PORTUGAL'S PERMREP ON KOSOVO: SIX MONTHS OF TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000544

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL'S PERMREP ON KOSOVO: SIX MONTHS OF TALKS,
NO AUTOMATICITY

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a lunch meeting on June 27, Portuguese
Permrep Joao Salgueiro and Ambassador Wolff discussed
strategies for achieving supervised independence for Kosovo.
Salgueiro expressed reservations about scenarios involving
unilateral recognition, was opposed to putting a Security
Council resolution on Kosovo to a vote that would end in a
veto, and argued for six more months of negotiations without
automatic implementation of the Ahtisaari settlement if no
deal is reached. End summary.

Options For Dealing With Kosovo Resolution


2. (C) In a lunch meeting on June 27, Portuguese Permrep
Joao Salgueiro (incoming EU Presidency) and Ambassador Wolff
discussed strategies for achieving supervised independence
for Kosovo. Salgueiro recounted a recent conversation with
Russian Permrep Churkin, who had told him that Russia was
working on creative ideas on Kosovo to present when Putin was
in Kennebunkport. Salgueiro opined that this claim had not
sounded credible to him. He also said that Churkin had
argued to him that once Kosovars have independence they could
throw out international supervision. Salgueiro said he
understood Russia was proposing another year of negotiations.
Ambassador Wolff explained that in our discussions with the
Russians, they had indicated a desire for a longer period,
but had not discussed the matter in detail because it seemed
to be secondary to the larger issue. Indeed, the Russian
Mission in New York had instructions not to engage at all on
such matters.


3. (C) Ambassador Wolff reviewed possible alternatives for
the Council, including avoiding a resolution altogether and
taking national decisions to recognize Kosovo's independence.
Salgueiro replied that such an option would be feasible if
we could remove the legal obstacle of UNSCR 1244, which he
averred that we could not. Ambassador Wolff responded that
our legal experts did not agree with this, but the whole
question would be moot anyway if the Kosovars decided to
declare independence on their own. Salgueiro responded that
"our message to the Kosovars should be that the only way to
keep your hopes on track is to be quiet until we tell you we
can no longer afford for you not to be." Ambassador Wolff
explained that this could not be done without some
perspective for the future for the people of Kosovo.
Salgueiro asserted that, on the subject of a plan B with no
resolution, we would still have to keep UNMIK but NATO's role
would become unclear. The Kosovars would also not be
satisfied with the dubious international status of not having
a clear claim on sovereignty. Ambassador Wolff explained
that for the Kosovars, the real question was how long they
would allow Serbia and Russia to block their independence.

Six Months of Negotiations Without Automaticity: An 18-year
Old Leaving Home


4. (C) Salgueiro asserted that for the Serbs, final status
was like a de-colonization process and needed to be dealt
with properly. He claimed that with proper negotiations, the
question of Kosovo's permanent separation from Serbia could
be handled. Therefore, Ambassador Wolff responded that we
could not ask of the Serbs to do what was impossible for
them; many experts had already declared that no political
figure in Serbia could agree to independence and we could not
expect either Tadic or Kostunica to come out of a negotiation
accepting this formally. Salgueiro insisted that we should
tell the Kosovars to "give us six more months and we will
work for you."


5. (C) Ambassador Wolff underscored that the situation in
Kosovo was becoming increasingly difficult and the political
reality remained that if there were a declaration of
independence by the Kosovars then we would be faced with the
decision of recognizing or not recognizing. He noted that we
were also having discussions with the Serbs in New York and
their approach was at least somewhat realistic and focused on
how to manage the Kosovo problem, as opposed to Russia's more
abstract approach. Salgueiro commented that the Serb Permrep
seemed to want to take a helpful approach, but was tightly
constrained. He said it was also unclear how exactly the
information circle involving Moscow, Belgrade and the Serbian
and Russian Missions in New York functioned.


6. (C) Comment: While Salgueiro seemed generally familiar
with the Kosovo issue, he seemed comfortable with ambiguous


and inconclusive arrangements that would postpone
decision-making and final determination of status. We will
need to work the Portuguese Presidency to ensure support for
our Kosovo decisions. End comment.

WOLFF