UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE REVIVED IN THE GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000394

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION
TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR
SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE REVIVED IN THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, G-4 SEEKS NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 59528

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Permanent
Representative, for reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary and Comment. The debate on Security Council
expansion has flashed hot again in New York, in the wake of
the report of the most recent set of facilitators to tackle
this long-running issue. Disappointed with the content of
the report, the G-4 countries are seeking new facilitators
with a mandate to move the membership towards a negotiation
on the "elements" of a resolution. Their opponents are
strongly opposed to a new facilitators process and any
discussion of options that go beyond those contained in the
most recent report. The decision on how to proceed now
(uneasily) rests with GA President Khalifa, who had sought to
avoid this very predicament from the start. Whatever she
chooses, she is likely to upset a number of influential PRs
in New York.


2. (C) There is a very real chance of a return to the
contentious debates of the summer of 2005. The lip service
paid to "flexibility" by the key protagonists over the past
year has quickly evaporated, now that specific alternatives
are being discussed. The G-4 cannot accept a process that
would appear to eliminate the possibility of new permanent
seats. At the same time, their opponents feel threatened by
a process that could lead to another vote getting exercise,
particularly in Africa. End Summary and Comment.

Security Council Expansion Debate:
Back to the Future


3. (C) General Assembly (GA) President Khalifa faces a
difficult and contentious decision on the way forward on
Security Council expansion. The sharp, negative exchanges
that characterized the debate on expansion in 2005, but had
been largely absent over the past year, re-emerged during the
GA's May 3 - 4 debates. These meetings of the "Open Ended
Working Group" on Council reform were organized by Khalifa to
respond to her facilitators' report released in April and to
establish a GA process on Council Reform for the rest of the
61st Session. Ambassador Khalilzad delivered the U.S.
statement, reaffirming U.S. support for expansion and for
Japan's permanent membership, while noting the importance of
comprehensive reform of the entire UN organization. His
statement is available via the USUN website (www.un.int/usa).


4. (C) The G-4 (India, Brazil, Japan and Germany) used the
debate to call on Khalifa to appoint one or two new
facilitators to draft an "options paper" on Council expansion
by the middle of June. This paper would lay out specific
options for Council expansion, including: expansion of both
permanent and non-permanent members (the G-4 approach);
interim expansion in a new, semi-permanent category (as
advocated by the facilitators); or expansion of non-permanent
members only. Publicly, the G-4 is calling for the creation
of such an elements paper as a means to kick start the
process of negotiation on a text. They admit privately,
though, that their first priority is to get such a paper
prior to this summer's African Union Summit and try to break
the current African common position, which is widely
understood to be preventing a number of potential supporters
from joining the G-4.


5. (C) The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group of G-4 opponents
(led by Pakistan, Italy and Korea) objects to the call for
new facilitators. UFC delegations accuse the G-4 of trying
"to switch horses mid-stream" after getting a facilitators'
report that concluded that new permanent seats were probably
not achievable at this time. UFC delegations have asked
Khalifa to continue consultations on the basis of the
facilitators' report. Pakistani PR Munir Akram said, "Either
accept the report as the basis for future work or do not --
you cannot have it both ways." UFC is worried that the G-4
will capitalize on the "new momentum" created by the
facilitators' report and the process established by the GA
President, without being forced to accept the idea that new
permanent seats are not viable at this time.

A New G-4 Plan?



5. (C/NF) At the same time, there are rumors in New York that
the G-4 has developed a new plan for Council expansion. An
Italian colleague told USUN that the plan would include five
new permanent seats (two elected from the entire membership,
and one each reserved for Africa, Asia and Latin America) and
four new non-permanent seats (one each for Eastern Europe,
Latin America, Africa and Asia). Among the rumors is some
confusion about exactly which G-4 countries are said to be in
favor of this approach, and whether or not all of the details
of the proposal, including potential recall clauses, have
been agreed. (Note: In our bilateral discussions, G-4
delegations have offered USUN no indication that Q a
proposal is in the works.)


6. (C) During the GA debate, Pakistan's Akram left no doubt
that UFC delegations would respond negatively to the G-4's
introduction of such a proposal: "There should be no
pre-emptive moves or arbitrary presentations by anyone. Such
moves would destroy the process and undermine momentum, with
theQuences we all witnessed in 2005."

