Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK401
2007-05-22 00:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USUN New York
Cable title:  

LEBANON TRIBUNAL: CHATAH CONSULTS P-3 AND OTHERS

Tags:  PREL PTER UNSC SY LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0401/01 1420027
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220027Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1933
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000401 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

FOR IO AND NEA FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON TRIBUNAL: CHATAH CONSULTS P-3 AND OTHERS
ON NEXT STEPS

REF: USUN 399

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000401

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

FOR IO AND NEA FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON TRIBUNAL: CHATAH CONSULTS P-3 AND OTHERS
ON NEXT STEPS

REF: USUN 399

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and Comment: P-3 Ambassadors met May 21 with
GOL Foreign Policy Advisor Mohamad Chatah, who said the
recent violence in Lebanon argued for accelerating action in
the Security Council. Chatah said the GOL would prefer a
vote on the tribunal May 25 even if it meant the resolution
received only 9-10 votes. Chatah subsequently met with the
Russian and Qatari PermReps, who raised familiar concerns
about the legal and political consequences of Council action.
Chatah is scheduled to meet representatives of China,
Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Slovakia, and South Africa on
May 22. The Lebanese also remain in close contact with the
UN's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). Separately, the Qatari
mission made a half-hearted effort May 21 to seek a Security
Council press statement on the bombings in Lebanon, an effort
that could be construed as a delaying tactic.


2. (C) The P-3 expect to formally table the resolution in the
Council on May 23 and schedule a vote as early as May 25.
Acting Foreign Minister Mitri is scheduled to arrive May 23.
The Lebanese mission plans to host a P-3 breakfast with
PermReps on May 23 followed by an afternoon meeting of
experts to review the lobbying effort and the anticipated
vote count. Based on these meetings, we will be able to
judge any need for revisions to the text and whether we can
meet the May 25th target date. P-3 Ambassadors suggested to
Chatah it would be helpful if Prime Minister Siniora
postponed his trip to Jakarta scheduled for this week and
focused on reaching out to leaders in Security Council states
more likely to support the tribunal resolution. USUN
recommends that Siniora also urge the Saudis to engage at a
senior level with key states and urge other like-minded Arab
leaders to do the same. USUN also recommends that calls by
regional Assistant Secretaries take place by May 23, with
more senior calls by the Secretary and others around May 24.
End Summary and Comment.

Chatah and P-3

--------------


3. (C) During a meeting with P-3 Ambassadors on May 21, GOL
Foreign Policy Advisor Mohamad Chatah argued that, in light
of the recent fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces and
Fatah al-Islam in Tripoli as well as the bombings in Beirut,
the tribunal UNSCR should be adopted as soon as possible.
The GOL would prefer a resolution with 9-10 votes on May 25
than a resolution with possibly 12 or more votes on June 1.
P-3 Ambassadors agreed that a May 25 vote was a good target
and that we should re-assess our position on May 23,
following P-3 demarches in UNSC capitals. They also agreed
that if we push for a vote on May 25, we should formally
table the draft in the Council May 23, or May 24 at the
latest. Chatah said that GOL Acting Foreign Minister Tariq
Mitri, along with GOL Ambassadors-designate to the U.S. and
the UN, would arrive in New York on May 23 to supplement the
P-3 lobbying effort with UNSC members. Chatah also reported
that PM Siniora still planned to leave for Indonesia on the
evening of May 23, but said the Prime Minister could change
his plans if the P-3 advised that his presence was needed in
Beirut to place phone calls to UNSC heads of state or
government.


4. (C) Reviewing P-3 bilateral discussions with UNSC members
on May 18, French PR de la Sabliere and Ambassador Khalilzad
agreed we should focus on securing support from Panama, Peru,
Congo, and Ghana in order to reach the necessary nine votes
in the Council. They also noted that Peru and Panama have
serious legal concerns about the text, while Congo has
concerns about the consequences for Lebanon's stability of
establishing the tribunal under Chapter VII. The two
Ambassadors judged that South Africa, Indonesia, Qatar,
Russia, and China are all unlikely to support the draft
resolution. Therefore, they recommended that the GOL
continue to lobby those countries, but focus its primary
efforts on those African and Latin countries more likely to
support the resolution and whom we need to obtain 9 votes.
The UK reported that Ghana, despite expressing preliminary
support for the draft resolution on May 18, clarified over
the weekend that its Foreign Minister might have legal
concerns about the draft. Accra has not yet finalized
instructions for its mission in New York.


5. (C) When asked about a Panamanian suggestion to leave the


door open for the Lebanese parliamentary process to succeed
even after the adoption of the resolution (reftel),Chatah
said the GOL could accept language stipulating that the
tribunal will be established by a certain date -- he
mentioned either May 31st or June 5th as possibilities --
unless the Lebanese parliament acts to ratify the UN-GOL
agreement and statute before that time. He also said that
the GOL did not have a preference between the "light" option
of bringing the agreement into effect and the "heavy" option
of the Council deciding to establish the tribunal. All that
Lebanon cared about, Chatah emphasized, was that the
resolution be adopted quickly.

Lebanese Lobbying Report
--------------


6. (C) Lebanese Charge Caroline Ziade reported to USUN May
21 that Chatah had met Russian PR Churkin, who said the
Russian delegation wanted to engage at an expert level on
questions related to how matters related to establishment of
the tribunal -- chiefly the appointment of judges and
location of the tribunal -- would be addressed if the
Lebanese parliament remained blocked. He also said Russia
feared that by adopting this resolution the Security Council
is playing the role of the Lebanese parliament. He reported
that the "joke" among Security Council members is that this
effort will serve as a precedent for the Council to impose
the Kyoto Treaty on the United States. Nonetheless, Churkin
committed to a serious review of the resolution. Russian DPR
Dolgov told USUN separately that Moscow also has a serious
problem with a Chapter VII resolution.


7. (C) Ziade said that Qatari PR Nasser had expressed
concerns about the use of Chapter VII, arguing that
introducing Chapter VII into the Lebanese political dynamic
would harm the reputation and credibility of the tribunal.
He echoed Russian questions about the issues of judges and
location. Nasser also repeated Qatari fears about the
consequences for Lebanese stability, but said he would report
Chatah's views to Doha.


8. (C) Ziade confirmed that the Lebanese continue to consult
with OLA. OLA is prepared to respond to any questions from
delegations on legal precedents. Chatah is scheduled to meet
the missions of China, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru,
Slovakia, and South Africa May 22. The Lebanese mission will
host a breakfast for P-3 PermReps May 23 and a meeting of P-3
experts in the afternoon; acting Foreign Minister al-Mitri
also arrives the afternoon of May 23.

Qatari Considers UNSC Press Statement
--------------


9. (C) The Qatari delegation consulted with USUN and other
delegations May 21 about a possible press statement on the
recent bombings in Lebanon. The Lebanese mission told the
Qataris that no action should be taken until Mitri arrive in
New York. The Qataris showed USUN a draft statement that
merely condemned the bombings, but agreed as of COB May 21 to
take no further action at this juncture.
KHALILZAD