinces;
however, provincial governments will remain responsible for
implementing the new tax codes, and significant challenges
will have to be overcome if the system is to function as
intended. In practice, provincial governments are likely to
continue holding substantial non-declared assets, and the
national government will likely remain unable to rein in
corruption in the provinces. Both the new budget law and the
VAT are awaiting implementing regulations yet to be
completed.

Negative Indicators in the Battle Against Corruption
-------------- --------------

VIENTIANE 00000139 003 OF 006




10. (C) Laos' larger and more visible neighbors have
generally garnered more attention with regard to corruption,
but, on closer examination, the depth of corruption in Laos
may be just as bad. Transparency International, in its 2006
report, rated Laos notably worse than the year before. The
World Bank Institute's Kaufmann-Kraay corruption measurement
identified Laos as more corrupt than Thailand, China, and
Vietnam, and only slightly better than Cambodia. Of the
multiple reasons for this, the woefully insufficient pay of
civil servants tops the list. The absence of transparency or
any effective check on authority, intrinsic to a one-party
Communist state, presents a serious challenge even to
estimating the extent of corruption. The GOL relies on donor
support for much of its budget, and, as most of this
assistance is not tied to good governance, there is little
incentive for reform. Finally, a large and increasing
portion of GDP is derived from resource extraction
industries, which are especially vulnerable to corruption
because the national government lacks adequate means to
effectively regulate them and their products are difficult to
trace.


11. (SBU) Low pay for civil servants is a critical problem,
and Laos is near the low end globally. Salaries for
physicians remain in the range of $120-$150 per month. To
receive care in government health care facilities, which
include most of the major hospitals in Laos, patients must
give supplemental cash to the doctors and nurses who care for
them. Police officers are paid even less; junior officer's
monthly salary is approximately $20. Laos, however, does not
have the lowest cost of living in the region, and private
labor costs are non-competitive with China and Vietnam. To
even approach the remuneration available in the private
sector, civil servant pay would have to be increased by a
factor of ten to twenty. As civil servants cannot possibly
survive on their salaries, many government officials see no
problem with receiving commissions, which they perceive as
nothing more than gratuities similar to what waiters might
receive in the U.S.; they do not see themselves as engaging
in a corrupt practice.


12. (C) The Lao People's Democratic Republic, as a
single-party communist state, is by its very nature resistant
to transparency and accountability. Decision-making
authority is centralized, and, absent an opposition party or
any effective check on the Communist Party's power, senior
leaders generally do as they please. Nepotism is rampant.
Ironically, a number of rich and powerful families in the
pre-1975 monarchy have continued to thrive under communism.
There is strong resistance to audit systems, and many local
governments have financial controls on expenditures but not
on revenues, creating ample opportunity for the diversion of
public funds. In general, there is no sense among Party
officials that there is anything significantly wrong with
corruption, though a few stalwarts still hold to the
socialist ideals of their youth.


13. (C) While Laos now has a legal basis to prosecute
corruption, and state-sanctioned organizations to root it
out, few government officials would be foolhardy enough to
take on the senior Party members who benefit the most from
the current system. There has been no recent high-profile
anti-corruption case against a Communist Party figure in
Laos, unlike those which have occurred in China and Vietnam.
Enforcement of the Anti-Corruption Law for anything other
than relatively minor offenses by the most junior officials
is next to impossible. The lack of judicial independence
would make the prosecution of a major case even more
problematic. The September 2005 arrest of a major Chinese
drug trafficker in Houaphan illustrates how daunting
corruption can be (ref A). Han Yongwan was arrested only
after the GOL came under intense pressure from China, Burma
and Thailand. Provincial officials were very slow to move on
this case, and even the Governor may have had a hand in
protecting this prominent organized crime figure. Lao
military officials were also implicated. The drug lord was
extradited to China via Burma, as Laos would have been an
uncertain venue at best for the trial.


14. (C) The ongoing construction of the new National Stadium
in Vientiane is an example of how the Anti-Corruption Law
exists on paper only. The law specifically forbids the use
of authority to take individual property. However, Vientiane
Municipality used its power of eminent domain to seize small

VIENTIANE 00000139 004 OF 006


parcels of privately-held land fronting Route 13, the major
north-south highway in Laos, for the construction of a
stadium and auxiliary facilities it will need to host the
Southeast Asia Games in 2009. These tracts, optimally sited
for commercial development, commanded premium values when
their former owners purchased them.


15. (C) When the landowners requested compensation from the
Municipality, officials responded that, while they
sympathized with the owners, no budget had been set aside for
the purchase of the stadium land and, consequently, no
compensation could be offered other than comparably-sized
plots in the rural countryside. Valuable private land seized
for public use following the Communist takeover in 1975 was
sometimes used by senior officials for their own estates, and
the memory of the past abuses makes the recently-displaced
landowners skeptical about who will really benefit from the
land they surrendered to the Vientiane authorities.


16. (C) Even the Embassy has not been immune to the effects
of corruption in Laos. Several years ago, when the NAS Field
Advisor in Phongsaly Province halted a construction project
because of the kickbacks being paid to senior provincial
officials, the corrupt officials used their Communist Party
connections at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to have
his visa revoked. The Embassy's Consular Section routinely
returns Lao passports to the MFA that the Ministry's own
officials have issued to persons who have obtained duplicate
identifies (new name, surname and date of birth) after
failing a visa interview. To our knowledge, no action has
ever been taken against any individual. The NAS has on
several occasions endured delays in processing law
enforcement program documents and equipment when the Director
refused to fund office furnishings for the concerned
officials. Fortunately, these experiences have generally
been the exception rather than the rule, but the rage and
shame on the faces of the Embassy's locally-engaged staff
when this occurs speaks to a long and simmering frustration
by some at the misuse of official authority.


17. (SBU) A direct consequence of decades of abuse of power
is that there is no public trust; government officials are
presumed to be corrupt unless proven otherwise. There is
also no mitigating indigenous civil society or strong private
sector to serve as an independent but unthreatening impetus
for reform. The government is drafting legislation to
regulate civil society and NGOs, providing some official
sanction; the few civil society institutions and NGOs that
exist in Laos continue to rely on a core of expatriate
experts rather than civic-minded Lao. There is ongoing
dialogue between the Lao Bar Association and some donors,
but, with fewer than 100 practicing attorneys in Laos, the
influence of this organization is limited.


18. (SBU) In many cases, donor activities do as much to
facilitate corruption as they do to promote good governance.
A substantial portion of the GOL's budget comes directly from
aid programs provided by foreign governments, international
organizations, and NGOs. Overseas development assistance
(ODA) flows in Laos are not transparent; much of the
assistance provided is expended on high-end SUVs and study
tours for senior officials rather than reaching the masses of
rural poor who need it most. Our discussions with Lao
counterparts on upcoming training programs often center
around one topic--the per diem rate for participants.
Management by objective is sorely lacking, and there is
strong resistance to procurement reforms. Corruption is not
the consequence of ODA; that problem runs much deeper in Lao
society. But many donors are not doing what they could to
promote transparency.


19. (C) A major donor's roundtable meeting held in Vientiane
in November 2006 was a lost opportunity to tie ODA to greater
transparency and better governance. One major reason for
this is that some of the largest donors to Laos, such as
Japan, China, and Vietnam, are focused more on their
bilateral relationships with the GOL than on the efficacy of
their programs. As the Japanese representative at the World
Bank discussions stated, "Japan is not in a position to link
ODA to governance . . . but expects the World Bank to assume
responsibility for pursuing this objective in Laos."
(Comment: Unspoken but clearly communicated at the World
Bank meeting was the message that, as long as Japan feels it
necessary to continue a bidding war with China for the good
will of the communist leadership, governance reform in Laos

VIENTIANE 00000139 005 OF 006


will not be a priority. The Japanese representative read
from a prepared statement with little enthusiasm. When the
NAS spoke with her about the size of Japanese ODA in Laos,
she stated that Japan contributed $80 million to Laos in
2006, seven to eight times the U.S. contribution. She then
remarked, "but you have results to show for what the U.S. has
put in," implying that Japan got little in return for its
generosity. End Comment).


