Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07VIENNA2879
2007-11-30 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

ALBERT ROHAN ON KOSOVO, AUSTRIA, AND THE EU

Tags:  PREL KV AU 
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VZCZCXRO4638
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVI #2879 3341321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301321Z NOV 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9089
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002879 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2022
TAGS: PREL KV AU
SUBJECT: ALBERT ROHAN ON KOSOVO, AUSTRIA, AND THE EU

REF: (A) VIENNA 2830 (B) VIENNA 2764

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott Kilner. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002879

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2022
TAGS: PREL KV AU
SUBJECT: ALBERT ROHAN ON KOSOVO, AUSTRIA, AND THE EU

REF: (A) VIENNA 2830 (B) VIENNA 2764

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott Kilner. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) In the run-up to Dec. 10, Charge and Pol/Econ Couns
met 11/29 with former Deputy to UN Kosovo Envoy Ahtisaari to
discuss Austria's Kosovo stance and Rohan's perspective on EU
deliberations over recognition and the dispatch of an EU
civilian mission to an independent Kosovo.


2. (C) Regarding Austria, Rohan described a difference of
views between Foreign Minister Plassnik, who would be willing
to move quickly to recognize Kosovo; and Chancellor
Gusenbauer, President Fischer, and the Social Democrats more
broadly. A member of Fischer's foreign policy advisory
panel, Rohan said the President was personally uncomfortable
with the idea of acting outside a strong multilateral (read:
UN) framework, and was only prepared to support recognition
because neither he nor any of his advisor can see any
alternative.


3. (C) In contrast, Rohan said that Plassnik, in recent
meetings with the Serb leadership, had told them that they
lost Kosovo as long ago as 1989 and they needed now to focus
on their future in Europe. The upshot of these tensions
within the government, Rohan concluded, will lead Austria to
be a member of the pack when it comes to EU action.


4. (C) Rohan was confident that the overwhelming majority of
EU states are willing to recognize Kosovo. He was concerned,
however, that there is no agreement within the EU on the need
to move quickly, so as to give UN SYG Ban a strong hand in
dealing with the Russians. He was particularly concerned
about ideas coming from Berlin that could delay EU action for
up to a month after a coordinated declaration of independence
(CDI). Russian pressure on the SYG during that month could
unravel the entire fabric. Provided the EU moves quickly,
Rohan was confident that the SYG would be willing to reject
Russian demands to call the CDI illegal and was also sure the
SYG would issue an invitation to the EU to deploy a civilian
mission. That invitation, he added, would be critical to
maintaining EU solidarity on the mission. Rohan was also
concerned about how the changed composition of the UNSC after
January 1 could affect Council deliberations. He asked
whether the U.S. had done its homework with the incoming
non-permanent members of the Council.


5. (C) To encourage EU action, Rohan urged the U.S. to push
its "clients" around the world to recognize Kosovo quickly.
Recognition by Arab states would be particularly useful and
he suggested the U.S. might work with Turkey to encourage
maximum, speedy Arab recognition. Emboffs asked whether
Austria, which proclaims Balkan affairs to be its chief
foreign policy concern, could perhaps engage the Germans more
directly. Rohan saw little value in Austrian approaches,
which he described in terms of party dynamics rather than
governmental relationships. Thus, Plassnik might talk to
Merkel, but as they both were strong supporters of early
recognition, little was to be gained. And a conversation
between Chancellor Gusenbauer and Foreign Minister
Steinmeier, by implication, would tend only to reinforce
their shared caution.
Kilner