Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK768
2007-09-19 22:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

DARFUR: UN-P3 SHARE UNAMID DEPLOYMENT CONCERNS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUCNDT #0768/01 2622231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 192231Z SEP 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2606
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000768 

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IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2107
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN-P3 SHARE UNAMID DEPLOYMENT CONCERNS

REF: USUN 00750

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 B/D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000768

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2107
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN-P3 SHARE UNAMID DEPLOYMENT CONCERNS

REF: USUN 00750

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 10.


2. (C) SUMMARY. P3 representatives pushed UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations Under Secretary-General Guehenno for
rapid deployment of UNAMID forces to Darfur and strategized
about support for African troop contributing countries
(TCCs). Guehenno said that many of the potential African
units were not up to UN standards and would need extensive
equipment and logistical support to deploy. He strongly
criticized the African Union's rejection of offers of
specialized military units from Uruguay and Norway and asked
the P3 to urge the AU to take a more flexible attitude
towards non-African TCCs. He also asked P3 countries to
approach potential TCC's with needed technical capabilities,
requesting support for UNAMID and involved African TCCs.
USUN seconds that request here. END SUMMARY.


3. (U) Representatives of the P3 (U.S., UK, France) Missions
to the UN discussed Darfur on September 18 with Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary Jean Marie
Guehenno. Guehenno was joined by A/SYG Jane Holl Lute and
Major General (MG) Per Five. P3 principals were Ambassador
Sanders (USUN),PermRep John Sawers (UK),and French Deputy
PermRep Jean-Pierre Lacroix.

--------------
DPKO: AU Unhelpful on UNAMID Implementation
--------------


4. (C) UKUN PermRep Sawers said the P3 were concerned that
the UNAMID deployment timeline has been delayed by UN-AU
disagreements over UNAMID force composition. Guehenno agreed
that some aspects of force generation were "stuck" and that
the UN and AU had competing notions of how much of the UN-AU
force should come from non-African countries. He said he
hoped to come to an agreement with the AU on a finalized list
of infantry in advance of the September 21 Darfur Ministerial
meeting in New York.


5. (C) Regarding logistical support, Guehenno said UNAMID
still lacks specialized units to provide adequate aviation,
transport and specialized military assets. Guehenno said

that a recent AU rejection of offers from Uruguay, Norway and
Sweden of specialized military assets had sent the "wrong
message" to potential TCCs with the right capabilities. He
added that many potential European TCCs were not confident
that the AU forces would be able to provide adequate security
for their specialized military units and were asking to
include their own force protection units. A/SYG Holl Lute
said that the security of specialized military units is a
concern for many potential TCCs, but that the UN is sensitive
to the AU's desire to be a "full partner" in UNAMID.


6. (C) On troop deployment more generally, Holl Lute said,
"there is going to be a problem" as new troops arrive whose
units have been brought up to UN equipment, staffing, and
training standards, and troops already on the ground note the
contrast with their own circumstances. Picking up on this
theme, Guehenno said that morale among troops already in the
field is very low. He said Force Commander General Agwai had
recently confided that the "force we have now is a broken
force." Guehenno said Agwai has concluded that the morale
problem can't be fixed except by replacing all present forces
because "we can't change the mindset once they have been
broken."


7. (C) In response to Ambassador Sander's inquiry about which
countries might be able to make up UNAMID shortfalls,
Guehenno said that Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Czech
Republic, India, South Africa and Ukraine had all provided
needed capacities to UN peacekeeping missions in the past and
might be willing to provide these assets to UNAMID as well.
(NOTE: UKUN contacted USUN subsequent to this meeting to
report that they have recommended that HMG approach these
governments to request support to UNAMID prior to the
September 21 Ministerial Meeting in New York. END NOTE.)

--------------
Many Potential TCCs Do Not Meet UN Standards
--------------


8. (C) Guehenno said that there are several delicate issues
to be resolved with the AU regarding the quality, composition
and equipping of the African TCCs. Guehenno noted that

USUN NEW Y 00000768 002 OF 002


several of the TCCs use different metrics for force strength.
(NOTE: The UN standard battalion is 800 men. Many of the
current AMIS battalions have as few as 530 men. END NOTE.)
He added that many of the current troops available from
proposed lists of TCCs lack the equipment and training that
will need to deploy. Lacroix reported that several potential
African TCCs had already approached France on a bilateral
basis to request support. Lacroix asked that DPKO provide a
prioritized list of TCC equipment requirements so the P3 can
begin looking at support in a coordinated manner. MG Five
said many of these units that do not qualify at present could
well be brought up to UN training and equipment standards
eventually and would therefore become eligible for UNAMID
deployment later in the process.

--------------
Unresolved Political and Legal Issues
--------------


9. (C) Guehenno noted that several issues impacting
deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP),most involving
the Government of Sudan (GOS),have not been resolved with
the GOS, including land to expand camps, lifting of air lift
restrictions and visas for UN personnel. Holl Lute referred
to difficulties with a "letter of assist" needed to keep U.S.
contractor PA&E on the ground under a sole source contract
extension pending a longer term competitive bill process.
Guehenno commented that Sudanese officials were still making
"different noises" regarding UNAMID deployment and suggested
that this reflected a lack of a "strategic shift" by the
Sudanese to accept the UN components of the force. He summed
up Sudan's position by saying he is well aware that
"Khartoum's insistence on African troops doesn't come from
Sudanese nationalism. Khartoum doesn't want a capable
force." Five added that DPKO was moving forward with
military planning on the assumption that the GOS would not be
fully cooperative with UNAMID deployment. For this reason,
DPKO planned to use the UNMIS supply lines based in Entebbe,
Uganda, rather than Port Sudan, to move many of the technical
equipment and other assets into Darfur.

--------------
Action Request
--------------


10. (C) USUN requests that the Department coordinate with P3
capitals to approach Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Czech
Republic, India, South Africa and Ukraine regarding support
to UNAMID in advance of the September 21 Ministerial meeting
in New York.

KHALILZAD