INDIAN UNSC REFORM GAMBIT: LOTS OF SOUND AND FURY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000779

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR IN JA PK IT
SUBJECT: INDIAN UNSC REFORM GAMBIT: LOTS OF SOUND AND FURY,
SIGNIFYING MORE THAN BEFORE

REF: A. BEIJING 5969


B. KUMAR-BROWN UNCLASS E-MAILS (9/10-9/17)

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The last few meetings of the 61st UNGA
session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on UNSC
reform, held between September 11-14, featured much more
controversy than usual in the fourteen-year history of the
working group. After President of the General Assembly (PGA)
Khalifa refused to call for "intergovernmental negotiations"
on UNSC reform in her report on the OEWG to the 62nd UNGA, a
group of 25 countries led by India tabled a draft resolution
calling on the new PGA to begin these talks on the basis of a
framework that hews closely to the G-4 model for UNSC
expansion. Pakistan, Italy, Egypt, and other members of the
Uniting for Consensus (UFC) bloc fought back that the draft
resolution was an affront to the PGA and an effort to impose
a particular model of UNSC reform on the broader membership.
The P5 mostly supported the PGA's approach and called for
consensus decision-making in the OEWG, although China took a
harder line against the Indian draft while the UK and France
took a softer position. The PGA eventually brokered a
compromise on her report that led India and its allies to
withdraw their resolution in exchange for a reference in her
report to "intergovernmental negotiations" on the basis of
progress achieved in the 61st UNGA -- meaning the efforts of
the two OEWG facilitators appointed by the PGA for 2006-7 who
concluded there was no consensus behind any particular
approach to UNSC expansion and suggested consideration of
interim expansion options. End Summary.

PGA Khalifa Upsets G-4
--------------


2. (U) Every year since the OEWG first convened in 1993, the
PGA has sent a report to the UNGA describing the working
group's work. In each of these years, the UNGA endorsed
these reports and adopted the draft "decision" contained
therein to extend the OEWG for another year and inscribe UNSC
reform as an item on the agenda of the next UNGA session.
Beginning in July 2007, PGA Khalifa began discussions on the
text of the 61st UNGA report on the OEWG. After a year in
which facilitators appointed by the PGA explored several UNSC
reform options with member states -- but concluded that none
enjoy consensus support -- G-4 representatives urged Khalifa
to propose that the 62nd UNGA begin "intergovernmental
negotiations" (presumably on a draft resolution to amend the
UN Charter) to expand the UNSC. After UFC members such as
Pakistan and Egypt told her privately these negotiations
would be premature, Khalifa refrained from including any
reference to them in her report. She also ultimately agreed
to a UFC demand to delete a preambular reference in the
report to the need to complete UNSC reform in the 62nd
session of the UNGA. Upon receiving a draft version of her
report dated September 10, G-4 PermReps expressed anger that
the PGA had rejected their requests and acceded to the wishes
of the UFC.

India Tries a Gambit
--------------


3. (U) Soon after the PGA released her draft report dated
September 10, the Indian Mission along with fifteen other
missions circulated a draft "framework" resolution on UNSC
reform, which was given the UN symbol L69. This resolution
requested that the new PGA to "immediately commence
result-oriented inter-governmental negotiations... so as to
adopt an outcome preferably before the end of 2007," taking
into account the following elements: expansion in both
permanent and non-permanent categories, "greater
representation to developing countries," and "representation
to the developed countries and those with transition
economies, reflective of contemporary realities." Most
delegates took these "elements" to be code for the G-4
proposal (permanent seats for Japan, Germany, India, and
Brazil as well as an expanded number of non-permanent seats)
tabled in early 2006. Before it was withdrawn on September
17, L69 had garnered 25 co-sponsors, including South Africa,
Nigeria, Congo, Brazil, Jamaica, and several Caribbean and
Pacific island nations.


4. (U) Although the Indian Mission described L69 as a
response to the PGA's refusal to call for "inter-governmental

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negotiations" in her report, implying it was a tactical ploy
to put pressure on the PGA, several delegates were unsure
whether India and its allies would push the draft resolution
to a vote. If L69 were put to a vote, several delegates from
countries in neither of the two UNSC reform camps thought it
could attract close to two-thirds support. They thought it
was particularly notable that a number of African countries
co-sponsored L69, despite the 2006 decision by the African
bloc not to endorse the G-4 proposal, and reasoned that even
a small degree of African support added to the number of
original G-4 supporters, would come close to the two-thirds
level. The Japanese told USUN they were unhappy with L69
because India had failed to consult its G-4 partners before
tabling the text, but admitted that if pushed to a vote, they
would support L69. Although Germany supported India's call
for a reference in the PGA's report to "inter-governmental
negotiations," it did not explicitly support L69.

Pakistan and Others Fight Back
--------------


5. (U) From the moment L69 was first circulated, leaders of
the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group -- mainly Pakistan and
Italy, but also Egypt, Argentina, and South Korea -- argued
that it was an affront to the current PGA and an underhanded
effort to impose a UNSC expansion model on the broader
membership through the office of the new PGA. Reports by the
two facilitators appointed by the PGA in 2007 concluded there
was no consensus behind any particular UNSC reform option and
that the UNGA should consider interim UNSC expansion. &So
on what basis should these "intergovernmental negotiations"
take place?8 the Egyptian PR repeatedly asked. Pakistani PR
Akram, who several times engaged in vitriolic exchanges with
Indian PR Sen, welcomed intergovernmental negotiations but
argued they should be based on the progress achieved by the
OEWG thus far -- a reference to the interim SC expansion
options. (Note: India opposes interim UNSC expansion options
because it fears they will drain momentum from the push for
permanent expansion. End Note.) Italian PR Spatafora engaged
in less pointed but equally passionate exchanges with his
German colleague and ultimately declared that Italy would
accept "any" compromise proposal offered by the PGA.

