Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK449
2007-06-05 22:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

DPKO BRIEFING ON DRC, JUNE 4

Tags:  BE CG FR PGOV PHUM PREL RW UK UNSC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0449/01 1562244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 052244Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2020
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1443
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 1195
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1125
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1026
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0163
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0280
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0223
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0746
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000449 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: BE CG FR PGOV PHUM PREL RW UK UNSC
SUBJECT: DPKO BRIEFING ON DRC, JUNE 4


(U) Classified by William J. Brencick, USUN Political
Minister-Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000449

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: BE CG FR PGOV PHUM PREL RW UK UNSC
SUBJECT: DPKO BRIEFING ON DRC, JUNE 4


(U) Classified by William J. Brencick, USUN Political
Minister-Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. Confidential - entire text.


2. (C) Summary: DPKO USG Guehenno briefed the P3 plus 2
concerning the situation in the DRC. He was particularly
concerned by the lack of progress towards a stable solution
to the political difficulties of the Kivus (especially the
role of Rwanda and the need for dialogue between Kinshasa and
Kigali). The political situation in Kinshasa was troublesome.
There was currently no counterweight to the power of the
presidency, human rights problems needed to be addressed, and
the role of Bemba was not resolved. Security Sector Reform
was not progressing adequately and needed the support of the
international community. He particularly advocated the
establishment of a framework (even if informal) for
international engagement with the GDRC. End Summary.


3. (C) The Under-Secretary-General for the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, briefed the P3
plus 2 (US, France, and the UK plus Belgium and South Africa)
on MONUC and the situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo on June 4th. This briefing was in part a preparation
for the UNSC trip to Africa, one part of which is a stop in
Kinshasa. USUN was represented by the POL Minister-Counselor
and the Senior Adviser for Africa.

The Situation in the Kivus


4. (C) Guehenno said that the situation in the Kivus remained
serious. The DRC was aware of the gravity, but there seemed
to be no clear plan to arrive at a solution with any promise
of stability. It was not sufficient to change the military
leadership in the east, while ignoring the need to engage all
the communities, especially the Banyamulenge, in a
substantive dialogue. The GDRC needed the assistance of the
international community to move further towards a solid plan.

There was also a need for the economic development of the
region, and the international community should target aid

projects with that in view.


5. (C) DPKO had received what it believed were credible reports
of Rwandans being recruited by Nkunda to strengthen his mixed
brigade. The UN had facilitated the return to Rwanda of up to
100 disaffected Rwandans who had been recruited by Nkunda.
President Kabila needed to be discouraged from furthering the
mixage of Nkunda's troops and support brassage, or full
integration.


6. (C) Guehenno believed that an agreed way forward between
Rwanda and the DRC needed to be established. Perhaps the
Tripartite Meeting in Lubumbashi would provide the venue for
the discussions of a political solution to the problem of the
FDLR (involving inevitably the settlement of some elements in
the DRC). The UN believed that the GDRC had sent a letter to
Kigali asking to engage on the FDLR and Nkunda questions.

Political Situation in Kinshasa


7. (C) At present there was no real counterweight to the power of
President Kabila. The Parliament was weak. The provinces,
which might provide a counterweight, were without sufficient
structure. The international community needed to send a
message to Kabila on the importance of checks and balances.
Just what these should be was perhaps not clear enough, but
the international community should support, he believed, the
newly created provincial institutions.


8. (C) The human rights situation remained troubling. The
harassment of opposition members continued. And there were
conflicting signals concerning the DRC commitment to good
governance. The authorities needed to know that the
international community was watching and concerned. It might
be helpful if it were made clear to Kabila the issues that he
should be prepared to discuss during the UNSC visit,
including freedom of the press and radio (which was
particularly important in the DRC).


9. (C) Nor was Bemba a symbol of good governance and democracy,
but ignoring him was not a good option. He was trying to get
in touch with Kabila. His parliamentary immunity remained,
and Guehenno understood that both the President and Vice
President of the Senate were opposed to lifting his immunity.

The Belgian Ambassador said that there was talk in Kinshasa
of a government reorganization. Perhaps Bemba might come
back as a leader of the opposition, and be treated as such,
but not treated as a force in himself. The French
representative said that the less space the government
accorded the opposition, the stronger they made Bemba. A
"radicalization" in the treatment of Bemba (e.g., trying him
in absentia) would only strengthen him.

Security Sector Reform


10. (C) Reform of the police was (relatively speaking) making
progress. Focus was therefore needed on the FARDC. MONUC
could not address this task alone; bilateral programs were
needed. The GDRC had promised an over-all strategic approach,
but none had been presented. But even without such a plan,
one could perhaps work battalion by battalion. One could also
work on the Command and Control structure (e.g., training of
the professional officer corps, support for the establishment
of a serious administrative framework that would see to
soldiers' pay, etc.)

A Framework for Engagement with the Congolese Authorities


11. (C) The GDRC had resisted a formal framework, but the
equivalent was needed. One needed to be pragmatic. Perhaps
Ambassadors should meet periodically and then engage the
government? The UK representative suggested that the UNSC
visit might provide the occasion to press Kabila to establish
a contact mechanism.
KHALILZAD