ALGERIAN READOUT ON JUNE 18-19 WESTERN SAHARA TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000513

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PREL WI AG MO
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN READOUT ON JUNE 18-19 WESTERN SAHARA TALKS

REF: USUN 512

Classified By: Amb. Jackie W. Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D).


1. (C) Summary: In a June 20 meeting with USUN and NEA,
Algerian negotiators present at the June 18-19 Western Sahara
peace talks praised the talks' atmospherics and results,
complimented Van Walsum on his handling of the negotiations,
and patted themselves on the back for the role that they had
played. They complained about the role of pro-Moroccan
Sahrawis in the negotiations but still saw the talks as a
breakthrough overall. The Algerians suggested that no
additional participants be added to the next round of talks,
and they requested a positive, but evenhanded, U.S. press
statement. End summary.


2. (SBU) USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders and NEA DAS Gordon
Gray met on June 20 with the Algerian delegation that had
attended the negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario
in Manhasset, NY, in order to get their views on the talks.
The delegation, which included MFA Secretary-General Ramdane
Lamamra (who had headed the delegation),MFA senior advisor
(and former UN Permrep) Abdullah Baali, and UN Permrep Youcef
Yousfi, had been present on site, but not allowed to attend
all sessions of the talks.


3. (C) The Algerian delegation was in good spirits. Like the
UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum
(reftel),they stated that the talks had gone as well as
could possibly have been hoped (and gave themselves some of
the credit for this). The Algerians described themselves as
the voice of reason, providing advice to Van Walsum and
keeping the Polisario in line. Van Walsum, they said, had
initially voiced to them his worries that direct talks might
not even be possible given the antipathy of the parties, and
had been prepared to lead off with proximity negotiations
that ultimately proved unnecessary. Once negotiations began,
Van Walsum had been frustrated at their pace, but the
Algerian advice that he show patience had borne fruit. Van
Walsum had also initially questioned the wisdom of starting
only with the easiest issues and working to the more
difficult ones, but the Algerians said they had counseled him
that this was the best way to proceed. Lamamra noted that
while Algeria and Van Walsum disagreed strongly on
"metaphysical issues" (e.g., the issues underlying the
Western Sahara dispute and the way in which it would best be
resolved),the Algerians saw him as a man who understood how
to pragmatically move things forward. The Algerians also
praised the role of MINURSO SRSG Julian Harston, who had been
present at the talks.


4. (C) Lamamra said the meeting also was a breakthrough in
the sense that, for the first time, the Algerians had had the
opportunity to meet with Morocco's "core foreign policy team"
rather than its various mouthpieces, and they were able to
gain a greater understanding of the foundational principles
underlying the Moroccan position. The only negative element
in the talks, the Algerian delegation said, had been the
presence of several members of the pro-Moroccan Royal Council
on Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) in the Moroccan delegation, some
of whom the GOM had inserted at the last minute. However,
they viewed the lack of a CORCAS speech in the closing
session of the talks (after an unannounced CORCAS speech in
the opening session) as a positive step.


5. (C) The Algerians expected the next round of talks to be
much more difficult, as the first round had been essentially
a reciprocal statement of positions, much easier than finding
areas of mutual compromise. They suggested that two things
could help the next round be productive. First, while the
Friends' help had been very important to this point, their
direct involvement in negotiations would spoil the positive
dynamic that was beginning to build. On this point, the
Algerians later specifically noted the statement issued by
Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos after the talks as
evidence that Spain's primary interest lay in grandstanding
for the benefit of their public. Second, they asked that any
U.S. statement on the talks not again characterize the
Moroccan plan as "serious and credible" - everyone knew how
the U.S. felt about the Moroccan plan from its repeated
statements about it; it was now time to focus on the talks.
WOLFF