Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK58
2007-01-25 15:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:  

SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

Tags:  UNGA AORC KUNR PREL 
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VZCZCXYZ0028
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0058/01 0251544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251544Z JAN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1190
INFO RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000058 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNGA AORC KUNR PREL
SUBJECT: SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
U.S. OF POSSIBLE NEW FUNDING APPROACHES

REF: USUN 52

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000058

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNGA AORC KUNR PREL
SUBJECT: SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
U.S. OF POSSIBLE NEW FUNDING APPROACHES

REF: USUN 52


1. 1. This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 2
and 13.


2. As reported reftel, the General Assembly (GA) agreed on
December 22, 2006 to additional funding for 27 special
political missions (SPMs),including the UN missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan (A/RES/61/252 Section VII). However, during
the Fifth Committee's consideration of the draft resolution,
the Syrian delegate raised objections to the expected
accomplishments and indicators of achievement associated with
implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1559
(withdrawal of foreign forces from southern Lebanon). He
also conveyed Syria's dislike of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway) in
charge of the mission. The Syrian delegate proposed a change
in the financing scheme of special political missions,
suggesting that SPMs be funded on the peacekeeping scale vs.
the regular budget scale. Both issues touch on the sensitive
relationship between the General Assembly and the Security
Council, as well as the role of the P-5 at the United
Nations. While a lack of time eventually cut off this
conversation, USUN believes these issues are not behind us
and that they will be raised again during the Fifth
Committee's next discussion on SPM financing, scheduled for
the March resumed session, when the Committee will consider
financing for two new SPMs in Nepal and Burundi. This cable
provides background, analysis, and thoughts on these issues.
USUN requests guidance on how to approach these issues in
upcoming discussions.

FINANCING OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS
--------------


3. Over the last several biennia (the UN regular budget is a
two-year budget),the funding requirements for special
political missions, as well as the nature of these missions,
have changed significantly. The initial provision for the
2002-2003 UN budget for special political missions was $98
million, while the current 2006-2007 estimate for all special
political missions is $702 million, more than a 700 percent
increase. In addition, special political missions now cover
a wide range of activities and include everything from
special envoys of the Secretary-General assigned to address a

specific political situation, to panels of experts on
sanctions, to peacebuilding missions, and to complex,
multi-disciplinary missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the
nature of the mandates of special political missions become
more complex and diverse and begin to include human rights,
electoral and other functions, the mandates of many SPMs have
become similar to those of most peacekeeping missions, which
themselves have become more complex in recent years.
However, no methodology exists to define a special political
mission or a peacekeeping mission. The general understanding
has been that the key difference between the two is related
to the deployment (or lack thereof) of troops. All
peacekeeping missions have troops deployed, generally to
enforce some type of ceasefire or peace agreement, while SPMs
do not have such a function.

PROPOSALS TO FUND SPECIAL POLITICAL
MISSIONS USING THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE
--------------


4. Until now, there has been agreement among Member States
to finance special political missions from the regular budget
and therefore at the scale of assessments applicable to the
regular budget (currently 22 percent for the U.S.). However,
given the increasing costs associated with SPMs, their impact
on the overall regular budget level, and the fact that all
but one are mandated by the Security Council, some
delegations, notably Japan and Syria, have called for the
General Assembly to consider financing Security
Council-approved special political missions at the
peacekeeping scale of assessment (26.0864 percent for the
U.S.). Syria actually went one step further by proposing
draft language during the December 2006 Fifth Committee
discussions that, if adopted, would have immediately changed
the scale of assessment used for special political missions.
A change in the scale of assessments would impact only the
P-5. The P-5 pay a higher percentage of the budgets for
peacekeeping missions than they do for the regular budget,
based on the notion of "special responsibilities" for the
permanent members of the Security Council. Developing
countries pay less on the peacekeeping scale, and therefore
would benefit the most from a change in the scale used to
finance SPMs. Most developed countries, such as the non-P5
EU members, Japan, and CANZ, would pay the same amount. Any
change in the scale used to finance SPMs would only,
therefore, impact the P-5.


POTENTIAL IMPACT ON U.S. FUNDING
OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS
--------------


5. A special consideration for the U.S. is the way we pay
our contributions to the regular budget vs. peacekeeping.
Regular budget contributions are funded through the
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account,
while the Contributions for International Peacekeeping
Activities (CIPA) account funds our assessments for
peacekeeping. Both accounts are facing shortfalls that
challenge our ability to pay our contributions in full.
Legislative language currently caps our payments for
peacekeeping at 25 percent, although we are assessed at a
higher rate, i.e. 26.0864 percent for 2007-2009. In
addition, CIPA language requires that Congress must be
notified 15 days in advance of the U.S. agreeing to a new
peacekeeping mission or any change in an existing
peacekeeping mission. If SPMs are funded on the peacekeeping
scale, and therefore from the CIPA account, USUN would
presume that this notification would apply to all 26 SPMs
that are mandated by the Security Council, adding another
step to the U.S. approval process.


THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS APPROVER
OF THE BUDGET
--------------


6. Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations states
that "The General Assembly shall consider and approve the
budget of the Organization." Over the years, the process for
GA consideration and approval of the budget has evolved, with
greater emphasis now placed on GA assessment of the views
concerning program priorities expressed by the 34 members of
the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC). Under the
provisions of GA resolutions 58/269 and 59/275, the CPC
convenes prior to the GA's consideration of each proposed
two-year budget to consider and subsequently make
recommendations on a plan outline prepared by the
Secretary-General reflecting the longer-term objectives of

SIPDIS
the Organization and a proposed biennial program plan. This
"experiment" in strategic framework planning, beginning with
the 2006-2007 biennial UN budget, was strongly influenced by
public sector trends toward results-based budgeting. As a
result, the UN budget now includes not only program
narratives, but also expected accomplishments and indicators
of achievement.


