Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK469
2007-06-11 22:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BORDER IMPASSE: DEMARCHE RESPONSE

Tags:  AF AU ER EU PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO ET 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000469 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017
TAGS: AF AU ER EU PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO ET
SUBJECT: ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BORDER IMPASSE: DEMARCHE RESPONSE

REF: SECSTATE 076306

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM BRENCICK FOR REASON
S 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000469

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017
TAGS: AF AU ER EU PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO ET
SUBJECT: ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BORDER IMPASSE: DEMARCHE RESPONSE

REF: SECSTATE 076306

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM BRENCICK FOR REASON
S 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Per reftel instructions, PolMinCouns and
Poloff discussed the Eritrea-Ethiopia border impasse with
Norwegian Deputy Permanent Representative Juul in the run-up
to the November 27 deadline for demarcation by coordinates as
imposed by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC).
PolMinCouns stressed that the entire process in Ethiopia and
Eritrea was timeline-driven: the expiration of the mandate of
the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in
July and the departure of the EEBC in November. PolMinCouns
acknowledged the negative impact the situation in Somalia had
on the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the
obstacles it presented for U.S. mediation. PolMinCouns
raised the possibility of a Friends of UNMEE meeting (a group
which Norway chairs) by the end of June. Poloff also spoke
with UKUN on June 8 on this topic, and that Mission had
little new to offer. Finally, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations updated the Security Council at June
11 consultations, saying that despite appearances, the
parties still maintained "two fundamentally irreconcilable
positions." END SUMMARY.

JOHANSON-ISAIAS MEETING WAS NO BREAKTHROUGH
--------------

2. (C) PolMinCouns and Poloff presented reftel demarche on
June 5 to Norwegian Deputy PermRep Mona Juul, Military
Advisor Arve Lauritzen and Political Counselor Berit Enge.
Juul reported on a meeting between Norwegian Minister of
State Raymond Johanson and Eritrean President Isaias in
Asmara on May 30, which she described as a "frank, open
discussion," which nevertheless revealed that "not much had
changed" on Isaias' part. Johanson and Isaias had spoken
about "virtual demarcation" of the border, but Isaias had
insisted that there be "stakes in the ground" before any
dialogue with Ethiopia could begin. Juul said that

Johanson's arguments for an economic normalization of
relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea had not resonated with
Isaias.


3. (C) PolMinsCouns asked if Isaias had given any indication
of Eritrean intentions if demarcation by coordinates were to
take place upon the EEBC's scheduled departure in November,
stressing that a major U.S. concern was what would happen
after November. Juul said Isaias had downplayed any threat
of war and had blamed the escalation of tensions squarely on
Ethiopia.

UNMEE'S MANDATE COULD BE AFFECTED
--------------

4. (C) Military Advisor Arve Lauritzen said Norway believed
that, per the EEBC's November 2006 decision, demarcation by
coordinates meant the dissolution of the Temporary Security
Zone (TSZ) and accordingly the end of UNMEE's mandate. He
advised that the mandate be changed to reflect this reality
during its July renewal. PolMinCouns suggested that UNMEE's
mandate be extended past November to prepare for any
eventuality (NOTE: UKUN Poloff Justin McKenzie Smith told
Poloff separately that London would support a six-month
rollover for UNMEE while the Friends of UNMEE inaugurated a
dialogue with concerned parties. END NOTE). Lauritzen noted
that continued Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of
movement (which DPR Juul remarked had come to be a "normal"
state of relations between the Eritrean Government and the
international community and would remain so until events
changed on the ground) sent a bad signal to Sudan and Chad,
as the restrictions indicated an abuse of UN authority which
did not bode well for potential UN operations in Darfur and
eastern Chad. Lauritzen said that UNMEE at the moment was
militarily paralyzed.


5. (C) Counselor Enge stated that UN involvement in the
region was crucial and reported the reluctance among members

USUN NEW Y 00000469 002 OF 003


of the Friends of UNMEE to further downsize the Mission under
the present circumstances. McKenzie Smith later said London
could see no way for UNMEE to be used as anything other than
a tripwire in the standoff between the sides. PolMinCouns
asserted that the issue should be highlighted on the Security
Council's Mission to Africa so that the African Union (AU)
could "get back in the business of conflict prevention."
Enge agreed that the AU's location in Addis Ababa was an
obstacle to true Eritrean cooperation.


6. (C) DPR Juul referred to a recent draft letter the
Norwegian Mission had written on behalf of the Friends of
UNMEE to the UN Secretary-General, urging him to act
immediately on the appointment of a new Special
Representative for UNMEE (NOTE: Just before the meeting, USUN
had confirmed its support as a co-sponsor of this letter.
END NOTE). Juul admitted the SRSG appointment would succeed
only if accompanied by demonstrable political will by the
parties but indicated Norway's intention to "do what could be
done" in the meantime. UKUN Poloff agreed that the SYG
should appoint a new SRSG as soon as possible. In later
Council consultations, DPKO Assistant-SYG Annabi reported
that interviews of SRSG candidates were ongoing and that the
process would be completed soon.

