DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ENCOURAGING ENGAGEMENT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000545

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC WI AG MO
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ENCOURAGING ENGAGEMENT ON
MOROCCO'S AUTONOMY PLAN

REF: STATE 88684

Classified By: Amb. Jackie Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Sanders delivered reftel demarche
points July 2 to Polisario New York Rep Ahmed Boukhari urging
serious and substantive Polisario engagement in the upcoming
August talks with Morocco, underscoring international
expectations of real progress between the parties, and noting
that the serious and credible Moroccan proposal represented a
realistic solution that would provide Western Sahara many of
the attributes of a sovereign state and lead the Sahrawi
closer to their goal of self-determination. Boukhari said
that the Polisario plans to submit to Personal Envoy van
Walsum for the August talks a suggested agenda that included
a proposal to "move on two feet" -- to alternate discussion
of the Moroccan plan with that of the Polisario plan. In
addition, the Polisario plans to suggest discussions of
issues the result of which might achieve a positive result
for the August talks: the release of political prisoners,
cooperation on landmine identification and disposal, joint
military patrols, and increased family visits. Boukhari said
the one redline for the Polisario would occur if, in its
continuing effort to make the negotiations seem to be one
between Sahrawi groups rather than between Morocco and the
Polisario, Morocco attempted to increase CORCAS participation
in the August talks. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Sanders delivered reftel demarche July 2 to
Polisario New York Rep Ahmed Boukhari, expressing U.S.
satisfaction with the reported positive atmosphere the June
18-19 talks and the agreement for additional talks in August.
She noted that engagement in the negotiations and the
resulting increase in international interest works in favor
of the Polisario and urged continued efforts on the part of
the Polisario to ensure that the positive momentum created by
the just completed round of talks be accelerated in the next,
more difficult round, when both sides will have to begin
making compromises. Ambassador Sanders said that if no
substantive engagement and agreement on any elements of a
solution are achieved in the next round, the international
community will consider the process a disappointment. Thus
the Polisario should begin to consider engaging realistically
in order not to be seen as the cause of a potential breakdown
in the negotiations. Ambassador Sanders ended by detailing
our belief that the Moroccan autonomy proposal is serious and
credible and deserves careful study by the Polisario. As
proposed, the plan gives the Western Sahara many of the
attributes of a sovereign state and it is difficult to
imagine a realistic solution that would lead the Sahrawi
closer to their goal of self-determination than this proposal
does.


3. (C) Boukhari said that he and negotiating team member
Mohamed Khaddad have been considering how the Polisario might
help move the August meetings forward and developed some
ideas that they planned to submit to the Polisario leadership
in mid-July. If approved, the Polisario team would offer the
suggestions to Personal Envoy van Walsum during a scheduled
August 5 pre-negotiation meeting. Boukhari said that the
fundamental Polisario proposal would be that the parties
"move on two feet" -- that each plan, the Moroccan and the
Polisario, be considered in turn. On one day the Moroccan
plan would be discussed, with both sides suggesting ways in
which the plan might be improved and on the second day, the
Polisario plan would be considered, with each side suggesting
ways in which the plan night be improved. In addition,
Boukhari said, with a view to achieving positive results
during the August meeting, the Polisario would suggest four
issues for discussion as confidence building measures that
would benefit all Sahrawi: the release of political
prisoners, cooperation on landmine identification and
disposal, joint military patrols as suggested by MINURSO, and
increased family visits.


4. (C) Assuring the U.S. that the Polisario intended to
continue to take the negotiations seriously, Boukhari said
that the one red line for the Polisario in August would be
continued Moroccan provocative behavior in its attempt to
make the negotiations seem to be a negotiation between two
Sahrawi groups rather than between the Polisario and Morocco.
If the Moroccans again attempted to increase the size of the
CORCAS component -- already three out of eight in the first
meetings -- the Polisario would be hard pressed to believe


that Morocco was entering talks with seriousness. In that
respect, Boukhari said, he urged the U.S. to use its
influence to convince the Moroccans to behave.


5. (C) Reviewing the Polisario team's take on the June 18-19
Manhasset meetings, Boukhari said that both delegations had,
for the most part, behaved well and that there had been
psychological progress if not substantive progress. The sole
discordant note had been the presence of the CORCAS and the
long-winded interventions of its representative. Boukhari
said that the head of the Polisario delegation had left the
room to express the delegation's displeasure. Boukhari
asserted that the Polisario had gone the extra mile to test
Moroccan intentions. He said that, in April, Jamaal al Omar,
a Moroccan national working in the office of the UN Deputy
Secretary-General, had approached him with a message from the

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Moroccans -- that the Moroccans would be open to informal
side meetings at Greentree. Having received permission from
the Polisario leadership, the Polisario delegation chief had
approached the Moroccan delegation chief after dinner on the
first evening to suggest an informal talk. But the Moroccans
had said they would talk only if the CORCAS representative
also participated in the discussion and the informal talks
never occurred.


6. (C) Boukhari said that although the Polisario intended to
work seriously on substance in the August meeting, he did not
believe much would be achieved until the third or fourth set
of negotiations. The first meeting had been very important,
but now the parties needed time to become accustomed with
each other and to work together on agendas. What is
important now is that both parties take the negotiations
seriously and that neither party act provocatively. To
ensure this last important requirement, Boukhari said, he
hoped that the U.S. would use its influence.
WOLFF