7. The strategic framework serves as the principal policy
directive and the basis for program planning, budgeting,
monitoring and evaluation for the UN regular budget. The
strategic framework is comprised of a number of logical
frameworks - one for each program. CPC members, including
until recently the U.S., review the strategic framework in
non-budget years and make recommendations for changes to the
program narratives, expected accomplishments, and indicators
of achievement in order to align them with the legislative
mandates previously approved by the GA. The recommendations
are then, with few exceptions, routinely endorsed by the GA
under the Fifth Committee's consideration of the agenda item
on "program planning." They then form the basis for the
Secretary-General's proposed program budget for the following

SIPDIS
biennium period.

DANGER OF POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ATTEMPTS TO REINTERPRET SECURITY
COUNCIL MANDATES
--------------


8. The level of detail included in the strategic framework
with regard to the Department of Political Affairs (where
funding for all special political missions falls) does not
allow for much scrutiny by the CPC with regard to individual
SPMs. However, as special political missions have grown
larger and more complex, the General Assembly has requested
greater detail about them in order to justify resource
requests. The GA ultimately has the authority to approve the
strategic framework, as well as to seek additional
information concerning any activity funded from the UN
budget. This has led to a unique problem for special
political missions, where all but one current mission is
approved by the Security Council. While there are other
elements in the regular budget that are based on Security
Council decisions, they tend to be buried and have not been
subject to much GA discussion or scrutiny. However, we are
now facing a situation where the GA, acting in its role
overseeing and approving resource allocation, may also
suggest changes to expecQ accomplishmQand indicators of
achievement, including for special political missions,
thereby essentially reinterpreting Security Council mandates.



9. This issue surfaced during the December discussions on
financing for special political missions, in particular with
regard to the logical framework associated with the
implementation of Security Council resolution 1559. The
Syrian delegate, under instructions from Damascus, submitted
all manner of objectionable language for the draft resolution
on SPM's being considered by the Fifth Committee in response
to the Syrian Government's dislike of the expected
accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the UN
mission in Southern Lebanon, as well as the Syrian
Government's dislike of the Secretary-General's Special
Representative (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway) in charge of the
mission. In effect the changes that were submitted would
have constituted a reinterpretation of the mandate. Despite
objections by USDel and the EU to opening up the logical
framework, and repeated statements that it was not the role
of the General Assembly, or the Secretariat for that matter,
to interpret Security Council resolutions, Syria insisted
that as part of the GA's responsibilities in allocating
resources, GA members had the right to ensure that
results-based budgeting was being accurately implemented.


THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
--------------


10. As we look ahead to the Fifth Committee's next
discussions on SPMs in March, USUN believes that more thought
must be given to the issues raised above, taking into account
the high priority we place on the mandates of many special
political missions, as well as the paramount role played by
the Security Council. Given the higher costs the U.S. would
face if SPMs were financed from the peacekeeping scale, as
well as the CIPA-related issues that might make it more
time-consuming and difficult for the Department to secure
Congressional support for financing these missions, USUN
recommends that we work with other members of the P-5 to
ensure SPM financing is kept in the regular budget. However,
achieving this will not be easy given the likely lack of
interest by many traditional allies, such as Japan and CANZ
(since the change in scale would not impact them),and the
group dynamics that play into Fifth Committee negotiations.


11. The Russian Federation and the U.S. are the only members
of the P-5 that operate on their own during Fifth Committee
discussions. China is part of the Group of 77 and China
(G-77),typically endorsing the G-77 "group" position, while
the United Kingdom and France are constrained by their
alignment with other European Union partners. The EU
consistently now speaks with one voice in the Fifth
Committee. Separately, Russia and China are not particularly
vocal in the Fifth Committee on budgetary issues. During the
December discussions, the Chinese clearly had no
understanding of the extent of the implications for the
Security Council and the P-5 of the language proposed by
Syria. Only after other P-5 Ambassadors raised the issue
with the Chinese Ambassador did the Chinese Fifth Committee
delegate begin to pay some attention. And even then, neither
the Chinese nor the Russians provided much support to the P-3
in trying to eliminate problematic language.


12. Another item to consider is that if we succeed in
keeping SPM funding in the regular budget, we will continue
to have discussions on the logical frameworks for the various
missions, most likely those in the Middle East. There is
also the possibility that some delegations will move to have
the CPC review the logical frameworks, a topic which also was
raised in December, although such an idea did not gain
traction at that time. With a review of the entire strategic
framework "experiment" scheduled for the sixty-second General
Assembly in the fall of 2007, the door is open to further
changes in the review process, including CPC's role in
examining the logical frameworks for SPMs. Given our
numerous concerns with the CPC and the fact that the GA seems
perfectly content to endorse CPC's recommendations, and not
make its own changes to the strategic framework, this could
prove highly problematic in our efforts to promote U.S.
interests. Therefore, we should keep in mind that any
position that supports keeping SPM funding in the regular
budget will need to take into account the possible CPC and
the GA roles reviewing logical frameworks and the impact of
these reviews on mandates created by Security Council
resolutions.

GUIDANCE REQUEST
--------------


13. USUN requests guidance as to how to approach these
issues in the upcoming Fifth Committee discussions in March.


WOLFF