Why does the G-4 want new facilitators?


7. (C) Conventional wisdom in New York is that the air had
come out of the Security Council expansion balloon over the
past year. A German contact told USUN that delegations that
had co-sponsored the G-4 resolution in 2005 had lost their
enthusiasm for the expansion debate. The Germans blame this
diminishing support on the lack of cohesion among the G-4
(which they primarily attribute to Japanese courtship of U.S.
support). Others attribute it to a general sense of fatigue
after more than a decade of debates on this topic with little
sense that compromise was near.


8. (C) The G-4 seek to capitalize on the sense of "new
momentum" established by the facilitators' report to
re-energize their base. However, they remain opposed to the
substance of the report, in particular its suggestion that
the best way forward is an interim solution that does not
include new permanent seats. The G-4 needs to turn the GA
process into one that allows for the re-introduction of their
basic position. Consultations on the basis of the current
report are unlikely to give them this window, and they appear
unwilling to introduce a revised proposal on their own as a
stand-alone document, understanding that it will receive a
lukewarm reception and could be attacked as an effort to
undermine the President's process.


9. (C) At the same time, the G-4 continues to see African
support as the key to achieving the two-thirds majority in
the GA required for passage. India, in particular, has been
aggressively courting African support for expansion in both
categories through a "South Initiative". (Note: Though our
knowledge of this initiative is incomplete, we understand
that they have hosted a series of meetings of developing
countries to develop proposals on reform initiatives like
Council expansion and GA revitalization.)


10. (C) The G-4 would like the Africans to be presented with
a series of options on expansion prior to their Summit this
summer. Their proposal for a new facilitators' process is
designed to narrow the choices on paper (presumably
eliminating as unrealistic the African position of two
permanent seats with a veto),leaving the Africans with the
choice between a smaller, interim expansion and a modified
G-4 proposal. The G-4 believe that, given such a choice, at
least some Africans would choose the G-4 model, breaking the
African consensus position and opening the door to a
vote-getting push on the continent. (Comment: The G-4 has
been confounded by African decision-making in the past, and
it is not clear to us that their scenario will play out as
expected, even if the President appoints facilitators with
the mandate they seek.)

And the P-5?


11. (C) China and Russia are concerned that the G-4 may have
found a way to capitalize on the report and advance their
aggressive Council expansion proposal. Though they both seek
to avoid the spotlight on this issue, the Chinese explicitly
called on the GA President, during the GA debate, not to
appoint new facilitators. China's DPR said that it was too


soon to begin a negotiation, given the wide disparity of
views among the membership and the sensitive national
interests at stake. The Chinese have told us that they plan
to call on Khalifa at the Ambassadorial-level to reinforce
the point.


12. (C/NF) The UK and France reiterated their support of the
individual G-4 candidate countries. France, a G-4 co-sponsor
in 2005, expressed support for negotiations, but noted that
"none of the previous resolutions have the necessary
support", a comment that was not welcomed by the G-4. The UK
never actually co-sponsored the G-4 resolution, though they
were publicly supportive of the proposal. Privately, UKUN
officers have been more skeptical about the benefits of
expansion than their national statements. They remain
concerned about any discussion that calls attention to the
"special status" of permanent members.

The Facilitators' Interim Solution


13. (C) The five facilitators drafted their report (emailed
to IO in April) based on more than two months of
consultations with a broad range of delegations. Their
report demonstrates a strong bias towards an "interim" or
"transitional" approach to enlarging the Council, which would
result in a moderate expansion of seats in a new,
"semi-permanent" category. However, they did not lay out any
of the details of a specific proposal for expansion on an
interim basis, or what sort of review mechanism is
anticipated, leaving these issues "for negotiations."


14. (C) The facilitators' approach, which includes a call for
the "widest possible political acceptance" of any proposed
expansion model, beyond the legally required minimums
established by the Charter, is based on an understanding
among them (Dutch PR Majoor in particular) that the debate
along established G-4/UFC lines was going nowhere.


15. (U) The facilitators' report is available at www.un.org/ga/
president/61/letters/SC-reform-Facil-report-2 0-April-07.pdf
KHALILZAD