UNSC/DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY ELIASSON TELLS COUNCIL

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SENSITIVE
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY ELIASSON TELLS COUNCIL
TO SET HIGH MARKERS FOR POLITICAL PROCESS


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1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In back-to-back meetings with Ambassador
Khalilzad and with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Permanent Five Members on May 17, UN Special Envoy (SE) for
Sudan Jan Eliasson recommended the Council set high markers
for all parties to the Darfur peace process to help move
along the three-track approach he outlined in his "roadmap":
convergence of initiatives to consolidate the positions of
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory movements,
pre-negotiations and, finally, invitation to formal talks.
Eliasson suggested the Council speak with one voice in urging
movements to prepare for negotiations, reminding Sudan's
neighbors to abide by their April 29 Tripoli commitments, and
calling on the Government of National Unity (GNU) stop aerial
bombardments and listen to "reasonable requests" from DPA
non-signatories. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) In May 17 meetings with Ambassador Khalilzad and
then with the UNSC P5 Members, SE Eliasson emphasized that
for Darfur peacekeeping to succeed, there must be a peace to
keep. He described his and African Union SE Salim's efforts
to convince parties to the Darfur conflict that there was no
military solution but acknowledged that a faction of the GNU
still held out hope for such an outcome. Eliasson reported
he had urged the GNU to refrain from aerial bombardments,
which it had done between February 11 and April 19, a lull
that needed to be sustained for the political process to
begin. Eliasson believed that GNU fears about the threat
Darfur instability posed to Sudanese cohesion and to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement were enough to keep Khartoum
from pursuing military victory in Darfur. Eliasson believed
President Bashir favored the political process but, like the
international community, was not open to re-negotiating the
DPA, just to amending it as needed.


3. (SBU) According to Eliasson, the non-signatory movements
were too politically and ideologically splintered ever to
unite (he counted at least 12-14 factions at this point).
The international community's best hope was to consolidate
their positions. He said the movements did however share
three basic demands they considered unaddressed by the DPA:
power-sharing, including a unified Darfur region and a
Darfurian vice-presidential slot; wealth-sharing, including
more money to the Darfur compensation fund; and security
issues, namely janjaweed-free returns for displaced
populations. Eliasson noted the logistical challenges he
faced in physically accessing the rebel movements and agreed
that the rainy season in the region would further complicate
the situation and delay the political process.


4. (SBU) Eliasson envisioned a three-stage political process,
as outlined in the "roadmap" he and Salim drafted for the
Secretary-General. Stage One was the convergence of

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initiatives to consolidate the rebel movements, to occur in
the coming weeks. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) had credibility with the rebel group the Sudan
Liberation Army and with "mediator" Eritrea, and GNU First
Vice President Salva Kiir made clear the SPLM's intention to
play a role in consolidating movements. Eliasson reported
the UN's intention to assist the SPLM in convening a meeting
of non-signatories in Juba. Eliasson noted the efforts of
Egypt, Libya, Chad and Eritrea, as well as by the Community
of Sant'Egidio, to gather non-signatories but warned there
was too much competition between initiatives. He called upon
the P5 to use its influence to ensure Phase One success,
including by reminding regional players of their commitments
made on April 29 in Tripoli to allow the UN and AU to
coordinate all initiatives.


5. (SBU) Eliasson's Phase Two was the pre-negotiation phase,
involving shuttle diplomacy and significant resources (NOTE:
Eliasson met with the SYG after the P5 meeting to request
this type of support. END NOTE),to take place in June.
Eliasson requested P5 assistance in urging the
non-signatories to accelerate their preparation for eventual
negotiations with the GNU. He recommended allowing three to
four weeks for this process in order to prevent movements'
resorting to "maximalist" positions or possibly to
confrontation.


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6. (SBU) The third and final phase was that of invitation to
and conduct of negotiation, envisioned for July. Eliasson
requested P5 assistance to his and Salim's efforts to make
this stage the priority by setting high benchmarks for the
movements and the GNU to make good-faith efforts at
negotiation. In response to a suggestion by Ambassador
Khalilzad that the parties be brought together to hash out
their differences, Eliasson recommended first strengthening
the negotiating teams from both sides and allowing Eliasson
and Salim to "massage" them. Eliasson said he did not mind
the "sanctions drum beating in the background" to keep the
political process moving forward, but he cautioned that a
"serious chance" existed with the parties to move forward.


7. (SBU) In addition to delays posed by the advent of the
rainy season, Eliasson pointed out three other possible
obstacles to the peace process. First was the potential
explosion of new tribal fighting, whose impact he described
as eclipsing that of rebel and GNU violence. Second was the
"radicalization" and militarization of refugee and IDP camps,
and finally was desertifiction, which Eliasson saw as
resulting in the loss of eight to ten kilometers of land in
the region per year.


8. (SBU) Members welcomed Eliasson's roadmap and expressed
readiness to assist his efforts. Chinese Deputy PermRep Liu
hoped for political progress during the summer, going so far
as to specify his wish that the situation be resolved by the
start of the General Assembly in September.
KHALILZAD