Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK670
2007-08-15 14:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

VAN WALSUM'S READOUT OF SECOND ROUND OF WESTERN

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC MO AG WI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0021
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DE RUCNDT #0670/01 2271424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151424Z AUG 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2460
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1372
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6253
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0072
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0986
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 0488
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000670 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MO AG WI
SUBJECT: VAN WALSUM'S READOUT OF SECOND ROUND OF WESTERN
SAHARA NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Amb. Jackie Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons
1.4 (B&D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000670

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MO AG WI
SUBJECT: VAN WALSUM'S READOUT OF SECOND ROUND OF WESTERN
SAHARA NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Amb. Jackie Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons
1.4 (B&D).


1. (C) Summary: In an August 13 meeting with Ambassador
Sanders, UN/SYG Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum said that the
second round of Western Sahara negotiations had shown some
engagement by the parties on peripheral substantive issues
including natural resources and local administration, but
that there had been no movement on the core final status
issues. Van Walsum sought U.S. assistance prior to the next
negotiation session scheduled for November to pressure the
parties to abandon their rigid postures: for Morocco to
limit CORCAS President Khalihenna Ould Errachid's provocative
behavior and for the Polisario to be more open-minded about
engaging on the Moroccan autonomy plan. End Summary.

Generally Positive Atmosphere, No Expectation of Progress
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Van Walsum gave a brief readout of the talks he had
mediated between Morocco and the Polisario, held August 10-11
in Manhasset, NY. He noted that the atmosphere of the talks
was generally positive for a second round and expressed some
pleasure at the fact that the talks did not break down. At
the same time, he said, it was clear that neither side was
ready to move forward. He said he made an attempt to move
from mere cordialities to a discussion of substantive issues
by inviting two Secretariat officials to make presentations
to the parties on issues that had "no direct bearing on
sovereignty" but were important to the lives of the people on
the ground: natural resources and local administration
issues. Nicholas Hasum, from the Executive Office of the
SYG, spoke on natural resources, and Leonardo Romeo, of the
UN Capital Development Fund, spoke on local administration
issues. While the Moroccan delegation initially objected to
the presentations, it eventually engaged quite actively with
UN officials and the Polisario on the subject matter.


3. (C) Van Walsum said he was less successful in attempting
to convince Morocco to discuss confidence-building measures.

Morocco objected in principle to the discussion of CBMs,
arguing both that a framework for discussion of CBMs exists
with UNHCR in Geneva, and that they did not want to take the
time dedicated to talks with the Polisario to discuss
"irrelevancies." They did not, however, rule out future
discussion of CBMs, provided that they are tackled in an ad
hoc context, and not under the auspices of UNSCR 1754. Van
Walsum suspected that the Moroccan reluctance to broach this
issue during the talks stemmed from their unwillingness to
touch on issues of human rights violations in the Western
Sahara. (Comment: Septel conversation with the Algerian
delegation confirmed that a human rights-linked CBM was
indeed one of their aims. End comment.)


4. (C) Van Walsum reported that the presence of CORCAS
President Khalihenna Ould Errachid continued to be an
irritant to the Polisario. As in the first negotiations,
Khalihenna lectured the Polisario delegation directly when
given the floor rather than addressing his comments to Van
Walsum per the agreed format for the meetings. Three members
of the Polisario delegation, in turn, would leave the room
whenever Khalihenna spoke, leaving one delegate so that the
Polisario could not be accused of walking out on the talks.
At meals, no Polisario official engaged in discussion with
the CORCAS delegate. Overall, however, Van Walsum said that
the Moroccans had been less provocative in the second round
of talks than they had in the first.

Future Talks, Next Steps
--------------


5. (C) Van Walsum said that as in the second round, all
future rounds would include an agenda item entitled
"implementing resolution 1754," under which all controversial
issues would be discussed. For such discussions, van Walsum
said, the operative principle must be "nothing is decided
until everything is decided" so as to enable the parties to
negotiate freely. But getting the two sides to engage on
substance was a challenge, and unless something changed
within the calculations of the leadership of either Morocco
or the Polisario between now and the next round, there could
be no expected progress in that round.


6. (C) Van Walsum said that the U.S. could play a useful
role by putting pressure on both sides to remove obstacles
that hinder substantive discussions. For Morocco, van Walsum
said, this meant reducing the role that the CORCAS
representative plays in future negotiation sessions, though
he admitted that such a role reduction may not be realistic
considering Khalihenna's status as a royal appointee. For
the Polisario, van Walsum said, this meant engaging
constructively with the Moroccan plan by vigorously
questioning and pressing Morocco for details on its
considerable ambiguities in the course of future
negotiations. Van Walsum acknowledged that in doing so,
Polisario leadership would risk seeing their discussion
publicized by the Moroccan Press Agency (MAP) as evidence
that the Polisario accepted the Moroccan autonomy plan. As
this round would happen on the eve of Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic,s (SADR) "National Congress" in December, such
press would be politically disastrous for the Polisario
leadership.


7. (C) Additionally, van Walsum suggested that the U.S.
might find creative ways to minimize the influence that the
press has on the negotiations, as the parties are currently
reluctant to even discuss the proposals of the other side so
as not to be portrayed as having conceded anything in their
respective media and public opinions. He noted that because
each side only publishes their successes in the national
media, neither has prepared its political classes or public
opinion for concessions or setbacks, and that this
development portends negatively for the future.


8. (SBU) Van Walsum said that the parties have agreed to meet
again during the second week of November somewhere in
northeastern Switzerland at a location "as far away from UN
people in Geneva as possible." He said the final communiqu
had said only that the negotiations would be "in Europe"
because the Swiss government had not yet formally agreed to
provide the facility; the communiqu had left the date of the
next round of talks vague in order to smooth ruffled Moroccan
feathers over an earlier leak of the confidential
arrangements for the next round to the Algerian press.


KHALILZAD