ALGERIAN READOUT ON AUGUST 10-11 WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000671

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC WI AG MO
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN READOUT ON AUGUST 10-11 WESTERN SAHARA
TALKS

REF: USUN 666

Classified By: Amb. Jackie W. Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons
1.4 (B&D).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Ambassador Sanders, members
of the Algerian delegation to the second round of the
Manhasset talks between Morocco and the Polisario on Western
Sahara expressed lower expectations of the progress of the
talks than they had after the initial round. The Algerians
said that Morocco had been less provocative in this round and
claimed that the talks on issues not directly prejudicing
Western Sahara's final status had gone well, but they
lamented Morocco's veto of talks on confidence building
measures (CBMs),and complained that Morocco was trying to
delay the next round of talks. End summary.


2. (SBU) USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders met on August 13 with
the Algerian delegation that attended the August 10-11
Western Sahara peace talks at Manhasset, NY in order to get
their readout of the talks. The Algerian delegation members
included MFA Secretary-General Ramdane Lamamra (who had
headed the delegation) and UN Permrep Youcef Yousfi; MFA
Senior Advisor Abdullah Baali, the third delegation member,
was not present.


3. (C) The Algerians were subdued in their assessment of the
talks. Lamamra characterized the negotiations as "not
promising, but useful," noting that the "psychological
atmosphere" of the talks was markedly less friendly than at
the first round. He attributed this change to Morocco's
hardened position. The latter was encapsulated in King
Mohammed's Throne Day speech, which, by stating that Morocco
would negotiate on the basis of "autonomy and nothing but
autonomy," had imposed "the mother of all preconditions" on
the supposedly precondition-free talks. The Algerians
admitted that the Moroccans had been considerably less
provocative in the second round than in the first and that
Moroccan Royal Council on Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) President
Khalihenna Ould Errachid's role had been much reduced.
Algeria itself, Lamamra said, had done its best to help the
process, but had adhered strictly to the Baker formula (under
which the UN requested its attendance) and would only attend
the opening and closing sessions and those sessions which
specifically addressed issues which would affect Algeria
directly.


4. (C) Given the impasse between Morocco and the Polisario on
the question of which plan to discuss, Lamamra believed that
Van Walsum's approach of bringing in outside experts was the
best course forward. He lamented the failure of an Walsum to
convince the Moroccans to broach the subject of
confidence-building measures (CBMs),as such measures would
best create the trust needed to move forward. While the
Moroccans had insisted that such measures must be negotiated
within the UNHCR framework, there were several potentially
helpful CBMs that fell outside of that framework, to include
demining, joint military patrols, and international monitors
for human rights in the Western Sahara. (Comment: All of
these, and particularly the latter, would be objectionable
for the Moroccans. End comment.)


5. (C) The Moroccan attitude toward the next round of talks,
Lamamra claimed, was disingenuous. While he
understood the need for the Moroccan delegation to prepare
for the Moroccan elections, these were on September 7 and the
new Moroccan government would be in place by early October.
There was no need to wait until November for the next round,
and indeed, Algeria and the Polisario had argued that it
would be preferable to have the next round prior to the next
SYG report (with the MINURSO renewal at the end of October),
if only so that report might have something to say. Van
Walsum had unfortunately given in to the Moroccans on this
point, Lamamra said; nevertheless, he saw a possibility for
moving the talks forward.


6. (C) As the discussion of local government and natural
resources had gone well, said Lamamra, future rounds should
include such discussions on topics that are "not
politicized." The delegations themselves could be polled on
the topics that they would like to see raised in this regard,
though this would run the risk of assuring that suggested
topics would be automatically vetoed by the other party.
Another way to move forward would be for the two sides to
have a smaller meeting at some point in the talks, with the
delegation leader from each side together with Van Walsum.
This formula would, however, be difficult for Morocco to
accept, as it would exclude CORCAS, which Morocco had
repeatedly made clear must be present at every discussion
between the two sides. Ultimately, Lamamra said, Morocco
would have to come to a formula that would satisfy the
Polisario's "dignity and aspirations;" otherwise the talks
could not proceed to any level of success.


KHALILZAD