RESPONSE TO NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000399

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. SECSTATE 65750


B. SECSTATE 66637

C. USUN NEW YORK 00374


1. (SBU) PolMinsCouns and Poloff delivered ref A and B points
to United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) Assistant-Secretary General Hedi Annabi, DPKO Africa
Division Director Dmitry Titov, DPKO Military Planning
Service Chief Ian Sinclair and DPKO Office of Mission Support
Senior Logistics Officer Peter McGhie on May 16.


2. (SBU) On the joint UN-African Union (AU) report on the
hybrid operation for Darfur, Annabi had yet to connect with
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit to
confirm the need for UN-AU agreement on the text by May 18.
Annabi was firm that no concessions would be made on
substance of the report, especially command and control, but
that "cosmetic" changes would be possible. Annabi
acknowledged that the UN would ultimately receive no credit
for the hybrid, as it would be touted as an AMIS success,
despite the fact that it would be UN-controlled and
Commanded. Annabi noted that Djinnit was aware of this
reality, whereas AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare
was not. Annabi requested USG assistance in convincing the
AU on this point, and Missionoffs relayed that demarches
would be conducted with the AU and some of its member
countries.


3. (SBU) Once UN-AU agreement was secured, Annabi said the
hybrid report would be transmitted to the UN Security Council
(UNSC) and to the AU Peace and Security Council, after which
"consultative briefings" would be conducted with Khartoum to
inform the Government of National Unity (GNU). Annabi
stressed that these would be consultations, not negotiations.
Annabi noted that this approach differed from that offered
by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in a May 11 meeting with the
P3 (ref C),who had reported that the report would go
simultaneously to the UNSC, the AU PSC and the GNU. Annabi
feared that if the GNU saw the report first, "we will
negotiate forever" on its provisions, whereas securing UNSC
and AU PSC agreement ahead of time would increase the
report's appeal to Khartoum.


4. (SBU) On the substance of the hybrid report, Annabi and
Titov were emphatic that operational control would
"absolutely" come from the UN. Annabi and Titov said that
the Addis Ababa coordination cell could not by definition
serve as an alternate command post and would consist of
mostly UN personnel, despite its being under AU auspices. On
incorporating language for a strong mandate to protect
civilians and humanitarian operations, as well as to disarm
the janjaweed, Titov said that the resultant UNSC resolution
should amplify these elements, which would be featured in the
report though without a specific Chapter VII reference.
Titov added that a UNSC stop in Khartoum during its June
mission to Africa could go a long way in getting the GNU on
board with any hybrid resolution under consideration at that
point.


5. (SBU) Annabi reported that the UN was making decisions on
Heavy Support Package (HSP) troop contributions and solicited
USG assistance in shoring up additional African troop
contributions for the Heavy Support Package, since the only
viable offers to date were from Egypt and Nigeria. He noted
there were no African engineering units or attack helicopters
pledged (Sinclair interjected that Jordan had recently put a
hold on its pledges of attack helicopters). Annabi pointed
out that the UN could not force deployment of certain troop
contributors on a host country if that country did not accept
them, and he enlisted USG assistance in convincing Khartoum
of the need to take non-African offers (such as Pakistan,
Jordan, Thailand, Bangladesh and China - all Sudan's
"friends," according to Annabi). Annabi believed that the UN
now had in hand sufficient TCC pledges for HSP requirements,
although they were mostly non-African.


6. (SBU) On China's pledge of an engineering unit, Titov
reported that the Chinese Ministry of Defense rejected the
proposal to move an existing Chinese unit from the UN Mission
in the Sudan (UNMIS) in order to expedite HSP deployment.
Titov was not optimistic that the new Chinese unit would

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deploy by August, as the Chinese suggested, given their
history of delayed deployment. On overall deployment of the
three stages of AMIS assistance, Annabi was cautious in
responding to USUN's push for tandem flow deployment. Annabi
acknowledged that the plan was "all one process," but warned
that the HSP was the backbone of what the hybrid operation
would ultimately be and without a majority of HSP elements as
"stepping stones" in place, hybrid success could be
jeopardized from the outset.


7. (SBU) Annabi reported that $60 million had been authorized
by the ACABQ for HSP funding. McGhie confirmed that a UN
officer of Somali descent was working well with the walis of
the three Darfur states (citing his language skills and
cultural knowledge as major factors),obviating the need for
USG pressure on the GNU on issues of water surveys,
permission for water use and designation of land for the HSP.
McGhie said identifying water sources was not the problem in
Nyala that it was in El Fasher and described plans for the
"super-camp" to be constructed in South Darfur. McGhie
reported that UN contracting with PA&E for construction was
"moving nicely." McGhie was pleased to hear that the USG
would finalize the contract for expansion of all seven camps
for the AMIS plus-up within a week and that the priority
camps could be ready by July/August.


8. (SBU) COL Sinclair noted that expansion of these seven
camps was the "cornerstone" of AMIS sector restructuring,
since the Force Commander refused to move from eight to three
sectors until the two additional battalions from Nigeria and
Rwanda were in place to provide force protection. Deployment
of these battalions in turn was predicated on camp expansion,
as well as to the provision of transport. Sinclair said that
the Cairo linked its pledge of 36 APCs to the infantry troops
it offered for the hybrid and that the GOE was not willing to
lease these APCs to other battalions besides its own,
effectively taking the Egyptian offer off the table. Titov
gave no specific indication of how much of the Egyptian
pledges DPKO would be able to accept, saying only it would
not be the whole package. Sinclair appealed to the USG for
assistance in this regard, saying that ideally the Nigerian
and Rwandan battalions should come equipped with their own
APCs and corresponding equipment or should appeal to donors
to supply them.


9. (SBU) Finally, on the issue of appointments, Annabi said
the UN was trying to persuade Konare to de-link the
announcement of Force Commander (FC) with the announcement of
Deputy FC, on which the Rwandan candidate was not yet
confirmed. Annabi reported that FC GEN Agwai would be in New
York and in Washington for consultations on May 17-18 and
would hopefully arrive in Sudan before the UNSC Mission
arrived in mid-June. Annabi assured that Agwai would have a
coterie of "trusted" UN advisors. Titov reported that there
was no UN movement yet on appointment of a Special
Representative for UNMIS, adding that "you (the USG) probably
know more about it than we do."


10. (SBU) USUN inquired about the status of the UN mission to
Chad, and Annabi reported that a delegation consisting of
police and military planners, humanitarian representatives,
logistics and political officer would depart for N'djamena
May 22 and remain for at least 30 days. Titov noted,
however, that the team would have no power of negotiation but
would only explain the concept and modalities of UN
peacekeeping for eastern Chad.
KHALILZAD