20. (C) Corruption in Laos is not confined to the public
sector. Depositors must still pay banks to make withdrawals
larger than a few hundred dollars. According to figures
presented at the World Bank meeting, construction kickbacks
normally run about 10%. Corruption in the mining sector is
rife; and China in particular has been able to exploit the
weakness of the GOL's regulatory system (ref F). In one
recent example, a Russian firm that had done all of the
survey and preparatory work on an iron ore claim was refused
permission to dig, only to find out later that a Chinese firm
had been granted the concession (ref I). Corruption in the
logging industry is also rampant, Vietnamese concerns
operating near the Lao-Vietnamese border being effectively
exempt from even the minimal attempts at enforcement found
elsewhere (ref G). Siene Saphanthong, the former Minister of
Agriculture, was transferred because he failed to control
corruption in the timber industry, but not prosecuted (ref
C). Corruption in resource extraction industries is likely
to get worse as the importance of this sector to the Lao
economy grows. Mining and hydropower, which currently
account for approximately 50% of GDP, will grow to 70% by the
end of the decade, and potentially 90% of GDP when these
industries are fully developed. Further complicating this
problem is the very close relationship between the private
sector and the GOL.

The Path Forward
--------------


21. (SBU) If Laos is ever to bring its corruption problems
under control, it must change the acquiescent attitude that
allows abusive practices to thrive. To that end, it must
take several key steps:

-Civil service pay must be increased to market levels, ending
the economic motivation that drives much of the more common,
albeit small-scale, corruption.

-The GOL and the Party, under the direction of senior
leaders, must rid themselves of their culture of corruption.
The prosecution of a corrupt senior official or officials
would send a strong message in this regard. As China's
influence in Laos grows, adopting some of China's strategies
for prosecuting corrupt officials might raise awareness among
Party officials and the government that corruption, even
among the elite, will not be tolerated.

-Prosecutors, the judiciary, and anti-corruption
organizations must receive the support they need from senior
leaders to act independently against corruption.

-The central government must regain its authority over the
provinces so that it can force implementation of reform
initiatives. Full implementation of a new
centrally-controlled tax structure would be critical to
effecting this change.

-The banking sector must be reformed and fiduciary controls
instituted.

-Whistle blowers must be protected and their efforts
recognized. Some exist, but they find safety only in donor
organizations outside of government.

- A mutual accountability framework has to be established for
donor support which links ODA to good governance. USG
programs have this, and it works. Procurement reform is a
must.

-Public institutions must be strengthened, and civil society
afforded a chance to develop.

-The GOL should prosecute several high-profile corruption
cases, as China has done, to send a clear signal that it is
no longer acceptable.


VIENTIANE 00000139 006 OF 006



22. (SBU) Changes such as these will not happen quickly,
particularly under the circumstances found in Laos. At the
January meeting, World Bank representatives suggested that
anti-corruption efforts in Laos must be incremental, using a
multi-sector approach. Initially, civil society must emerge
as a partner in development, then transition into being a
source for oversight. Positive developments need to be
reinforced, particularly where key stakeholders perceive
corruption as a threat to the nation's long-term goals and
prosperity. For its part, the World Bank does not plan to
make any major changes to its current anti-corruption
strategy in Laos, based on its five pillars:

-Preventing Fraud and Corruption within World Bank Projects.
-Helping countries that request World Bank support in their
efforts to reduce corruption.
-Taking corruption more explicitly into account in its
country assistance strategy.
-Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce
corruption.
-Protecting the Bank from internal fraud and corruption.

The World Bank will continue to move forward with its
anti-corruption programs in Laos when, where, and with whom
it believes there is a reasonable chance for success, which
the Bank terms its "points of entry." In doing so, it
parallels other donors concerned with governance, working
with institutions and individuals that are relatively free of
corruption, and avoiding the rest.


23. (C) Comment: The corruption problem in Laos is not
hopeless. the World Bank contends that there are officials,
some very senior, who wish to fight corruption, but they have
been blocked by interference from the Communist Party. The
NAS has found that the GOL officials it works with often come
to favor the transparency and tight controls we profess after
they have worked with the Embassy for several years and have
seen how much more effective and beneficial our system can
be. Surprisingly the most vocal critics of government
corruption at the World Bank meeting were the Lao nationals
representing foreign NGOs; in our experience, the few Lao
citizens willing to discuss the subject with us rail against
the abuses they face every day whenever out of earshot of
Party officials. Laos has shown a willingness to take on
corruption, but in order to do so effectively, it will have
to make profound changes in its government, society, and
political culture. End Comment.
HASLACH