Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07VIENTIANE110
2007-02-12 10:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vientiane
Cable title:  

DIPLOMATIC TOUR OF RESETTLED HMONG; WHERE ARE ALL

Tags:  KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH 
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VZCZCXRO4648
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0110/01 0431033
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121033Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0861
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7137
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0145
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0967
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2807
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0212
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0681
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0507
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0147
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0585
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000110 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC),PRM/FO (DAS GREENE),
PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT),DRL/AWH (ORONA),AND IO/FO (DAS WARLICK
AND LAGON)
BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2017
TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC TOUR OF RESETTLED HMONG; WHERE ARE ALL
THE REFUGEES?

REF: A. 06 VIENTIANE 1205


B. BANGKOK 816

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000110

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC),PRM/FO (DAS GREENE),
PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT),DRL/AWH (ORONA),AND IO/FO (DAS WARLICK
AND LAGON)
BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2017
TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC TOUR OF RESETTLED HMONG; WHERE ARE ALL
THE REFUGEES?

REF: A. 06 VIENTIANE 1205


B. BANGKOK 816

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary: An MFA-led February 8 tour of one Hmong area
near Vientiane proved little about the situation of resettled
Hmong in Laos -- especially former insurgents. Only one
family of five from the group of 52 economic migrants had
been returned to the well-to-do area visited. However the
MFA tour may be the beginning of a very long process toward
the Government of Laos (GOL) allowing some sort of
international monitoring. Our next priority: pushing MFA to
set up a promised next trip -- to Bolikhamxai Province, long
mute on Hmong issues including surrenders, resettlements, and
the fate of the group of 16 Hmong former insurgents just
pushed back from Thailand in early January. Meanwhile, MFA
continues to plan for the return of the 153 Hmong from Nong
Khai despite the embarrassing failure of the January 30
attempted pushback. At the same time, the international
community moves forward with plans to resettle this group and
other Hmong with Australia leading the way by promising to
take 200 of the 441 referred recently by UNHCR. And in the
background, one analyst points out, are radical Hmong
Americans who will use either a pushback of the 153 or
successful resettlement to generate headlines and enhance
fundraising activities. End summary.

The Village Visit
--------------

2. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief participated in a high-profile
MFA-led visit February 8 for Vientiane-based diplomats and
journalists to Kilometer 52, an area near Vientiane with a
high concentration of well-to-do ethnic Hmong. The visit,
promised during MFA Press DG Yong's February 1 press
conference on the attempt to push back 153 Hmong from Nong
Khai, actually only produced one returnee family from

Thailand: of the 52 pushed back across the border in November
(ref A),only 8 were sent here -- a couple with three
children originally from a local village plus their three
nephews. The nephews' relatives later appeared to take the
nephews back to their home village, leaving only the family
of five remaining here.


3. (U) The diplomatic group met with 100 local villagers led
by village chief Siphandone who specified Kilometer 52 is
actually a collection of eleven villages with close to 16,000
people. Of the population, 58 percent are ethnic Hmong or
other "Lao Sung;" 5% are Khmu; and 37% are lowland Lao.
Eighty percent of the villagers are farmers, growing rice and
raising livestock with some new rubber plantings. The
presence of multiple Western Union offices indicated one
reason why this area is well-to-do: remittances from
relatives overseas.


4. (SBU) The parents from the family of five -- who appeared
to have little education -- told the group they decided to
leave the village because they lacked sufficient good-quality
farmland. Their absence was short-lived: they left their
village in September 2006, were detained soon thereafter in
Thailand, and then were held for two months before being sent
back. They had paid a trafficker Baht 3000 ($87) per person
to be taken to Thailand. Since the family was gone for such
a short period, returning to the village and settling back in
was not difficult. The father said that conditions at the
Nong Khai Immigrant Detention Center (IDC) had been very bad;
there was not enough food; and there had been "pain" -- which
he did not define.


5. (C) Since this visit focused on just the group of returned
economic migrants rather than more sensitive returnees, the
Kilometer 52 visit appeared at best a tentative step toward
monitoring. Participants attempted to make clear that
joining the visit did not indicate international acceptance
of the GOL version of internal tranquillity in Laos. MFA has
promised a future trip to Bolikhamxai Province where a group
of 16 Hmong, apparently from the Yang Wangmeng insurgent

VIENTIANE 00000110 002 OF 003


group, pushed back from Thailand in January have been sent.
The Bolikhamxai visit, announced in a diplomatic note along
with the Kilometer 52 visit, had to be postponed, according
to DG Yong, because it would need more extensive preparations
including an overnight stay in Pakxan. E/P Chief took the
opportunity of a subsequent lunch to push DG Yong strongly on
setting up the Bolikhamxai trip as soon as possible.

Planning for the 152
--------------

6. (C) DG Yong told a German poloff during the Kilometer 52
visit that he had been given authority via Prime Minister's
Decrees to clear land and install roads for a new settlement
for 300 people in northern Vientiane Province including
authority to purchase six tractors for this project. He
clarified to E/P Chief in their subsequent lunch that this
300-person settlement was designed to resettle the 152 (153
with a new baby) Hmong currently in the Nong Khai Immigration
Detention Center. When asked why space for 300, DG Yong
clarified that the GOL does not want any "mono-ethnic"
settlements at this point, so the 152 would be resettled with
people from other ethnic groups. Asked why this group would
not be split up and sent back to home provinces as had been
done with the 52 economic migrants, Yong responded that this
group did not have homes to return to, so a new settlement
area had to be set up for its members.

