AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH SYG'S PERSONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000985

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH SYG'S PERSONAL
ENVOY FOR WESTERN SAHARA PETER VAN WALSUM


Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad. E.O 12958.
Reasons 1.4 (B&D)


1. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad met November 2 with the
Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Peter

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van Walsum, who, following the October 31 renewal of the
MINURSO (Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)
mandate, was consulting the "parties" (Morocco and the
Polisario Front),the "neighboring countries" (Algeria and
Mauritania),and "Friends of Western Sahara" (U.S., UK.
France, Russia, and Spain) to exchange views on the next
steps to be taken toward the third round of the Western
Sahara negotiations.


2. (C) Reviewing his understanding of the U.S. position, Van
Walsum said that he and the U.S. agreed on several points.
First, both agreed that an independent Western Sahara was not
a realistic option. Both agreed as well that the current
stalemate characterized by two mutually irreconcilable
proposals (the Moroccan and the Polisario Front) was going
nowhere. Finally, both were agreed that a "push" was needed.
What that "push" should entail, however, was the point on
which van Walsum and Washington differed.


3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said that the U.S. believes that
the Moroccan proposal is "serious and credible" and should
form the basis of negotiations. He said that Morocco already
controlled the Western Sahara; the problem seemed to be
Algeria, which has refused to engage and which has yet to
help the Polisario accept a realistic view of the future of
the Western Sahara. Van Walsum said that while it is true
that the Polisario needs a push to understand that
independence is not in the cards, Morocco also needs to be
nudged. The Moroccans, he said, should be pushed to be more
forthcoming on making concessions. Van Walsum said that the
Moroccans continue to insist they are "open," but have done
little to demonstrate that openness. He said they need to
let the Polisario know that hypothetically there would be a
significant role for the Polisario in an autonomous Western
Sahara. Van Walsum said he had mentioned the idea to the
Moroccans and they had nodded their heads, but without much
enthusiasm. Moreover, van Walsum said, the Moroccans have
been wasting time by calling into question the standing of
the Polisario. It is clear, van Walsum said, that the
"parties" are not equal, but if the Moroccans continued to
insist that the other side does not represent the Sahrawi,
how could a deal ever be reached?


4. (C) Asked by Ambassador Khalilzad what the Polisario
thought of a hypothetical discussion of Polisario roles in an
autonomous Western Sahara, van Walsum replied that the
Polisario Front feels it is a trick to make them discuss the
Moroccan proposal and are suspicious that doing so would bind
them to an acceptance of autonomy. Van Walsum stressed that
the key to progress was to push the Moroccans and Algerians
into a realistic appraisal that an independent Western Sahara
is not in the cards. Ambassador agreed that the key seemed
to be to find a way to bring Morocco and Algeria into
dialogue. he said that the U.S. might be able to contribute
by exploring the possibilities of a Moroccan-Algerian
dialogue.


5. (C) Van Walsum said he understood that the U.S. wants each
time to go a little further to saying that the only proposal
is the Moroccan proposal. But in doing so, the U.S. is
moving from an honest broker to the French position. He said
that the U.S. feels that he should follow that line as well
and that had he done so in his recent report, it would have
been possible for the U.S. to obtain a better resolution. He
said if that was Washington's view, then Washington was
underestimating the strong resistance to the approach of
Morocco and it was overestimating its own influence. Van
Walsum noted how effective Algeria had been in mobilizing
South Africa and Russia into generating resistance to
weakening language that guaranteed self-determination and the
equality of the two proposals.
Khalilzad