Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK430
2007-06-01 14:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

DEMARCHE RESPONSE SOMALIA PKO CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Tags:  UNSC PREL SO MOPS 
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VZCZCXRO2854
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0430 1521450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011450Z JUN 07 ZEL ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1992
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000430 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C E D COPY (PARAS RENUMBERED)

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IO AND AF FOR FRONT FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017
TAGS: UNSC PREL SO MOPS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE SOMALIA PKO CONTINGENCY PLANNING

REF: SECSTATE 73567

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000430

SIPDIS

C O R R E C E D COPY (PARAS RENUMBERED)

SIPDIS

IO AND AF FOR FRONT FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017
TAGS: UNSC PREL SO MOPS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE SOMALIA PKO CONTINGENCY PLANNING

REF: SECSTATE 73567

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Sanders told DPKO's Africa
Division chief that proper planning and preparation for a UN
peacekeeping operation are essential to support any progress
in the Somali political process. Titov reported that DPKO
has begun limited military planning and will present a "range
of options" when the SYG briefs the UNSC on the situation in
Somalia in mid to late June. Titov said "politically
permissive conditions" and full deployment of AMISOM forces
were prerequisite to further UN involvement in Somalia. END
SUMMARY.

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DPKO Planning Moving
Forward Slowly
--------------


2. (C) AMB Jackie Sanders delivered reftel demarche points to
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Africa Director
Dimitri Titov on May 31. AMB Sanders opened the meeting by
asking Titov for an update on DPKO contingency planning for
Somalia, emphasizing that UNSCR 1744 and the April 30 PRST
had instructed DPKO to begin planning for a UN mission to
replace AMISOM. Titov responded that DPKO has begun work on
a "range of options" to be presented to the Council when the
SYG's office briefs the Council on the situation in Somalia
in June. (NOTE: The briefing is tentatively set for June 14.
END NOTE.) Titov said that his military planning team's
preliminary estimate is that a PKO mission to Somalia with a
"limited mandate" would require at least twenty thousand
soldiers to provide security in the Mogadishu, Baidoa and
Kismayo triangle.


3. (C) Titov said that the forthcoming report would be based
on "several assumptions" regarding the conditions under which
a UN force would deploy:

-- Political progress that created a permissive political
environment for a peacekeeping deployment.
-- A successful, inclusive National Reconciliation Congress.
-- A sustainable ceasefire.
-- Full deployment of AMISOM forces.


4. (C) AMB Sanders responded that the conditions for a UN
deployment of a UN force were an issue for Council
consideration and that the Council had already instructed the
UN to begin military planning for a UN deployment to replace
AMISOM. Titov rebutted that the situation in Mogadishu is
"frankly mayhem" and the Council could not expect that a UN
peacekeeping force would deploy into a hostile environment.

--------------
DPKO Looking at Ways to
Support AMISOM
--------------


5. (C) Titov said that the UN has begun looking at ways that
the UN can support AMISOM's deployment. Titov said that a
robust AMISOM deployment would help set the stage for further
UN engagement. Titov said he plans to meet with AU
representatives in the next few days to discuss the
possibility of expanded UN support for AMISOM and the U.S.
should be prepared for the "standard AU request for funding
and equipment."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) Working-level DPKO and DPA contacts have told USUN
officers that they are reluctant to deploy UN peacekeepers to
an operational environment as hostile as Somalia. France,
Belgium and Italy will likely couch their opposition to
further UN engagement in Somalia by echoing DPKO's insistence
on first establishing permissive political conditions. As a
first step in counteracting these nay-sayers, we should
consider putting forward a PRST that sets attainable
political objectives for the upcoming Somali National
Reconciliation Congress.

KHALILZAD