1. (S/NF) On March 26, EconUnit Chief delivered ref A
talking points to Helmut Krehlik, Head of the Ministry of
Economy's (MoE) Export and Import Control Division. Krehlik
said he was unaware of the impending shipment, but promised
to inquire with Palfinger Europe GmbH immediately. Krehlik
expressed some surprise, as his impression from an early 2006
visit (ref B) to the company was that Palfinger wanted to
cooperate closely with the GoA on any questionable exports.
Krehlik recalled that, at the time, Palfinger had promised
him and an official from Austria's domestic intelligence
service (BVT) that Palfinger would inform the GoA of any
orders from Iranian entities.



2. (S/NF) Later on March 26, Krehlik contacted post with an
update. A Palfinger official, Mr. Gantschnigg (FNU),
confirmed to Krehlik that the company shipped five cranes to
Iran's Alborz Manufacturing (AMT Company) on March 16.
Austrian customs cleared the shipment on the same day.
According to Krehlik, Gantschnigg claimed that Palfinger had
notified the BVT in November 2006 of the Iranian order and
the BVT had replied that it had no derogatory information
concerning AMT. Based on the BVT's reply, Palfinger
initiated the shipment.



3. (S/NF) Krehlik said that four additional cranes for
delivery to AMT are under construction. Krehlik blind cc'ed
post with an email in which he imposed a special licensing
requirement on any further shipments, based on AMT's
relationship to Instrumentation Factories Plan (IFP).
Krehlik added that, if Palfinger requests more background on
the grounds for stopping further shipments, the MoE cannot
share ref A classified material with the company. Therefore,
the GoA would appreciate transmission of our request through
official intelligence channels. On the basis of the BVT
request, the MoE will prohibit further shipments. All
relevant agencies at post are aware of this request.
Kilner