UNSC/CHAD: NO AGREEMENT YET ON UN PEACEKEEPING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000433

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/CHAD: NO AGREEMENT YET ON UN PEACEKEEPING


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1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At May 31 United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) consultations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) Africa Director Titov updated on the security
situation in eastern Chad and on prospects for UN
peacekeeping in the region. Titov reported on conversations
that the UN team (in N'Djamena since May 21) had with FM
Allam-mi on May 28, in which Allam-mi warned a robust UN
presence in eastern Chad could harm Chadian relations with
its neighbors Sudan and Libya. Calling UNSCR 1706 - which
provided for a UN multidimensional presence in eastern Chad
and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) - "obsolete,"
Allam-mi advocated a phased approach beginning with
deployment of civilian police to protect refugees and
humanitarian workers in eastern Chad, to be followed "if
necessary" by a military deployment. Ambassador Sanders
called for IDPs to be included in any such mandate. Titov
said that the security situation in Chad necessitated
protection elements beyond police but assured that the UN
team would continue to engage with the GOC to narrow the gap
in respective peacekeeping perceptions. Some Members
suggested that DPKO pursue peacekeeping in CAR before moving
into Chad to gain credibility. Indonesia, Qatar and Russia
called for the UNSC to respect Chad's sovereignty in
authorizing any peacekeeping operation deployment. France
alluded to a plan to improve the humanitarian situation in
the region. The UN team will report its findings to the UNSC
when it returns next month. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) At May 31 UNSC consultations, DPKO Africa Director
Titov updated on the "volatile and unpredictable" security
situation on the ground in eastern Chad. Although the
Government of Chad (GOC) had lifted state of emergency
measures on May 26, anti-government rebel activity and
criminality continued, especially in the regions of Dar Tama
and Dar Sila, which now harbored 150,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) as a result of insecurity. Titov said that
Chadian authorities were distributing weapons and ammunition
to civilians to help ward off attacks and that the National
Armed Forces (ANT) had itself received new equipment and was
reinforcing its positions in the east. Titov noted that
President Deby himself had spent a good deal of time in
eastern Chad over past weeks. Despite this show of force,
Titov doubted that the GOC could protect civilians and
humanitarian workers caught in the middle. He cited an April
23 attack by unidentified gunmen on UNHCR security personnel
and a May 25 attack near Iriba that led to the suspension of
World Food Programme operations as evidence of persistent
lawlessness and insufficient government control.


3. (SBU) Director Titov described the state of UN efforts to
establish a UN peacekeeping operation in the region. In
response to FM Allam-mi's March 23 suggestion that a small
team of UN go to N'Djamena to confer with the GOC on eastern
Chad peacekeeping, the UN dispatched such a mission on May 21
for at least 30 days. The team, headed by DPKO Situation
Center Chief Francois Dureau (who had been on the two
Technical Assessment Missions to Chad),had so far met with
FM Allam-mi, members of the Chad Country Team, the African
Union (AU) office and the Inter-Ministerial Committee
established by the GOC to address the issue of the east. In
a May 28 meeting with the team, FM Allam-mi called for any
peacekeeping operation to focus on the security of the
232,000 Sudanese refugees and the humanitarian workers
attending to them. Given the deterioration of the security
situation over the past nine months, Allam-mi, according to
Titov, declared that UNSCR 1706 - which provided for a UN
multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and northeastern
CAR - had been rendered "obsolete" as a peacekeeping model.
He noted that GOC relations with Sudan had improved after
bilateral agreements reached in Tripoli and Riyadh but argued
that this process could be jeopardized by a UN military
presence in eastern Chad, as could GOC relations with
northern neighbor Libya.


4. (SBU) According to Titov, Allam-mi had advocated a phased
approach to eastern Chad peacekeeping, beginning with
deployment of civilian police to protect refugees and
humanitarian workers, to be followed "if necessary" by a
military deployment. Titov noted that this approach deviated
from UN thinking in two main ways: first, its scope of
protection focused only on refugees and humanitarian workers,
whereas DPKO assessed that IDPs need the same level of

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protection; and second, it presupposed use of mobile units
outside refugee camps, something DPKO assessed could be
carried out only by military personnel, not/not gendarmes.
Titov assured that the UN team would continue to engage with
the GOC to narrow this gap in respective peacekeeping
perceptions and would explore all configurations and stages
of deployment. In response to comments by the Qatari
delegate, Titov added that the UN would be flexible in taking
on board regional agreements like those of Tripoli and Riyadh
but with the understanding that their signatories would be
equally forthcoming with the GOC. Titov commented that
peacekeeping was not the only option in eastern Chad, adding
that a strong political process would also be effective.


5. (SBU) On CAR, Titov acknowledged that President Bozize
remained supportive of UN peacekeeping there and that the UN
team would travel to CAR as part of its mission. Several
Members - including Qatar, Slovakia, Belgium and Indonesia -
advocated for the UN to begin a robust peacekeeping
deployment in CAR before moving to eastern Chad as a way to
create a stabilizing effect and to avoid holding CAR hostage
to Chadian reticence. Titov explained that Chad and CAR
peacekeeping were initially considered a package for reasons
of logistics and command and control, but he made clear that
the UN team would examine ways to delink deployment of a UN
operation in one country from that in the other. He noted
that the security problem in CAR was not limited to the area
in and around Birao, and he also mentioned the latest flow of
cross-border refugees into the country.


6. (SBU) In addition to Qatar, several other Members
suggested that DPKO needed to consider regional efforts to
calm the Chad situation. French PermRep de La Sabliere said
the fact that the nascent implementation of the Tripoli
Agreements between Chad and Sudan could not be ignored and
could signal a "fragile improvement" in Khartoum-N'Djamena
relations. De La Sabliere, like Ambassador Sanders and
Russian Deputy PermRep Dolgov, stressed that any peacekeeping
force should address the needs of IDPs and of local
populations. De La Sabliere (who in the past has said that
the Chad situation was not merely a by-product of Darfur
violence but had its own independent issues meriting
international attention) noted that the eastern Chad
situation owed much to the Darfur crisis, and he alluded to a
plan from Paris to improve the humanitarian situation in the
region (COMMENT. Presumably de La Sabliere was referring to
some variety of humanitarian corridor through Chad into
Darfur. END COMMENT).


7. (SBU) Indonesia, Qatar and Russia reminded the UNSC to
respect Chad's sovereignty in authorizing any deployment, but
the Indonesian Deputy PermRep pointed out that at the same
time, the GOC must be reminded of its responsibility to
protect its own population. Russian Deputy PermRep Dolgov
suggested another meeting with a GOC official in New York to
address eastern Chad peacekeeping, stressing the importance
of working with local and central authorities on the issue.
KHALILZAD