Assessing The Kilometer 52 Visit
--------------

7. (C) The "like-minded" diplomatic group met February 9 to
exchange views on the village visit and next steps. One
point of agreement: the promised visit to Bolikhamxai
Province would be very important. Meeting with one family
from the group of 52 pushed back in November was not
controversial since this group of economic migrants had no
connections to the insurgency. The group of 16 pushed back
to Bolikhamxai in January clearly had insurgency links.
Moreover, Bolikhamxai is one of the most closed provinces,
releasing no information about any of the groups of
insurgents that have surrendered there (ref A). The group
considered the Kilometer 52 village visit as a first step --
and a relatively difficult step -- for MFA in trying to
become more transparent, a process with which the Government
of Laos (GOL) lacks experience and has a long way to go. The
message that this group had returned and had not been
harassed -- the point was clear that only traffickers, not
economic migrants, would be punished -- appeared designed to
help dry up the flow of economic migrants to Thailand.


8. (C) Summing up his views for the group, Australian
Ambassador Maclean noted that, during the past year, the GOL
for the first time has acknowledged that Hmong in Thailand,
including in the Petchabun camp, are from Laos -- a
significant political development. Moreover, the GOL has
made a great deal of progress with the Thai Government toward
reaching agreement on their return. This agreement of course
is at variance with the Thai Government's international
obligations. The attempted January 30 pushback of the 152
Hmong from Nong Khai represented a major bilateral commitment
as can be seen by the formal ceremonies held at Nong Khai
City Hall by representatives of the two governments; the
failure of the push back was a tremendous loss of face,
particularly for the Thai side. In essence, the GOL has
"boxed in" the Thais with the bilateral agreement to return
the Hmong despite the Thais' international obligations.


9. (C) Ambassador Maclean also noted a spurt of renewed UNHCR
referrals for resettlement. Before screening was suspended
in early February, the UNHCR had referred 441 Hmong for third
country resettlement. These are not Hmong from the camp in
Petchabun; these are Lao Hmong who have gotten to Bangkok,
other locations, and those at the Nong Khai Immigration
Detention Center. Australia plans to accept as many as 200
-- processing the first group next week. Of the 200, 26 are
from the Nong Khai group of 152; these 26 are receiving final
medical clearances. (Note: UNHCR has also informed Embassy
Bangkok (ref B) that the Netherlands plans to accept a
further 22 from the group of 152.)

VIENTIANE 00000110 003 OF 003




10. (C) Ambassador Maclean suggested the like-minded group
might stress to GOL officials that real international
monitoring would be in the GOL's own interests. Now the
UNHCR has to accept the version of events being told by a
person seeking refugee determination since UNHCR is not
allowed to be present in Laos to do its own assessment. A
durable monitoring system would decrease the numbers of
applicants being given political refugee status. For
instance, the bulk of the Hmong at the holding camp in
Petchabun are most likely economic migrants with perhaps no
more than 4% real refugees.


11. (C) The group agreed that pushing the GOL directly on
this issue is not likely to be productive; GOL officials do
not react well when others push them. ASEAN may also be able
to help at some point; the ASEAN Summit recently held in Cebu
identified migration as a major issue. Another avenue in the
future might be to ask for Vietnam to help since Vietnam now
accepts some international monitoring of its upland
minorities. So far, Vietnam has not been willing to
"interfere" in Lao internal events. UNDP Country
Representative Sonam Rana noted that UNHCR is trying to
restore its relations with the GOL; she has been telling GOL
officials that having the UNHCR in Laos is in the GOL's own
interests. In their lunch, E/P Chief prodded DG Yong on this
issue, countering Yong's argument that the GOL does not want
to "internationalize" the Hmong issue through accepting
outside monitoring by pointing out the issue is obviously
internationalized already with Hmong in Thailand and being
accepted for resettlement abroad by a range of countries.


One Analyst's View
--------------

12. (C) Regarding the attempt January 30 to push back the 153
from Nong Khai, one analyst noted most Hmong American groups
have been very quiet possibly because of rivalries among
Hmong factions. The two main leaders in the group of 153,
Blia Shoua Her and Chong Lee Lor, and the activist supporting
them have long been at odds with the more radical
Hmong-American groups. These latter groups may actually see
advantages of the pushback happening in terms of headlines
and enhanced fundraising opportunities. Of course, if the
153 are granted asylum and overseas resettlement, these
groups will also claim credit and use this to enhance
fundraising as well. In terms of the larger Hmong group in
Petchabun, this analyst estimates that less than 15% are
legitimate refugees, although the radical Hmong American
groups insist that all are refugees.

Comment
--------------

13. (C) Accepting the MFA invitation to tour a Hmong area
that has little to do with the insurgency to meet with
recently returned economic migrants was something of a gamble
for the diplomats who participated. On one side was the
possibility of Lao headlines that "Diplomats Support Lao
Efforts." Indeed the Vientiane Times and Lao Patthana
newspapers had articles the day after the visit saying:
"Hmong 'returned' by Thai authorities 'happy' to be back in
Laos" where they can "have their own homes and can educate
their children." On the other side was trying to find a way
to work with MFA to create an opportunity for meaningful
monitoring sometime in the future. The latter seemed a bit
more likely since the original MFA invitation was for trips
to both the Kilometer 52 area near Vientiane and more distant
Bolikhamxai Province. We are disappointed the GOL has
postponed the latter trip and will continue to push for this
energetically. We will also maintain the dialogue with our
like-minded colleagues to push for some sort of outside
monitoring either via a UNHCR return to Laos or possibly an
ASEAN approach. Meanwhile, we remain wary about the fate of
the 153 in Nong Khai as well as the larger group in
Petchabun.
HASLACH