P5 (Mostly) Observe the Melee
--------------


6. (C) Throughout the various OEWG meetings, the P5 generally
expressed support for the PGA's report and underscored the
need for consensus decision-making. China took the most
forward-leaning position against L69, calling it a "disputed
and rushed" resolution that "could undermine UNSC reform
efforts in the future." (Note: In addition to the demarche
to Embassy Beijing requesting that the U.S. more actively
oppose L69, the Israeli Mission told USUN that the Chinese
placed a high-level call to Jerusalem urging opposition to
L69. End Note.) Russia argued that any resolution on UNSC
reform, even a "framework" resolution that does not actually
amend the UN Charter, requires a two-thirds majority per UNGA
resolution 53/30 (1998). (Note: This resolution decided not
to adopt any resolution on equitable representation in or
increase in the membership of the UNSC without the support of
at least two-thirds of member states. End Note.) The
Russians, however, had instructions to abstain on L69 if it
came to a vote -- in contrast to Chinese and U.S.
instructions to vote against. True to past practice, the
British and French delegations took a softer line on L69, and
said they support permanent seats for the G-4 as well as the
principle of expansion in both permanent and non-permanent
categories.

PGA Finally Strikes a Deal
--------------


7. (C) After several days of OEWG meetings in which PGA
Khalifa repeatedly exhorted delegations to support her draft
report without much success, she consulted the main
protagonists and announced on September 14 that she had
brokered a compromise which enjoyed consensus support.
Immediately after making this announcement, she gaveled the
OEWG meeting to a close and sent her report to the UNGA
plenary for consideration on behalf of the working group.
Although India, South Africa, and other L69 co-sponsors later
complained that they had not fully supported Khalifa's
compromise and that she had exceeded her authority by ending

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discussion in the OEWG, they ultimately withdrew L69 and
supported her draft report with the amendments to the draft
UNGA decision:


8. (U) The final version of the decision, contained in the
PGA's report and adopted by the UNGA plenary by consensus, is
below (edits are capitalized with original language in
brackets):

"The General Assembly, recalling its previous resolutions and
decisions relevant to the question of equitable
representation on and increase in the membership of the
Security Council and other matters related ot the Security
Council, having considered the report of the Open-Ended
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on
and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and
Other Matters related to the Security Council, which was
established pursuant to its resolution 48/26 of 3 December
1993, on its deliberations during the sixty-first session of
hte General Assembly, bearing in mind the United Nations
Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000, adopted by Heads
of State and Government, in which they resolved, in respect
of reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, to
intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of
the Security Council in all its aspects, and recalling the
2005 World Summit Outcome of 16 September 2005, in which
Heads of State and Government expressed support for early
reform of the Council and recommended that the Council
continue to adapt its working methods:

(a) Takes note of the report of the Working Group on the
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related
to the Security Council on its work during the sixty-first
session of the General Assembly;

(b) Notes with appreciation the Chairperson's initiative to
stimulate an active discussion relating to the comprehensive
reform of the Security Council by the Working Group;

(c) Urges the Working Group to continue to exert efforts
during the sixty-first session, aimed at achieving GENERAL
AGREEMENT (vice "progress" in the consideration of...) among
member states in the consideration of all issues relevant to
the question of equitable representation on and increase in
the membership of the Security Council and other matters
related to the Security Council;

(d) Decides that the question of equitable representation on
and increase in the membership of the Security Council and
other matters related to the Security Council should be
considered during the sixty-second session of the General
Assembly, so that further concrete RESULTS (vice "steps") may
be achieved, INCLUDING THROUGH INTERGOVERNMENTAL
NEGOTIATIONS, BUILDING ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED SO FAR,
PARTICULARLY IN THE SIXTY-FIRST SESSION, AS WELL AS THE
POSITIONS OF AND PROPOSALS MADE BY ALL MEMBER STATES.

(e) Also decides that the Working Group should continue its
work, taking into account the progress achieved during the
forty-eighth to sixty-first sessions of the General Assembly
and drawing on the experience of the sixty-first session, as
well as the views to be expressed during the sixty-second
session, and also taking into consideration the discussion on
the process of implementation of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome;

(f) Further decides that the Working Group should submit a
report to the General Assembly before the end of its
sixty-first session, including any agreed recommendations."

Comment: What Does this Mean?
--------------


9. (C) It is tempting to conclude that this year's drama in
the OEWG will mean nothing more than it has for the last
fourteen years. But this year was slightly different. Both
the G-4 and UFC groups are frustrated at the lack of progress
on this issue. While UNSC reform may still be far away, the
push for "intergovernmental negotiations" could give the new
PGA an opportunity to launch discussions on a specific UNSC
reform text and try to use his office to muster two-thirds
majority support. Although it is difficult to count votes
because the OEWG has always operated by consensus, several

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"neutral" delegates thought L69 could come close to reaching
the two-thirds threshold with the African support it
attracted. If and when that threshold is crossed, the
spotlight will shift to the P5 -- whose parliamentary
ratification is required for any amendment to the UN Charter
to expand the UNSC. In the coming months, therefore, we will
have to work with the new PGA and our allies among the UFC to
ensure OEWG discussions do not proceed in a manner we cannot
support. In doing so, we will in particular need to manage
British and French inclinations to support any reform
proposal that diverts attention from their own permanent
seats on the Council.
KHALILZAD