NEW UN ENVOY TO IRAQ OUTLINES FIRST STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000799

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: NEW UN ENVOY TO IRAQ OUTLINES FIRST STEPS

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On September 26, Ambassador Khalilzad met
with Staffan de Mistura, the UN's newly-appointed Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Iraq and
head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI). The Ambassador underscored strong U.S. support for
de Mistura, and encouraged him to turn to USG interlocutors
for assistance in implementing UNAMI's new mandate. De
Mistura said UN SYG Ban told him the job is the most
important UN political post in the world, but agreed to take
the position only after it was clear the U.S. strongly
supported him. He said the Secretary-General is "totally
supportive" of his request to fast-track personnel and other
logistical issues. In that regard, he urged the U.S. to
focus on the quality rather than the number of personnel he
brings with him. De Mistura said he would request the
secondment of diplomats from key countries to augment his
staff, and asked the U.S. to consider nominating an
Arab-speaking individual. To capitalize on the international
support for an expanded UN role expressed during the
September 22 ministerial, De Mistura said he preferred to
defer consultations in Washington and other P5 capitals until
after he had established himself in Baghdad and consulted in
the region. See Action Request in para 4. End summary.

DE MISTURA ASSURED OF U.S. SUPPORT
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad began the meeting by
congratulating de Mistura on his new role. He urged the UN
to undertake a "more engaged" approach in Iraq, in keeping
with UNSC Resolution 1770 that expanded the UN's mandate.
The U.S. will do its part, said the Ambassador, but we need
the UN to become fully involved in encouraging Iraqis towards
a national compact and national reconciliation. The
Ambassador encouraged de Mistura to consider the many avenues
where the UN can be useful, including the regularization and
institutionalization of a robust regional dialogue. Citing
the President and the Secretary, he underscored U.S.
willingness to help de Mistura and the UN however possible,
and said that de Mistura could count on U.S. support in Iraq,
New York, and elsewhere.


3. (C) De Mistura thanked the Ambassador for U.S. support,
and noted that he would not have taken the position if he had
not been convinced that the U.S. supported his nomination.
The Secretary-General told de Mistura that the UN's role in
Iraq is "the most important and delicate political mission
that the UN has in the world," and de Mistura was grateful
that the UN and the U.S. strongly backed him. Over the next
year, "we need to make something positive happen," said de
Mistura, and he stressed his commitment to working closely
with the U.S. and the Iraqis.

KEY PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
--------------


4. (C) De Mistura reported that the Secretary-General would
be "totally supportive" of de Mistura's requests to
fast-track personnel and logistics issues. The new SRSG told
Ambassador Khalilzad that he will handpick quality people to
join his team, and said competence would be his primary
criterion. He urged that the U.S. "avoid the numbers game"
in looking at UNAMI staff in Baghdad, and focus instead on
the quality of the people he puts on his team. He was
receptive to the message that current UNAMI mission staff
have a reputation of pro-Sunni bias that has complicated the
UN's engagement with the GOI. De Mistura said a number of
countries, including Russia, had already approached the UN to
offer their nationals to join the staff. De Mistura supports
seconded nationals joining his staff as a means of expanding
international support, and urged that the U.S. consider
nominating a "good Arabic-speaker." Ambassador Khalilzad
said the U.S. would work on this, and suggested that
including nationals from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran could
help decrease the suspicions of these countries towards
UNAMI. ACTION REQUEST: USUN requests State to evaluate the
prospect of a U.S. secondee to UNAMI and to identify
potential candidates. Ambassador Khalilzad notes a U.S.
staff member could improve connectivity and timely exchanges.
END ACTION REQUEST.


5. (C) The new SRSG raised two other key issues for UNAMI's
future. First, he noted that the routine process of planning
for the UN's new integrated compound in Baghdad, involving
the UN's ACABQ budget advisory committee and the UN General
Assembly, would be unacceptably lengthy given the urgent
political context. Therefore, he would be recommending
several creative approaches to accelerate action, including

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the use of subcontractors that bypassed the UN's procurement
system. He would also recommend supplementing UN funds
available for construction by soliciting donations from
member states. Ambassador Khalilzad suggested de Mistura
also explore the availability of existing property in Baghdad
that might be available for the UN's needs.


6. (C) Second, de Mistura raised UNAMI's need for its own
plane in order to undertake the internal and regional travel
necessary to fulfill his mandate, as well as to illustrate
the UN's independence from the coalition. De Mistura
underscored that the process for acquiring a civilian plane
with appropriate counter-measures was lengthy. Relaying his
understanding that counter-measures are required primarily
for landing and take-off at BIAP, he proposed that MNF-I
assist a UN plane on take-off and landing at BIAP with MNF
assets that can provide the required counter-measures. This
arrangement would free UNAMI to use a dedicated UN plane for
travel and otherwise minimize the UN's reliance on MNF-I.
Ambassador Khalilzad suggested de Mistura raise this proposal
with the Embassy and MNF-I when he arrived in Baghdad.
(Note: UN staff subsequently clarified that this approach
may not be feasible or acceptable to the UN's Department of
Safety and Security. End Note.)

THE IRAQ COMPACT
--------------


7. (C) De Mistura raised the Iraq Compact, and said he would
like to be useful in assisting the process and coordinating
with Ibrahim Gambari. The Ambassador said the Compact was an
important tool because it created incentives for Iraqis "to
do the right thing." De Mistura agreed, and said it was
similar to the carrot of EU membership dangled to the
countries from the former Yugoslavia. The Ambassador noted
that it is important to show the Iraqis that their behavior
has consequences, and that by pursuing national
reconciliation and economic reform as described in the
Compact, they would receive concrete benefits.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


8. (C) According to Darko Mocibob, the UN's Iraq team leader,
de Mistura will spend the month of October closing down his
office in Italy and attending to family issues. Outgoing
SRSG Ashraf Qazi will leave Baghdad by the second week of
October, and de Mistura's first days as new SRSG will be in
Istanbul, when he will attend the Iraq Neighbors Conference
starting October 31. He will depart Istanbul for Amman, and
shortly afterwards arrive in Baghdad. De Mistura expressed
willingness to visit Washington as soon as possible, but
noted that symbolically it would be important for him to
begin work in Baghdad and the region before returning to P5
capitals for consultations.
KHALILZAD