RECEPTIVE TO FRIENDS MEETING
--------------

7. (C) DPR Juul was receptive to the idea of a Friends of
UNMEE meeting at the end of June, despite the fact that a
previous meeting had been just over a month ago. She was
open to the idea of inviting a high-level European Union
representative to brief the group. Enge asked if AF/E
Officer William Schofield were still planning to travel in
the near future to both Asmara and Addis Ababa, and she
requested that he raise revitalization of the Military
Coordination Commission during his Addis stop. Lauritzen
inquired about USG efforts to pressure the Ethiopian
Government to accept without preconditions the EEBC decision.
PolMinCouns said we were trying to impress upon the
Ethiopian Government the need to live up to its international
obligations.


8. (C) UKUN Poloff McKenzie Smith suggested that the
Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement meet in June to issue a
public statement encouraging the EEBC's findings. However,
he considered the EEBC's November deadline to be unhelpful
and worthy of re-evaluation. McKenzie Smith did not think
that any mention of sanctions against either side would be
productive.

DPKO NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROGRESS
--------------

9. (C) At June 11 Security Council consultations, DPKO
Assistant-SYG Annabi reported that the security situation
remained tense and that Eritrea's 45 "permanent" restrictions
against UNMEE (i.e., intact for at least six months) remained
as well, including the refusal of a visa to a DPKO Africa
Division Senior Political Affairs Officer of Canadian
nationality during his trip to the region during the week of
June 4 (NOTE: Eritrean DPR Araya Desta claimed to DepPolCouns
that the DPKO officer had been denied a visa on procedural
grounds because his application was filed in Khartoum vice
New York. END NOTE). Annabi reported on a June 4 incident
involving an UNMEE patrol stopped at gunpoint by Eritrean
Defense Forces (EDF) and a June 5 incident in which an EDF
officer threatened UNMEE with "serious action" if the Mission
did not expeditiously "compensate" an EDF soldier injured
during an accident with an UNMEE vehicle. Annabi expressed
concern over continued EDF troop and militia rotations and
movement of IDPs into the TSZ. A/SYG Annabi reported that
Ethiopian Armed Forces planned to conduct tactical military
training exercises in Sector West from June 11-17, coinciding
with the UNSC's visit to the region.


10. (C) Despite a May 31 letter from the EEBC President
reminding the parties of the looming November deadline and

USUN NEW Y 00000469 003 OF 003


urging their re-engagement with the Commission, Annabi saw
little prospect for resolving the border dispute. He cited
June 5 comments by Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign
Affairs Tekada blaming the inability to proceed on
demarcation on Eritrea's restrictions on UNMEE and its
violation of the TSZ. Annabi considered that even the June 8
letter from Ethiopian FM Seyoum to the Security Council
President, in which Ethiopia accepted the EEBC delimitation
decision without precondition, was nonetheless fraught with
conditions, including a demand that Eritrea restore the
integrity of the TSZ and UNMEE's freedom of movement. Annabi
assured that the UN would continue to assess the impact and
implications of the November deadline on the ground and the
likely scenarios before and beyond November if the current
stalemate persisted. Annabi appealed to the Council on its
Mission to the region to encourage both leaders to re-confirm
their commitment to the Algiers Agreements, especially the
cease-fire; to exercise restraint; to restore TSZ integrity;
to resume MCC activity; and to cooperate with UNMEE.


11. (C) Italian DPR Mantovani challenged Annabi's assessment
of the June 8 letter, saying that the "ball was now in the
Council's court" to respond to Ethiopia's statement that it
accepted the EEBC decision without precondition. UK
PolMinCouns Johnston supported Mantovani's argument, saying
that if the Ethiopian Government were serious, then this
would represent "a huge step forward." Annabi did not back
down, however, stating that despite rhetoric making it seem
like both sides were ready for demarcation, "there is always
a 'but'," and he insisted that the sides retained their "two
fundamentally irreconcilable positions."

COMMENT
--------------

12. (C) There is a general sense among Council Members, the
UN and key partners that the international community would be
well served to plan ahead for what may come in November.
Members, at least preliminarily, seem to favor a six-month
extension of UNMEE's mandate come July to accommodate
whatever may happen on demarcation after that time. There
are no clear plans emerging on how to engage the parties
ahead of November, and Norway seems reluctant to come out in
front on this issue, especially since the information it
receives from Asmara is not radically different from the
rhetoric Asmara expresses in the media.


13. (C) To avoid having dubious interlocutors step in to fill
the mediation gap (specifically Sudan and Libya),it would
make sense to bring on a non-Western player, perhaps the AU,
despite Eritrea's objections to its authority. Getting the
AU involved in conflict prevention might serve to detract
from the peacekeeping failures it is suffering but would
involve considerable confidence-building with the Eritrean
Government. Perhaps a meeting in a neutral location between
AU Commission Chair Konare and Eritrean President Isaias
could help to move the process forward. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD