Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK435
2007-06-01 20:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

NO SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1706 AS HYBRID BASIS FOR

Tags:  CD CT PREL SU UNSC KPKO 
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VZCZCXRO3215
OO RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0435/01 1522054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 012054Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1999
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1121
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1022
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: CD CT PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: NO SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1706 AS HYBRID BASIS FOR
DARFUR

REF: A. SECSTATE 75006


B. USUN NEW YORK 00407

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: CD CT PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: NO SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1706 AS HYBRID BASIS FOR
DARFUR

REF: A. SECSTATE 75006


B. USUN NEW YORK 00407

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad convened a June 1 meeting of the
Security Council Permanent Three Members to deliver ref A
points. Participating in the meeting were UK Permanent
Representative (PR) Emyr Jones Parry, UN Counsellor Paul
Johnston, French Charge Jean-Marie Lacroix, French Counsellor
Nicolas de Riviere, French Poloff Clement LeClerc, USUN
Deputy PolCouns and Poloff.

NEED NEW RESOLUTION AS A PRACTICAL MATTER . . .
-------------- --
2.(C) Ambassador Khalilzad presented to P3 counterparts the
importance of proceeding under the authority of UNSCR 1706
(2006) to mandate the United Nations (UN) - African Union
(AU) hybrid operation in Darfur. Consistent with previous
discussions, neither UK PermRep Jones Parry nor French Charge
Lacroix saw any way for the Council to authorize the hybrid
based solely on 1706. Jones Parry commented that to do so
could hurt the Council, since 1706 never received Sudanese
consent, as indicated in OP1 of that resolution, and was
accordingly never implemented (NOTE: Jones Parry and Lacroix
made absolutely clear that the UK and France read OP1 of 1706
as requiring, vice inviting, Khartoum's consent to any UN
peacekeeping operation as a practical if not legal matter.
END NOTE). To link the hybrid to such an un-implementable
text "would not get us anywhere," Jones Parry declared. UK
Counsellor Johnston noted that de-linking the two resolutions
could also help secure Sudanese consent, since Khartoum had
objected to several provisions of 1706, including OP8(j) and
(k) on restructuring the police service and promoting rule of
law.


3. (C) French Charge Lacroix agreed, adding that 1706 had
been adopted "in a completely different context." He
expressed hope that if Sudanese consent were secured for a
new hybrid resolution, the text could potentially be adopted
by consensus, signaling "a new page" in the Council's
dealings on Darfur. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) Africa Director Titov said as much to Deputy PolCouns
on May 29 when he advised that "if you want to 'rough up
Khartoum,' go with 1706; however, if you want to try to start
a new, cooperative chapter, go with a new resolution using
the language of the UN-AU report."

. . . ALSO FOR FINANCIAL REALITIES
--------------

4. (C) In addition to the political rationale behind seeking
a new resolution on the hybrid, Jones Parry argued there were
financial reasons as well. A new resolution would be
necessary to avoid ambiguities in approaching the Fifth
Committee for funding. DPKO Africa Director Titov confirmed
this logic to Deputy PolCouns on May 29, explaining that the
UN Comptroller needed "explicit text" to implement the Addis
Ababa Agreements, beyond the scope of a letter from the
Security Council President to the Secretary-General (SYG),as
was done to finance the Heavy Support Package (HSP),or a
Presidential Statement. DPKO noted it had been hard enough
to get the UN Comptroller to move on the HSP with only a
letter, let alone on a package exceeding a billion dollars
per year.

UN-AU AGREEMENT ON REPORT STILL OUTSTANDING
--------------

5. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad stressed that effective
protection of civilians, as demanded by 1706, was essential,
a point with which both the UK and France heartily agreed.
Jones Parry said that if the hybrid report, stillQnder
negotiation between the UN and the AU, were insufficient in
this regard, "then we'll send it back to them." DPKO
Under-SYG Guehenno needed P3 support to come to an agreement
with AU Commission Chairman Konare, according to Jones Parry.
According to UKUN, SYG Ban had threatened to forgo agreement
with Konare on the hybrid report if it meant backing down on
specific provisions, presumably those dealing with command
and control. To avoid a UN-AU split on their joint
peacekeeping venture, all P3 members agreed to encourage
quietly both Ban and Konare to agree the report as soon as
possible. Otherwise, Ambassador Khalilzad warned, the
planned June 5-6 consultative briefings with the Sudanese
Government on the text would not take place and the whole
process would be delayed (NOTE: In subsequent Security
Council consultations, SYG Ban announced that the AU had
reverted with changes to the hybrid report as submitted to
the Council per ref B. We will report on these changes

USUN NEW Y 00000435 002 OF 002


septel. END NOTE).
KHALILZAD