KOSOVO: CHURKIN CHAFES AGAINST SHORT MOSCOW LEASH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000442

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CHURKIN CHAFES AGAINST SHORT MOSCOW LEASH

REF: USUN NEW YORK 416

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (C) SUMMARY. Russian Ambassador to the UN Churkin shared
Moscow's latest hard line guidance on Kosovo with Ambassador
Khalilzad on June 4. Churkin said Moscow wants: no reference
to SYG Special Envoy Ahtisaari's proposal in the Security
Council resolution; at least a year of further
Belgrade-Pristina negotiations; and Security Council review
of Kosovo after those negotiations. Ambassadors Churkin and
Khalilzad quickly put aside that guidance as unhelpful. In
its place, they brainstormed about a conceptual formula that
would use an UNMIK phase-out period to simultaneously stage
Belgrade-Pristina negotiations after which the Ahtisaari
proposal would be fully implemented and UN member states
would be free to recognize Kosovo sovereignty unless the
Council expressly decided on a different course. Churkin
clearly finds such a formula attractive, especially if
selected aspects of UNSCR 1244 were to remain in force during
the negotiations. Equally clearly, however, such a way out
is unlikely to resonate in Moscow. Ambassador Khalilzad
impressed on Churkin that Moscow's hard line is increasingly
uniting most of the rest of the Council around the idea of
putting the draft resolution to a vote in the very near
future. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad met on June 4 in his office
with Russian PermRep Vitaly Churkin at the latter's request
to present Moscow's just-received guidance. Churkin came
alone. Deputy PolCounselor also participated in the meeting.


3. (C) Ambassador Churkin read very hard line instructions
from Moscow and, as he did in another recent meeting
(reftel),followed them up with more accommodating personal
observations. Translating the Moscow instructions, Churkin
said:

-- "To start with the good news, Moscow would approve
resolution language suggesting that Kosovo presents a unique
case because of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (i.e.,
Moscow will not accept language referring to the
non-consensual/violent breakup of Yugoslavia, massive
repression, extended UNMIK administration).
-- "Moscow cannot accept even 'taking note' of Ahtisaari --
we would instead have to take out (for use) some elements of
Ahtisaari regarding, for example, the rights of Serbs and the
improving of internal government mechanisms.
-- "There must be no less than a year for further
negotiations during which there would be more balanced
international mediation. (NOTE. Churkin later said Ahtisaari
might be acceptable as mediator if he would "swear on a bible
that he would be more balanced." END NOTE.)
-- "Mosow believes this (a year of negotiations) would have a
realistic chance to bring Belgrade and Pristina closer to
compromise.
-- "There must be a provision ruling out a unilateral
declaration of independence during the negotiations.
-- "The PISG must expressly recommit to implementing
Standards and ruling out violence during the negotiations.
-- "UNSCR 1244 must remain in force during the negotiations.
-- "Postponed independence and automaticity are absolutely
unacceptable. The results of the negotiations must be
reviewed by the Security Council after a year."


4. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad replied that the Moscow line
seems harder than ever and gives us nothing to talk about.
True to that observation, neither ambassador referred
directly to the Moscow points for the rest of the meeting.
Instead, Ambassador Khalilzad asked whether we might consider
a formula calling for implementation of the Ahtisaari package
after some specified transition/negotiation period unless the
results of the negotiations convinced the Council to pursue a
different course. Warming somewhat to this idea, Churkin
thought this formula might include listing of those aspects
of Ahtisaari to be implemented now and those to be
implemented after negotiations. Similarly he suggested the
Council might specify those aspects of UNSCR 1244 that would
remain in effect during the negotiation period.


5. (C) DepPol Counselor pointed out that the one-year
duration of negotiations would be problematic, even assuming
the rest of the formula were acceptable to all, because it
would put us well beyond the 120-days UNMIK's phase-out needs
make available to us. Ambassador Khalilzad pointed out that
the EU would be unlikely to agree to replace UNMIK for such
an extended period of political uncertainty. Churkin
nevertheless insisted that "I think we are very close," and
said he would report immediately to Moscow. Ambassador
Khalilzad closed the meeting by telling Churkin that Russian
intransigence had caused pressure to move the outstanding

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draft resolution to build rapidly in several Security Council
capitals, including Washington, and urged Churkin to engage
with Moscow and then with us quickly and substantively.


6. (C) COMMENT. For what little it's worth, Churkin seems to
us sincere in his desire to reach an accommodation on the way
forward on Kosovo. We devalue this apparent good faith
because it seems to have not even a shred of resonance in
Moscow. For all Churkin's openness to creative ambiguity,
the message he came to deliver was crystal clear -- Russia
continues to insist on an open-ended final status process
during which Kosovo continues in a status quo the Security
Council long ago concluded was unsustainable.
KHALILZAD